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I. INTRODUCTICSî 
Investment plans, whether at the national, regional, or sectoral 
level are the core of development plans. In order to reach national 
objectives the investment projects must be properly selected. In terms 
of national planning the stated objectives generally refer to the growth 
in national income, balance of payments equilibrium, a reduction in 
uneiq)loyment or underemployment, price stability, etc. The selection of 
investment projects must be consistent and appropriate with these general 
objectives of national economic policy. 
In terms of regional planning, the stated objectives generally refer 
to the growth and balanced development of the different ragions that con­
stitute the nation. For this, one generally looks for the possibility of 
utilizing to the fullest extent possible the available resources of each 
region. A properly worked out investment plan must allow for the neces­
sary compatibility between national development plans and regional 
development plans. 
The national investment program is also directly related to sector 
planning, be it with respect to the selection of those sectors which are 
considered to be of higher priority than others or with respect to 
specific activities that are to be given priorities within those sectors 
or with respect to the desired and/or required rates of growth as im­
plicitly derived from the general objectives stated in the national 
development plan. Because of this an investment program is necessarily 
a major component of a national development plan. A separation between 
the selection of projects and planning at the national level necessarily 
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brings about a series of effects that must obstruct the fulfillment of the 
objectives of the development plan. 
In this thesis we will initially revise the major criteria that are 
in use to evaluate investment expenditures. In the analysis of these 
criteria we will show systematically how such criteria when used as an 
instrument of analysis allow us to translate the incidence of an invest­
ment project in terms of the stated objectives in the development plan. 
Given this we will be in a position to establish whether the selected 
projects are consistent and compatible with the already defined objec­
tives. In other words, with the application of project evaluation 
criteria from the social point of view we will search for a comparison, 
selection, ordering and quantification of the social economic effects of 
the projects in portfolio and/or projects in execution and their con­
sistency with stated national objectives. 
In Chapter II we present a review of project evaluation criteria. 
First, we consider the traditional or commercial criteria which are very 
frequently used as decision criteria for capital expenditures. Above 
criteria are not particularly useful in the evaluation of the large-
scale public investment projects subsequently analyzed in this thesis. 
But their Inclusion is nevertheless useful because frequently minor sub­
components of the investment program, as related to specific Investment 
projects, could usefully utilize these types of criteria. 
Initially we analyze the so-called crude investment criteria. In 
what follows we make reference to five of these which in our opinion are 
the most representative of such criteria. Among these, we have the 
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pay-back method. This method gives us the time necessary during which 
the initial investment will be totally recovered. Next we refer to the 
method of the average arithmetic rate of return, which compares the 
average annual net income with the initial investment. On the other 
hand the annual cost method looks for that project among available proj­
ects which results in the minimum annual cost. The annual return on 
capital employed method relates the net profit generated to the capital 
employed during the lifetime of the several projects. The fifth crude 
evaluation criterion is commonly known as the MÀF1 method as formulated 
by the Machinery and Allied Products Institute. This method not only 
determines the average return of the investment but also permits the 
selection of the optimal moment of time at which to renovate fixed 
capital. 
The common characteristic of these five crude investment criteria is 
that none of them considers the value aspect of money over time; that is, 
none of these methods uses a discounting approach. We illustrate these 
characteristics, advantages, disadvantages, etc. with particular examples. 
In the next section we analyze the method of net present value and the 
internal rate of return. In the discussion of these criteria we also 
make reference to possible variations and conventions utilized in their 
practical application. 
The above traditional methods have repeatedly proven their value as 
a criterion for the selection of investment projects in the private 
sector. But their usefulness within the context of a large-scale invest­
ment program is limited. The arguments against traditional commercial 
criteria are discussed in greater detail subsequently. 
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In Chapter III we present the conceptual basis of social benefit-
cost analysis. Initially we start out with the basic postulates of the 
perfectly competitive model and its Implication in the evaluation of 
projects both for a well-developed economy and for a lesser-developed 
economy. Given the existence of certain market imperfections in the 
economics of lesser-developed countries the prices generated in the 
several commodity and factor markets do not truly reflect the social 
opportunity cost of the factors of production. 
The causes of these imperfections are quite diverse. Among those 
occurring most frequently are those of a fixed or institutionally deter­
mined wage rate, controlled exchange rates, an attempt to fix the prices 
of specific commodities as a matter of social policy, the existence of 
monopolistic and monopsonistlc market structures, etc. Given these 
conditions it is often necessary when evaluating an investment project 
to adjust the prices of the principal inputs and outputs so that they 
may reflect their real social opportunity cost. In this context we 
analyze the currently most advanced methodologies with respect to the 
proper selection of the social rate of discount to be subsequently used 
in project evaluation. Specifically we analyze the selection of the 
social rate of discount taking into account the criterion of social 
opportunity cost and taking into account the social time preference rate 
approach. 
Given this we present the theoretical basis for the determination of 
the shadow price of labor. We discuss in detail the different formula­
tions as associated with different methodologies. Subsequently we present 
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the theoretical basis of the determination of the shadow price of foreign 
exchange, again indicating the several existing methodological variations 
in this respect. 
In Chapter IV we develop in detail the conceptual basis of social 
evaluation criteria which we subsequently apply to a number of important 
projects appearing in the Peruvian national investment program. We first 
of all analyze and discuss the method proposed by Steven Marglin. Given 
Marglin's approach we calculate the net present value, the benefit-cost 
ratio and the internal rate of return. The indexes of social profita­
bility are expressed with the consumers goods as the numeraire. 
This method allows us to identify the contribution and the distribu­
tion of costs and associated benefits with respect to the distinct 
economic groups or classes associated or affected by the project. This 
allows us to identify and to assign the distributional shares of costs 
and benefits as related to the public sector, the private sector, wage 
earners, farmers or whatever other economic group associated or affected 
by the project. 
The practical application of these methods proceeds in three succes­
sive steps. During the first step we evaluate the projects using actual 
market prices. In the second step we then switch to the utilization of 
shadow prices. In the final and third step we calculate the distribu­
tional shares of benefits and costs with respect to the different economi­
cally identifiable groups that participate in or are affected by the 
project. After this we proceed to determine the indexes of profitability 
according to the consumption generated for each participating group. 
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Subsequently we present the method proposed by Little and Mirrlees. 
As before we determine the net present value, the benefit-cost ratio and 
the internal rate of return. However with this method we utilize invest­
ment as a numeraire. 
After this we analyze the method of marginal social productivity of 
capital as proposed by Hollis Chenery. This method allows us to measure 
the contribution of a project to national income and to the balance of 
payments. In the practical application of this method, we also consider 
three variants. Initially we consider the cost, of the projects as a 
given total amount and the annual flows as given annual averages without 
having recourse to a discounting process. In a second step we express the 
respective cost flows and benefit flows in annual equivalent values. In 
a third step we then also consider the utilization of shadow prices for 
strategic inputs. 
Finally we present the method originated by Tinbergen and commonly 
known as semi input-output. With this method we determine a benefit-cost 
ratio taking into account the intersectoral effects originated by the 
initial investment. 
In Chapter V we give a brief description and analyze the evolution 
of the Peruvian economy during the period 1968-1975. 
In Chapter VI we analyze the economic evaluation of the selected 
projects for this study according to the above mentioned criteria. 
Initially we give a brief description of these twelve investment projects. 
These projects belong respectively to the agricultural, industrial and 
mining sectors. The projects chosen represent the most inçortant 
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projects of their kind within their respective sectors. They furthermore 
reflect the strategy of the Peruvian government in the Investment field. 
Subsequently we describe the adjustments which were necessary with 
respect to the statistical information as contained in the feasibility 
studies. These adjustments were necessary in order to come up with a 
uniform structure of concepts so as to be able to compare different proj­
ects. Also there is a tendency to overevaluate the benefits and to under-
estipiate the costs associated with the projects. For this purpose it was 
necessary to visit the projects and those in charge so as to verify at 
the field level the prices and expected quantities to be produced. 
Finally we have chosen to express the costs and the benefits of these 
projects with respect to the same base year. 
After having made the statistical adjustments we proceeded to speci­
fy the assumptions and definitions of the variables and parameters 
associated with each evaluation criterion. Subsequently we determined 
for each of the twelve projects their respective indexes of social 
profitability. At the same time we proceeded to make comparisons between 
projects and obtained respective rankings of these projects according to 
the results obtained for each evaluation criterion. 
For the definitive version of Marglin's method we have also made a 
sensitivity analysis taking into account the interdependencies between 
the shadow price of capital, the shadow price of labor and the social 
rate of discount. 
In Chapter VII we then present the major conclusions of this study. 
An appendix contains the data which underlie the evaluation of the 
projects here discussed. 
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II. TRADITIONAL CRITERIA FOR 
PROJECTS EVALUATION 
A. Crude Investment Criteria 
1, The payback method 
The payback period is one of the simplest and best known methods in 
project evaluation. It can be defined as the time period during which 
the initial investment is totally recovered [6, 8]. It is not, in the 
immediate sense of the word a measure of profitability. The calculation 
of the payback period can be done in two alternative ways. If the annual 
net revenues are equal between years then the payback period is given by 
the quotient between the initial investment and the annual net revenue. 
Alternatively one can subtract the successive annual revenues from the 
initial investment until the result equals to zero. The number of sub­
tractions performed determine the payback period. 
A variant of this method is known as that of the cut-off period 
criterion. This consists in the predetermination of a maximum recovery 
period. Those projects that exceed the cut-off period are eliminated and 
generally the alternative with the minimum payback period is selected. 
The users of the payback method justify its application whenever the 
recovery period is a critical project decision parameter, as for example 
when uncertainty due to the range of possible annual revenues increases as 
time goes by. 
This is the case in those industries subject to rapid technological 
change, such that industries must replace plant and equipment. ~It is also 
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relevant when product or production methods cannot be protected through 
patents. Sometimes uncertainty due to the continuation of a fixed period 
operations contract also advocates the use of the payback method. 
2. The average rate of return method 
The objective of this method is to determine the average return of 
capital invested. This method compares the sum of expected annual bene­
fits with the initial investment [l, 56]. 
Generally annual benefits are taken to be annual net revenues 
allowing for operation, maintenance and taxes. Sometimes only the reve­
nues of the first years are included. This is because estimates of 
revenues beyond the first four or five years become too unreliable. In 
another alternative one restricts benefits to the most frequent expected 
annual revenues, i.e. the mode. This is because large inter-annual 
fluctuations in net revenue might distort a simple average. The average 
rate of return method should be used only as a complementary method in a 
project evaluation. Its use provides acceptable results when evaluating 
small or rapidly depreciating investments. 
3. The annual cost method 
The annual cost method [42] selects that investment alternative which 
requires the least annual outlay. It is therefore a cost minimization 
criterion. Its principal feature is to treat revenue as a cost. The 
annual revenue is determined as a percentage of the initial investment as 
determined by the investor. 
Suppose that a firm wants to increase its operations in accounting. 
For that purpose it can choose between two alternatives, a highly 
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mechanized system (Plan A) or semi-automatic system (Plan B). The basic 
information and calculations for both alternatives are given in Table 2.1. 
Table 2,1, Summary form of the annual cost method 
Item 
Plan A Plan B 
(dollars) 
1. Initial investment 800,000 80,000 
2. Total annual cost 244,800 183,280 
Return on investment 112,000 11,200 
Operation cost 40,000 160,000 
Depreciation 48,000 7,600 
Taxes 44,800 4,480 
3. Useful life 15 years 10 years 
Fixed investment is linearly depreciated. The average tax rate is 
40 percent of annual revenues. The investor desires a minimum return of 
14 percent in view of the market for this type of services. The firm can 
borrow outside capital at 7 percent. 
In Table 2.1, Plan A generates a return of $112,000 per year, whereas 
Plan B generates $11,200 annually. The difference in recurrent costs is 
explained by Zhe difference in labor intensity of the two systems. 
Given these conditions, the annual cost method would select Plan B 
as the most attractive because its annual cost of $183,280 is less than 
that of alternative A, which equals $244,800. 
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There are several questionable steps in the application and justifi­
cation of this method. Foremost is the peculiar treatment of revenue as a 
cost; because if investment increases the annual cost will increase pro­
portionally. Revenues are not tied in any form with prices and quantities 
produced. Similarly the selection of the desired rate of return is 
entirely too subjective. Generally the method will be biased in favor of 
labor intensive systems. 
4. The annual return on capital employed method 
Generally the success of a business enterprise can be measured with 
respect to profits earned. But such profits earned must be expressed 
relative to certain other financial indicators. For example one can 
express profits in relation to the total capital employed or profits 
earned relative to sales. The annual return on capital employed method 
[52] results when we express net profits earned in relation to the net 
tangible capital used during a specific period. For purposes of invest­
ment evaluation we would select that alternative which increases this 
ratio in greatest proportion. 
Frequently we can also use its application in the context of addi­
tional projects in the sense that we measure the additional profits 
generated with respect to the additional capital employed. 
Let us suppose that at a given moment of time the total capital of a 
firm amounts to $800,000 which has been financed by 10,000 outstanding 
common shares each with a nominal value of $80.00 per share. The net 
profits generated during the last year of operations were $80,000, or a 
return of 10 percent over the capital employed. 
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The firm wants to decide whether it should engage in an additional 
investment equal to $50,000 which would be covered by an additional 
emission of 625 shares each at a nominal value of 80 dollars. 
The amount of capital so raised can be utilized for two projects. 
The alternative A has a potential earnings of $9,000 per year for the next 
15 years, whereas alternative B generates $12,000 per year but only for 
the next 9 years. 
Table 2.2, Summary form of the annual return on capital employed method 
Alternative A Alternative B 
Item (dollars) 
1. Annual net profits 89,000 92,000 
Before new investment 80,000 80,000 
After new investment 9,000 12,000 
2. Capital employed 850,000 850,000 
Before new investment 800,000 800,000 
After new investment 50,000 50,000 
3. Return on capital as a percentage 
of net profits over capital 
employed 
Before new investment 10.0% 10.0% 
After new investment 10.5% 10.8% 
With respect to Table 2.2 we see that the selected alternative will be 
Alternative B because its return to capital employed of 10,87» is larger 
than that in Alternative A which equals 10.5%. That is to say. 
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alternative B increases in a greater proportion the profits of the firm 
relative to alternative A. Note that the return on capital before the new 
investment was 10 percent. 
As we can appreciate, the above method takes as an evaluation 
criterion a specific rate of return but as a method of project evaluation 
and particularly as a method of comparison between projects, it is very 
simple. 
In the example used we can see that alternative A has been eliminated 
even though it generates the greatest amount of profits. This is because 
the profits generated in this project continue for an additional six years. 
Also, this method does not allow us to compare other characteristics 
of the projects, for example, operation costs, maintenance costs, the 
amount of production, etc. 
In conclusion we must emphasize that this method is based on account­
ing concepts which can be easily modified. Consequently a different 
definition of capital or components of capital can seriously affect the 
results obtained. Specifically a decrease in working capital will in­
crease the total amount of capital available given the accounting defini­
tion that tangible net worth is arrived at as the difference between 
assets and liabilities. 
5. The M&PI method 
The MAPI method [67] is closely tied to the problem of renewal of 
fixed assets (machinery, equipment, etc.). That is to say, it helps to 
determine the most opportune moment for a company to replace their exist­
ing installations. 
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The MA.PI method is a profitability index, indicating the return on 
average net investment. The rate of return is determined by the quotient 
of the average benefits over the average net investment for the whole of 
the period under consideration. 
The application of this method is based on a standard format contain­
ing the basic information, as in Table 2^ . The project in question and the 
existing alternative is initially specified in the format. One alterna­
tive may be to keep the presently existing assets. The period of analysis 
is usually a year, but it can be extended to longer periods. The first 
part of the format allows us to determine the "operating advantage" or 
net result. In Part lA the effect on revenue is measured by changes in 
product quality and/or volume of production. The effect on costs is 
measured in Part IB. The combined effect or the annual operating advan­
tage is the difference between the effect on revenue and costs and is 
determined in Part IC. 
In Part II one determines the average net investment and the rate 
of return thereon. Tax incentives may lessen the net cost of the project. 
If we deduct from the net cost the anticipated investment for the period 
and the salvage value of the reserved assets of the project we obtain the 
initial net investment, as in Part IIA. 
In Part IIB one determines the retention value at the end of the 
period of analysis. It can be understood as the initial investment less 
a capital consumption allowance. 
In Part IIC one calculates the return on investment as the quotient 
between the annual operative advantage after taxes, with respect to 
average net investment. 
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Suppose that the Alfa Corporation wants to renew their fixed assets. 
The cost of the new asset is $14,000, including installation and freight. 
The estimated service life is 16 years, after which it will retain an 
expected salvage value of 10 percent of acquisition cost. The replaced 
assets do not have a salvage value. 
Referring to Table 2.3 we observe that the annual operating advantage 
equals $6,500 which is the net effect of the increase in revenues and the 
reduction in operating costs of $1,000 and $5,500 respectively. 
The initial net investment of $14,000 equals net cost. This because 
we assume a zero salvage value for the existing equipment and no other 
capital additions are foreseen for this period. We further assume the 
absence of any tax incentives. 
Part IIB contains the asset's retention value at the end of the 
period. In this case a service life of 16 years and a salvage value of 
10 percent, results in a survival percentage of 93 percent after the first 
year. The retention value is given by the net cost multiplied by this 
percentage, or 13,020 dollars. In this case the terminal net investment 
equals the retention value of the asset at the end of the period of 
analysis. The average net investment given an initial net investment of 
14,000 dollars and a terminal net investment of 13,020 dollars, equals 
13,510 dollars. 
Given linear depreciation and a salvage rate of 10 percent, annual 
depreciation equals $787.50. Taxes are levied on the annual operating 
advantage minus depreciation. With a marginal rate of 60 percent, taxes 
equal 3,427.50 dollars. 
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- Table 2,3. MÀPI method summary form 
Project: Purchase of new equipment 
Alternative: Continuing as it is 
Comparison period (n): one year 
Part I. Operating advantage 
A. Effect of project on revenue 
1. From change in quality of products 
2. From change in volume of output 
3. Total 
B. Effect on operating cost 
4. Direct labor 
5. Indirect labor 
6. Inputs 
7. Materials 
8. Maintenance 
9. Power 
10. Subcontracting 
11. Inventory 
12. Insurance 
13. Others 
14. Total 
Increase Decrease 
(dollars) 
1,000 
1,000 
3,600 
1,100 
300 
100 
150 
50 
200 
5,500 
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Table 2.3, Continued 
Increase Decrease 
(dollars) 
C. Net effect 
15. Net increase in revenue 1,000 
16. Net decrease in operating costs 
17. Annual operating advantage 6,500 
Part II. Investment and return 
A. Initial investment 
18. Installed cost of project minus 
initial tax benefit 
Net cost 
19. Investment in alternative 
Capital additions minus initial tax benefits 
Disposal value of assets retired by project 
20. Initial net investment (18-19) 
B. Terminal investment 
21. Retention value of project 
22. Disposal value of alternative 
23. Terminal investment (21-22) 
C. Return 
24. Average net capital consumption (20-23)/N 
25. Average net investment (20+23)/2 
26. Before tax return (17-24)/(25) x 100 
27. Increase in depreciation and interest deductions 
28. Taxable operating advantage (17-27) 
5,500 
(dollars) 
14,000 
14,000 
14,000 
13,020 
13,020 
980 
13,510 
40.86% 
787.50 
5,712.5 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
29. Increase in income tax (28 x tax rate) 
30. After tax operating advantage (17-29) 
31. Available for return on investment (30-24) 
32. After tax return (31/25) x 100 
3,427.5 
3,072.5 
2,092.5 
15.49% 
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The net returns equal the annual operating advantage minus taxes and 
the capital consumption allowance, or 2,092.50 dollars. 
Finally the rate of return equals the ratio between above calculated 
figure and average net investment, or 15.5 percent. 
We could follow the same procedure for alternative assets, and then 
choose the alternative with the largest annual rate of return. 
The MA.PI method, represents an orderly and systematic approach to 
investment analysis. Its basic merit is the incorporation of the concepts 
of service life, obsolescence and depreciation in the calculation of the 
rate of return. On the other hand the method is not practical, for the 
evaluation and comparison of large scale complex projects. Finally, the 
use of averages will bias the results when the annual flows are subject to 
substantial variations. 
B. . Discounted Cash Flow Methods 
One common disadvantage of the use of crude investment criteria is 
the calculation of benefits in terms of accounting concepts. This is not 
necessarily compatible with a correct analysis of capital expenditures for 
several reasons. Financial accounting is fundamentally set up to report 
past events about the behavior of a specific variable or accounting con­
cept. The analysis is linked to a predetermined accounting period, 
generally one year. Similarly the choice of accounting method implies 
that benefits can be manipulated according to the method selected. For a 
given objective this will give different results. On the other hand the 
natural accounting period for any project is given by the cash flows that 
occur during the project's useful life. 
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Given differences in the cash flows of costs and benefits over time 
a comparison of these figures in nominal values would cause serious dis­
tortions in the evaluation of a project. We must therefore consider the 
time value of money. This is most easily done by reducing the nominal 
values in terms of a common basis through discounting. Given this cash 
flows can be added, subtracted, etc. 
1. The net present value method 
The net present value (NPV) incorporates the time value of money for 
purposes of investment analysis. It expresses all expenses and expected 
earnings in terms of a base year, generally the first year of construction. 
The NPV approach measures the attractiveness of a project in monetary 
terms, but can adopt other forms as will be explained subsequently. The 
net present value of a risk free project represents the potential increase 
in net worth of an enterprise if it undertakes the investment. With risk 
present as is usual, the NPV expresses expected net benefits only. The 
calculation of the NPV requires the use of a predetermined discount rate 
[52, 56]. 
Curve BB' in quadrant I of Figure 1 represents the cumulative net 
benefits of a given project. On the vertical axis we have plotted as a 
positive magnitude the present value of the future net flows for given but 
different rates of discount. The initial cost of the project is repre­
sented by the distance OB. If we assume that the initial investment will 
take place in year zero, then its present value is given by the distance 
OC which equals OB. 
21 
Let"us suppose that the initial rate of discount equals r^ , and that 
the period of production equals t = n. For this rate of discount the 
net present value equals PV^ . Observe that this value represents the 
sum of the future net flows (FV^ , FVg, •••> FV^ ) discounted with respect 
to year zero since this corresponds to initial year of construction. The 
dotted line rrj^  represents the equivalent value of PV^  when the future 
net flows are discounted for a period different from the year zero at the 
same rate of discount r. 
In this case the net present value is given by the difference between 
the value PV, and OC. In other words by the distance PV^ , C. If we 
increase the rate of discount to r^  the new present value equals PV^  and 
the equivalent flow for different periods of discount are represented by 
the line r^ rg'. For this alternative the net present value is determined 
by the difference between PV^  and OC. That is to say the line represented 
by PVg, C. One will observe that in the fourth quadrant the relationship 
between the rate of discount and the net present value to the extent that 
the rate of discount increases the net present value, will decrease. More 
specifically the tangent of the curve PV is negative. 
Generally the present value of a given investment is given by the 
following equivalent algebraic expressions 
B 
NPV = n (2.1a) 
(1+r)* 
NPV = S 
t=l (1+r)^  
t 1 ; ... ) n (2.1b) 
where 
22 
Quadrant I 
I 
Quadrant IV 
FV, 
PV. 
PV 
FV, / 
PV, 
C. 
t =n 
Figure 2.1. Graphical representation of the net present value method 
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NPV = the net present value of a given investment; 
= cash flow year t, that can be positive, negative, or zero; 
r = the discount rate; 
n = useful life of the investment. 
With this method a project will result profitable when it fulfills 
one of the following conditions [60]. 
Condition II When the net present value of the benefits is larger 
than the present value of the costs. 
n B II C 
S  ^^ Z  ^t = 1, ..., n (2.2a) 
t=l (1+r) t=l (1+r) 
Condition III When the quotient of the present value of the benefits 
and the present value of the costs is larger than unity. 
S  ^ 1 t = 1, ..., n (2.2b) 
t=l Cj. (1+r) 
Condition III: When the actual valrs of the annuity of the benefits 
exceeds the actual value of the annuity of the costs. 
S (B. - C ) >0 t = 1, ..., n (2.2c) 
t=l ' ' r(l+r)t 
Condition IV; When the internal rate of return of the project is 
larger than the rate of discount selected. That is to say, when i is 
larger than r, where i is given by: 
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S \ =0 t = 1, n (2.2d) 
t=l (1+i) 
where 
= benefit year t, 
= cost year t, 
r = discount rate, 
b = constant annuity of the benefits, 
c = constant annuity of the costs, 
i = internal rate of discount, and 
n = useful life of the project. 
We must emphasize that the method of the net present value is sensitive 
with respect to the rate of discount selected. In practice it will not be 
easy to select the proper rate of discount. In Table 2.4 we present the 
average rate of return for different types of productive activities. 
These averages were calculated on basis of information obtained from 
references [65] and [58]. 
In Table 2,4 the average range of the rate of return for the types of 
business activities presented fluctuates between 4% percent and 16% per­
cent. The selection of a specific value within this range as the 
appropriate rate of discount has a very substantial influence on the net 
present value. 
In practice one frequently makes references to the following 
criteria in selecting an appropriate rate of discount [42, 50]: 
1. the market rate of interest defined as the rate of return on 
relatively safe investments, 
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Table 2.4. Average return for types of enterprises 
Average return on investment 
Type of enterprises (percentage) 
Business with stable earnings 4% - 7% 
Public utilities 5% - 7% 
Permanent business with small risk 5% - 8% 
Business with average risk 6% - 11% 
Temporal business 7% - 13% 
Business affected by climatic conditions 10% - 16% 
Business to be initiated 8 up 
Business with high risk 12 up 
2. the minimum rate of return as defined by the directors of 
the firm in question, 
3. the fair rate of return as in regulated public utilities, 
4. the average rate of return of a specific line of business 
activity, 
5. the rate at which the firm can borrow capital. 
The concept of the cost at which capital is available appears to be 
the most reasonable in setting the rate of discount. In generic form the 
cost of capital can be represented by the following formula: 
cost of capital = [(r^ )(i^ ) + (r^ Xi^ ) + (r^ )(ijj)]/100 (2.3) 
where 
r = conmon stock as percentage of total capital, 
d 
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= average yield on common stock, 
r^  = preferred stock as percentage of total capital, 
ig = average yield on preferred stock, 
r^  = debenture bonds as percentage of total capital, 
i^  = average yield on debenture bonds. 
2. The internal rate of return method 
We can define the internal rate of return as that rate of discount 
for which the present value of the benefits equals the present value of 
the costs [56, 64]. 
In Figure 2 we present a graphical representation of the internal 
rate of return. On quadrant I we have curve BB* which represents the 
accumulated net benefits of the project. On the vertical axis we measure 
the present value of the future net benefits for different rates of dis­
count, indicated as PV. On the other hand the initial investment is 
indicated by the distance OB. Assuming that investment is undertaken 
during year zero, its present value is given by the distance OC which 
equals OB. 
* 
Given that the useful life of the project equals n = t and given a 
* 
rate of discount equal to r we then discount the net benefits so as to 
* 
obtain their equivalent present value. Because of this the distance PV 
* 
equals OC. It will be seen therefore that r represents the internal rate 
of return because as can be seen in quadrant IV at point A the net present 
* 
value is equal to zero because PV - OC = 0. Similarly it follows that 
the values of net present value beyond point A are positive and below 
point A they must be negative. 
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NPV Quadrant I 
Quadrant IV 
PV 
r* 
PV 
n=t 
Figure 2.2. Graphical representation of the internal rate of return 
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* * 
The dotted line r , represents the equivalent present values 
* 
equal to PV when the future net flows are discounted for a period of 
production with a starting point other than year zero. In practice the 
procedure to find the internal rate of return is by means of an iterative 
process. For example one may select an initial rate of discount and one 
compares the benefits and cost obtained. In case there are differences 
one then utilizes a larger or smaller rate of discount until the 
differences.have been reduced to zero. Generally the internal rate of 
discount can be defined by means of the following equivalent expressions: 
n Bj. 
S = 0 t = 1, ..., n (2.4b) 
t=l (1+i) 
where 
= cash flow year t, that can be positive, negative, or zero; 
i = the internal rate of return; 
n = useful life of the investment. 
The project selection rule given by this method implies that one will 
look for that project which has the highest rate of return, given of course 
that this rate of return is larger than the rate at which the enterprise 
must borrow the capital so invested. In other words the internal rate of 
return can be interpreted as the maximum rate of return which a firm can 
allow itself to be paid in financing an investment without losing money. 
This approach is appropriate when the investment alternatives are indepen­
dent, such that their nature and objectives do not compete with each other. 
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When one has to evaluate projects which are substitutes for one 
another in the attainment of a similar objective then the most satisfac­
tory way of applying the internal rate of return method is in terms of 
increments in the net flows of capital involved. This variant consists 
in ordering the projects according to the initial investment requirement 
starting with the least costly alternative. One then compares the 
projects on a pairwise basis, always maintaining the most favorable 
alternative. This alternative serves as the base of comparison until 
some other alternative comes out better or until no more projects are 
to be considered. 
In Table 2,5 we present an example of the use of the internal rate of 
return method when we have projects which may substitute for one another. 
We assume first that the minimum rate of return can not be less than 15 
percent. When we compare alternative II and I we observe that the 
marginal rate of return equals 12 percent. Since this rate of return is 
less than the minimum acceptable rate of return, we eliminate alternative 
II. We then proceed by comparing alternative III with alternative I and 
obtain a rate of return equal to 13.1 percent. This eliminates 
alternative III. 
One may appreciate from column I that no alternative generates a 
return larger than 15 percent. Hence alternative I is the most favorable 
one. Let us assume that the firm considers that the minimum acceptable 
rate of return must lie within the range given by 10 percent and 15 per­
cent. In this case when we compare alternative II and I we obtain the 
marginal rate of return equal to 12 percent. Since this value falls 
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within the acceptable range given for the minimum acceptable rate of 
return we eliminate alternative I. 
Table 2.5. The internal rate of return method (IRR) applied to mutually 
exclusive alternatives 
First 
cost 
Annual net 
cash flow 
Overall 
IRR I 
IRR on incremental 
investment over: 
II III IV 
Alternative (dollars) (percentage) 
I 6,000 660 11.0 
II 7,500 840 11.2 12.0 
III 9,000 1,053 11.7 13.1 14.2 
IV 10,500 1,323 12.6 14.7 16.1 18.0 
V 12,000 1,500 12.5 14.0 14.6 14.9 7.0 
When we compare alternative III and II we obtain a return of 14 per­
cent which eliminates alternative II. Then we consider alternative IV 
which has a rate of return of 18 percent. But when we compare alternative 
V and IV we observe that the rate of return is 7 percent less than that 
specified in the minimum acceptable rate of return. Hence alternative IV 
is the most favorable alternative in this particular case. 
One should observe that this process depends on the definition and 
on the specification of the minimum acceptable rate of return. Neverthe­
less we must mention the internal rate of return method may fail under 
certain circumstances, that is, the results produced may be ambiguous. 
In Figure 3 we present four graphs which present the possible results of 
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the use of the internal rate of return method. For these purposes we 
measure on the vertical axis the net present value of the project and on 
the horizontal axis the rate of discount. 
In Figure 3.a we have the conventional result where r represents the 
internal rate of return. This result is characteristic when one compares 
an initial investment followed by a flow of benefits. In Figure 3.b the 
internal rate of return method does not give us a unique result. One will 
appreciate that the internal rate of return is given simultaneously by r^  
and r^ . This case will generally present itself when a project requires 
large additions of capital during its useful life. 
In Figure 3.c it is impossible to determine a value for the internal 
rate of return. This is due to the fact that the benefits are so large 
that for no rate of discount will the present value equal that of the 
present value of the costs. Finally in Figure 3.d we have a case somewhat 
similar to the above mentioned one, except that the initial investment is 
very large. Because of this the net present value is always negative. 
NPV NPV 
NPV 
(3a) 
NPV 
(3c) 
Figure 2.3. Possible results of the internal rate of return 
(3b) 
NPV. 
(3d) 
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III. THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The objective of this section is the analysis and the development of 
the conceptual basis which underlies the cost-benefit criterion. Initi­
ally we will take as a point of reference the model of perfect competi­
tion. Subsequently we will revise the basic assumptions made with respect 
to consumer and producer behavior and with respect to the structure of 
the economic factor and product markets. Given these assumptions we then 
derive the optimality conditions for the efficient allocation of resources 
and the maximization of consumer utility and producer profits. Given 
this situation one can demonstrate that the benefit-cost criterion is a 
restatement of the first order optimality conditions of the perfectly 
competitive model. 
In these conditions the distribution of resources as based on market 
prices for commodities and production factors will result in Pareto opti­
mality for a given income distribution. In other words market prices of 
goods and factors would equate and equal the marginal social cost of 
producing and the marginal social benefit of using these goods and factors 
of production. Consequently the money value of outputs and inputs at 
market prices must be the representative figures of the benefits and costs 
of the marginal project. 
In the case of well-developed economies one may assume that the market 
prices are acceptable approximations for equilibrium prices as would be 
theoretically derived from a model of perfect competition. In this sense 
the prices actually observed reflect the opportunity cost of the factors 
of production. Consequently the evaluation of a change in economic 
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structure in terms of costs and benefits can be done using the market 
prices. On the other hand the prevailing econcanic environment in develop­
ing economies is significantly different from the conditions associated 
with the model of perfect competition. In this sense one must take into 
account a series of market imperfections which a priori prohibit the 
possibility of satisfying the equilibrium conditions required for the 
optimal distribution of resources. 
Commonly such disequilibriums are associated with distortions which 
may arise in factor markets due to monopolistic and monopsonistic elements, 
price controls, the institutional determination of salaries and wage rates, 
etc. 
Under these conditions the actually observed prices do not reflect 
the real opportunity cost of the factors. Should one use such prices 
nevertheless the resulting distribution of resources would become ineffi­
cient. That is to say, market prices will not reflect the social costs 
and benefits of using and producing different commodities. Given this 
situation the problem reduces itself to the necessity of making an adjust­
ment in the observed market prices. Such adjustments will result in 
shadow prices which can be presumed to reflect the real social opportunity 
cost of the factors of production. 
Consequently in the evaluation of a change in the economic structure 
one will then use the shadow prices so calculated. Obviously the deter­
mination of(Shadow prices are to some extent dependent on the specific 
circumstances of the economic environment within which the project is to 
proceed. 
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A. Perfect Competition, Market Imperfections, 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
We may safely state that cost-benefit analysis is closely linked with 
the principles of the theory of welfare economics. In this sense we can 
interpret cost-benefit analysis as a specific application of the theory of 
income distribution based on the so-called principles of compensation or 
more specifically that of a potential Pareto improvement [57]. 
Initially we will discuss the problem of resource distribution with 
respect to a purely competitive economy where all resources are privately 
owned. The solution of the model so obtained represents a social optimum 
and we will detail the assumptions necessary for such a solution to be 
achieved. 
With respect to the consumer we make the following assumptions. First 
the consumer must be rational in the sense that his preferences are consis­
tent and well-defined. Second the preferences of each consumer are inde­
pendent of all other consumers. Consequently the utility function of each 
consumer is not affected by the change in the utility pursued by any other 
individual. Thirdly, the utility function for each consumer must reflect 
a decreasing rate of commodity substitution among goods. Also the con­
sumer must be supposed to look for the irifl-gimiim amount of utility possible 
for given income. 
With respect to the assumption of the behavior of the producer we 
consider that each producer will try to maximize profits. Production must 
be carried out under conditions of decreasing marginal returns. We also 
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assume the absence of externalities of either the technological or 
pecuniary kind. 
Finally the assmg)tion8 with respect to the structure of the 
economies factor and product markets are the following: there must 
exist perfect information with respect to the prices and commodities; 
every market has so many buyers and sellers that nc single trader 
has any control over the price of the good or service which is being 
exchanged. Additionally it must be assumed that all available 
resources are fully employed. 
Finally, the optimality of the competitive model assumes that 
the resultant distribution of income is appropriate and constant 
over time. In this form, the distribution of resources, in a 
perfectly competitive economy on the basis of market prices will 
result in Pareto optimality for a given distribution of income. 
The technical conditions necessary for the existence of a 
Pareto optimum are as follows: the marginal rates of substitution 
of any pair of commodities must be the same for all individuals 
consuming both goods. The marginal rates of substitution between 
any pair of factors must be the same in all industries in which 
they are used. The marginal rates of transformation in production 
of different goods must be equal to their marginal rates of sub­
stitution in consumption. 
37 
Given these conditions production and distribution cannot be 
reorganized to make one individual better off without making scaneone 
else worse off [34]. 
Given an investment project, the values of the outputs and 
inputs at market prices would then provide the relevant costs and 
benefits figures to be used in determining the net present value 
of the project. Individual firms produce up to that point where 
price equals marginal cost, where costs are determined by the 
technical conditions of production and by factor prices. The latter 
reflect the predisposition of consumers to supply these factors 
and their value in the production of other goods. 
In equilibrium the consumer will distribute his incane in 
such a manner that the marginal rates of substitution are equal 
to relative prices. In this sense the benefit of a commodity 
is equal to the price that the consumer pays. Taking benefits equal 
to prices paid we can as in Eckstein [17] state that the firm 
should produce up to that point where marginal costs equal 
marginal benefits. 
Expressed in a different manner, the marginal conditions 
imply that in equilibrium the benefit-cost ratio equals unity. 
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Let us suppose that we have a marginal project with respect to the 
national economy. The production function of the project is represented 
by: 
K(Y^ , Y^ , Y^ , Y^ ) = 0 (3.1) 
where : 
Y^ , Y^  = quantities of products and 
Y^ , ..., Y^  = quantities of factors. 
In addition we define a change in social welfare in. terms of national 
income units. Where national income is defined to include the negative 
values of factor services. Then we can write: 
n 
AW = Z P. AY. i = 1, ..., k, I, ..., n (3.2) 
i=l  ^  ^
The increase in social welfare is maximized by maximizing the following 
relation: 
Z = S P. AY. - XK (Y., ..., Y,, Y,, Y^ ) (3.3) 
1 1  J .  K  ^  n  
The first order conditions are given by: 
p. - X If;- - 0 (3.4) 
If we define the benefits and costs of an investment project as: 
B = P^  AY^  + ... + P^  AY^  (3.5a) 
C = P, AY, + ... + P_ AY„ (3.5b) 
t -v n n 
where : 
AY^ , ..., AY^  = changes in outputs and. 
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Aï-, AY = changes in inputs. 
V n 
Then, we can express the change in welfare function in terms of benefits 
and costs by: 
AW = B - C (3.6) 
In this way, relation (3.3) turns into: 
Z* = B - C - XK (Y^ , Y^  ^Y , YJ (3.7) 
The first order conditions becomes: 
- X = 0 i = 1, ..., k (3.8a) 
- X ff- = 0 s = ..., n (3.8b) 
 ^s  ^s 
Which implies that the marginal benefits are equal to the marginal costs. 
2B_ !!i ^  àç_ (3,) 
BY. 3K 3Y ÔK 1 s 
Or alternatively, the benefit-cost ratio equals unity. 
If = 1 (3-10) 
We said before that the system prices in a well-developed economy can be 
taken as a first approximation with respect to the prices which would 
exist in a model operating under perfect competition. In this sense the 
distribution of resources given the incentives provided by market prices 
is also an efficient distribution. 
On the other hand, in under developed countries one frequently finds 
a series of market imperfections. This implies that actual market prices 
do not reflect the true opportunity cost of factors of production. In 
these circumstances the immediate application of actual prices must 
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necessarily conduce to a continuation of the misallocation of 
resources. 
One of the restrictions frequently found in developing economies is 
the small size of the market. This inçlies that only a small number of 
firms can operate the size of the plant and level of production as 
required in a model of perfect competition. Under such conditions the 
firms can expand the volume of production and thereby reduce their unit 
costs of production. That is to say such firms operate in a range of 
decreasing average costs. This situation is conducive to the creation of 
an oligopolistic or monopolistic market structure, with its associated 
pricing policies. One may expect that on both sides of the market certain 
imperfections will exist which have an influence on the determination of 
the price at which goods are sold and bought. 
Also the obvious interdependence of production processes create 
certain diseconomies of scale which reflect themselves in the productivity 
and efficiency of the firms. Also the assumption of perfect resource 
mobility is questionable. Furthermore the limited amount of information 
about prices and market organization imply that producers and consumers 
to a lesser or greater extent cannot efficiently allocate their available 
resources. The reduced size of the market, surplus labor, and capital 
rationing militate against the most efficient use of resources. The 
optimality conditions of the competitive model assume that the associated 
income distribution is appropriate; this assumption is not shared with 
those who are familiar with the great inequality of incomes in lesser 
developed countries. 
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Given these reasons, the observed market prices do not reflect the 
true opportunity cost of resources and outputs. What is needed is a 
systematic adjustment in such prices, particularly for strategic inputs 
like capital, labor and foreign exchange. 
B. The Social Rate of Discount 
We observed previously that the rate of discount was an important 
parameter in relation to investment decisions. From the point of view of 
the single competitive firm the appropriate rate is that at which capital 
can be borrowed. This principle also holds for public investment. An 
inappropriate choice of the rate of discount leads to a sub-optimal selec­
tion of investment projects. In particular a low rate of discount will 
favor capital intensive projects of long duration. 
With respect to Peru the available feasibility studies do not try to 
justify the choice of the rate of discount on a theoretical basis, it 
seems to be selected arbitrarily. With well-organized capital markets one 
or the other market rate of interest can be taken as a point of reference. 
But even then such rates will not necessarily be representative of the 
consumer rate of discount. Ideally these two rates of discount should be 
equal to one another. Similarly the market rate of interest does not 
necessarily correspond to the rate of interest received by the representa­
tive firm. Ideally a firm should invest up to that point where the mar­
ginal efficiency of capital equals the market rate. Or in a static con­
text, the marginal rate of transformation between current and future out­
put flows should equal the market rate of interest. 
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Since the capital goods, and inputs markets are subject to substan­
tial imperfections in the lesser developed countries we should develop 
methodologies that allow us to adjust for this. Generally speaking there 
are two ways of doing this [26, 49], On the one hand one can define the 
concept of the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC). It measures the 
value which society foregoes if it were to use the funds designated for 
public sector use for private sector use instead. The chronological rate 
of time preference (SIP) takes into account the relative valuation which 
society assigns to consumption at different periods of time. 
In the following pages we will briefly review the theoretical argu­
ments for both of these concepts, and their relevance for project evalu­
ation. 
1. Social opportunity cost 
The social opportunity cost concept addresses itself to the question 
as to whether resources currently being employed in the private sector 
should be assigned to the public sector [30]. But there is no single 
representative rate of return of capital in the private sector. Typically 
therefore the concept of social opportunity cost is made to refer to the 
marginal productivity of capital as between economic branches of activity. 
The marginal productivity of capital serves as substitute concept for the 
internal rate of return of investment projects. Given differential taxa­
tion procedures throughout the private sector, the internal rate of return 
can be estimated in two ways. One can calculate the rate of return before 
taxes or one can consider taxes paid as indirect benefits. However, 
other distortions influence this computation, such as the effective 
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degree of tariff protection. To allow for this one could price the 
factors of production and intermediate inputs used at border prices. 
Generally therefore the estimation of the social rate of discount 
should be based on the following considerations. One should identify the 
different sectors that participate in the realization of the public 
sector project. In this manner the social rate of discount will reflect 
a weighted average of the representative sectorial internal rates of 
return [7]. This allows us to write the SDR as follows: 
SDR = 2 i a,. i(c),. + S r b^ . 
h j 
+ Z Z c^ j i(K)^ j (3.11) 
where : 
a . = percentage participation of enterprise j in the production 
SJ 
of consumption good s, used in the public sector project, 
i(c) . = the rate of internal rate of return of enterprise j in the 
SJ 
production of consumption good s, 
b, . = percentage participation of enterprise j in the production 
Kj 
of intermediate good k, used in the public sector project, 
i(I), . = the rate of internal rate of return of enterprise j in the 
Kj 
production of the intermediate good k, 
c^ j = percentage participation of enterprise j in the production 
of capital good h, used in the public sector project and, 
i(K), . = the rate of internal rate of return of enterprise j in the 
hj 
production of capital good h. 
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The proper estimation of the social rate of discount requires there­
fore very detailed information which in practice is not usually available. 
Furthermore, in the lesser developed countries most of the capital goods 
will have to be imported. This represents a methodological difficulty 
which is not easily surmounted, unless one assumes the relevance of 
external rates of return to an internal situation. 
Alternatively one may prefer to work with a market rate of interest, 
usually the rate of interest on long term public sector bonds. The 
argument in favor of this procedure is [63] that such a rate reflects the 
cost of borrowed capital used in financing the project. It assumes that 
such bonds are essentially risk free [70, 73]. Given the inflationary 
environment of many lesser developed countries and the possibility of 
unilateral rescheduling of the internally held public debt such an assump­
tion is not warranted. Furthermore such issues are not generally sold 
throughout existing capital markets. Often they are imposed upon the 
banking system by decree. 
2, The social time rate of preference 
The social time rate of preference rejects the theoretical approach 
of social opportunity cost. The arguments are as follows: Given multiple 
markets imperfections and rates of interest it is impossible to select a 
single rate of interest which reflects both the time rate of preference 
and the marginal productivity of capital [26]. The STP method therefore 
determines the social rate of discount in relation to the value that 
society assigns to consumption in different periods of time. The problem 
consists in finding over time a convergence between individual and social 
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decisions as to how much to consume, save and invest. Such a convergence 
is equivalent to a proper weighting of the consumption enjoyed by succes­
sive generations. 
Taking into account uncertainty and the finite life horizon of the 
individual it is reasonable to assume that the flow of income generated 
during his life will be distributed in favor of current consumption. 
Moreover the existence of capital markets allow the individual to convert 
at will long term financial instruments in current consumption. Because 
of this the individual preferences of the present generation are in con­
flict with the potential level of consumption of future generations. 
Marglin [49] considers three situations which can be used to define the 
social time rate of preference. Brest and Turvey also take a similar 
approach [60]. 
Marglin first considers the situation where individual preferences 
give a higher weight to present consumption, in conflict with the interest 
of future generations. The competent authorities in order to preserve the 
interest of future generations will coerce the present generation to ob­
serve the proper level of savings. It can be enforced through the market 
mechanism. This approach known as authoritarian, is rejected by Marglin. 
A second approach is known as schizophrenic. Economic men have two 
preference mappings. One represents their individual preferences and the 
other their preferences as members of society, reflecting concern for the 
welfare of future generations. The proper rate of interest differs 
between these two preference mappings and is therefore undeterminable. 
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In order to solve this problem Marglin suggested that the planning 
authorities reconcile the interests of present and future generations. 
Such intervention is necessary because the market mechanism reflects 
individual preferences only. The emphasis to be given to future genera­
tion welfare is a political decision. 
In order to better understand the concept of the social time rate of 
preference we can take Irving Fisher's indifference curve analysis of 
private investment decision making [26]. The solution obtained is valid 
for a two period analysis. We first analyze such a decision from the 
individual's point of view, and then extend it to the field of public in­
vestment . 
In Figure 4 we represent along the two axis the quantities consumed 
in the respective time periods. The individual initially consumes OA^  
units in period t, and nothing in period t+1. That decision has a corre­
sponding location on the indifference curve U^ . Line represents the 
borrowing-lending possibility curve. The slope of this line equals the 
rate of interest plus one. The individual can distribute his consumption 
between the two periods by moving along this curve. Point B^  indicates a 
position where the individual consumes OB^  units in period t+1 and nothing 
in period t. This option will result in a position on the lower indif­
ference curve U^ . 
We assume that the only form of redistributing consumption between 
the two periods is through borrowing and lending. The individual will 
reach his preferred position at point X^ . He will borrow consuming 
OAg in period t, and OB^  in period t+1, a decision which locates him on 
indifference curve Ug. 
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Curve represents the investment possibilities. The slope of 
this line is the marginal efficiency of capital. The rate of transforma­
tion of present goods into future goods decreases as the volume of 
investment increases. 
According to the principle of net present value or the internal rate 
of return, the investor will invest A^ A^  as indicated by point X^ . At 
this point the marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the rate of 
interest. In this situation the investor will consume QA^  in period t, 
and OB^  in period t+1. The utility level attained is indicated by the 
indifference curve U^ . The present value of the consumption in the two 
periods, represented by point equals QAg. 
If the investor invests an amount A^ A^  then the marginal efficiency 
of capital will equal the marginal rate of substitution between consump­
tion in period t and t+1. The investor's decision locates him in point 
X^ , corresponding to the indifference curve U^ . In this position he will 
consume OA^  in period t and OB^  in period t+1. 
If the investor follows the rule of maximizing the internal rate of 
return he can achieve a position on indifference curve Ug. At point X^  
he will invest A^ A^ , borrow A^ A^ , consume OA. in period t and OB^  in 
period t+1. 
In case of public investment curve B^ A^  represents the social produc­
tivity of investment. The indifference curves U^ , ..., Ug represent two 
period social time preference indifference curves. The slope of these 
indifference curves represent society's marginal rate of substitution of 
present for future goods. 
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Figure 3.1. The graphical approach to the derivation of the social time 
preference function 
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C. The Shadow Price of Labor 
In a perfectly competitive model the wage rate will equal the 
marginal value productivity of labor. In the lesser developed countries 
the prior condition of perfectly competitive markets does not exist. 
Actual wage rates may be determined by custom, by law or througih collec­
tive bargaining. Typically the actual wage rate will be larger than its 
marginal value productivity, especially in agriculture. This allows for 
additional employment. Such additional employment, beyond that implied 
in the perfectly competitive model, is called disguised unemployment. 
Often the additional assumption is made that the productivity of such 
labor is close to zero [45]. 
The social opportunity cost of employing such labor is then zero or 
in any case below the existing market wage. This loss in productivity 
(m) serves as a first approximation of the shadow wage rate. 
SWR = m (3.12) 
In order to mobilize the labor necessary elsewhere the offered wage 
(s) must be larger than the previous wage (m). The difference (s-m) can 
be interpreted as an additional allocation for consumption purposes. 
Consequently (3.12) can be rewritten as 
SWR = m + (s-m) (3.13) 
But not all of this increase in consumption represents a social cost, 
because society values F units of consumption as equivalent to one unit of 
savings. In order to determine the net social cost of this increase in 
consumption a fraction 1/P must be subtracted. Expression (3.13) then 
becomes 
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SWR = m + (s-m) - (s-m)/P (3.14) 
One should also allow for changes in the disutility of work (D) 
associated with the mobilization of labor for purposes of the project. 
Such changes are compensated for when the utility maximizing worker gives 
equal weight to the disutility of additional work and the additional 
utility possible through work. Hence the disutility of additional work 
(D) equals the change in consumption (s-m) and its value in terms of 
savings equals a(s-m)/P, where a represents the weight society gives to 
this disutility. 
If we assume that the wage rate paid by the project is institution­
ally determined and larger than the market wage rate w, then the net 
change in the disutility of work equals (s-m) - (s-w) or (w-m). This 
allows us to write a general formula of the social opportunity cost of 
work. 
SWR = m + (s-m) - (s-m)/P +a(w-m)/P 
= s - (s-m)/P +a(w-m)/P (3.15) 
where : 
m = production foregone, 
s = wage rate paid by the project, 
P = the price of social income foregone in terms of 
consumption and 
w = market wage 
If with Lewis [45] we assume that the marginal productivity of labor 
equals zero, then m equals zero. Similarly the wage rate of the project, 
according to Lewis must be at least equal to the average product per 
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worker in the traditional sector. In practice the observed gap in wage 
rates between the modern and traditional sector equals 30 percent [31]. 
If we assume that society does not value the loss of leisure (a=0) 
and if the savings/consumption rates are optimal (P=l) then the shadow 
wage rate equals the marginal product of labor. This equals zero in 
Lewis's case. 
Harberger [30] argues that the social opportunity cost of labor must 
reflect the actual wage rate. If the project takes place in a rural area 
then the appropriate wage rate is that wage rate at which workers can be 
obtained. In case the project is located in an urban area an additional 
premium above the existing wage rate may be necessary in order to induce 
rural labor to migrate to urban areas. The shadow wage rate is therefore 
always larger than zero. Assuming that the individual rationally allo­
cates his time between leisure and work, one should start with the assump­
tion that 0=1. 
Little and Mirrlees [46] sustain that the shadow wage rate must be 
different frcsn the market wage. The social opportunity cost of work 
should reflect the additional resources channelled towards additional 
consumption, directly and indirectly. Additional employment implies 
certain beneficial externalities, such as improved health and nutrition, 
etc. 
ONUDI [14] also sustains that the actual wage rate is not an 
appropriate measure for the social opportunity cost of labor, in particu­
lar under circumstances of surplus labor. According to ONUDI [14] the 
shadow wage rate can be decomposed into three elements. The first element 
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refers to the direct opportunity cost. It is to be understood as the 
social valuation of the marginal product foregone when a worker 
is employed by the project. This component appears as the element m 
above. 
The second element tries to capture the indirect effects in terms of 
its effect on the savings rate. Generally a large discrepancy between 
the actual wage received and the marginal productivity will imply a 
lesser savings rate. It assumes that workers have a very high propensity 
to consume. 
The third element that should be included in estimating the shadow 
wage is the income redistributive effect of the project. The weight 
attached to this depends on the societal importance of investment fore­
gone, and consequently future employment opportunities foregone. Conse­
quently the shadow wage rate may exceed exceed the actual wage rate, 
given a sufficient importance of these indirect effects. 
D. The Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange 
Foreign exchange is often rationed in lesser developed countries. 
The quoted exchange rate therefore does not reflect a rate established 
through the free interplay of the demand for and supply of foreign ex­
change. Tariffs, quotas and other import restrictions also distort the 
internal price structure. 
In the traditional two goods-two factor international trade model, 
the optimal pattern of production and trade is given by the tangency of 
the domestic production possibility frontier and the terms of trade line. 
Consumption is determined by the tangency of the same trade line and the 
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highest social indifference curve. Maximum welfare is obtained when the 
marginal foreign rate of transformation equals the marginal national rate 
of transformation and the marginal rate of substitution of the two goods. 
The relevant prices of the two goods are given by the international prices 
of the two goods. The relative factor prices are then also determined 
according to Samuelson's theorem [62]. 
The earlier mentioned restrictions create a disequilibrium between 
the relative prices between traded and nontraded commodities. The use of 
market prices in evaluating a changing output mix brought about by a 
project is therefore wrong. The current literature adjusts for these 
discrepancies by either taking the foreign currency prices of the commodi­
ties and using a shadow exchange rate to calculate the shadow prices of 
commodities [2, 9] or alternatively use the foreign currency as the 
numeraire. In that case the foreign currency prices of the commodities 
will be the relevant shadow prices [46]. 
We first discuss the approach which expresses the shadow prices of 
the goods and services in domestic currency. Harberger [30], Fontaine 
[27] and the UNIDO [14] suggest that the foreign exchange shadow price 
should reflect the value of an additional dollar in terms of social wel­
fare, where welfare is measured in national income units. It assumes 
that the economy is in equilibrium. The valuation of benefits and costs 
are based on welfare measuring shadow prices. These shadow prices are the 
result of corrected input and output prices associated with the project, 
taking into account the relevant shadow exchange rate. 
If the project yields a net benefit, using above shadow prices, then 
the project is socially attractive. The shadow exchange rate can be 
54 
expressed as follows: 
n m 
r (2 T. W. dM. - S S. W. dX.) 
-m. '  ^  ^ r  ^  ^  ^
2 W. dM. - s w. dX. 
i=l  ^  ^ j=l J J 
where : 
r = market exchange rate, 
= effective tariff for import i, 
W. = (constant) world price for import i, 
dM^  = marginal change in imports induced by the project 
(i ~ Ij •••, n)J 
Sj = export tax or subsidy for export j, 
Wj = (constant) world price for export j, and 
dXj = marginal change in exports induced by the project 
(j =1, m). 
This procedure can be criticized in the sense that only marginal 
changes in imports and exports of currently traded goods are taken into 
considérâtion. 
Bruno [9] and Krueger [44] suggest that the foreign exchange shadow 
price should reflect the opportunity cost of a dollar in other uses. For 
an econony beset with balance of payments problems, the cost of producing 
foreign exchange can be used as a resource allocating criterion. In this 
sense it represents a measure of the opportunity cost of domestic resources 
in saving or creating an additional unit of foreign exchange. If this 
cost is less than the shadow foreign exchange rate, then the project is 
socially attractive. Following Bruno we have 
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I 'ij 
CFEbk = r-nr (3-17) 
where : 
a^ j = input of primary factor i per unit of output j, 
= price of primary factor i, 
b . = input of good s per unit of output j, 
sj 
Pg = price of good s, 
Xj = foreign exchange revenue per unit of output j and 
Mj = foreign exchange loss per unit of output j. 
The first term in the numerator is the value added of the primary 
factor of production. The second term measures the value of nontraded 
domestic inputs. The denominator measures the net foreign exchange 
attributable to the production of j. 
Bacha and Taylor [ 2] propose that the foreign exchange shadow price 
should be the equilibrium exchange rate, defined for an economic environ­
ment without international trade distortions. It allows for a readjust­
ment in imports and exports as related to foreign international trade. 
The essential condition for its application implies that the product of 
the effective tariff and the official exchange rate not exceed the equilib­
rium exchange rate of the economy. The equilibrium exchange rate is cal­
culated as follows: 
r [Z S (X E^ ) Z T (-M E°)] 
i  ^  ^^  i J JJ 
Z X. E- M. 
i l l  j  :  :  
56 
where: 
r = official exchange rate, 
= tax or subsidy on i*"^  export, 
= share of sector i in total exports, 
= price elasticity of export supply of the i'^  good, 
Tj = tariff on the good, 
= share of sector j in total imports and, 
E™ = price elasticity of import demand of the good. 
Little and Mirrlees [46] take the foreign currency as a numeraire 
In that case the foreign currency prices of the domestically produced 
goods will be the relevant shadow prices. Little and Mirrlees. distinguish 
two steps. In the first step one identifies the tradeable goods, valued 
at world prices. Nontradeable goods are also valued at international 
prices by using conversion coefficients. Subsequently the cost of labor 
is valued at a shadow wage rate, as previously explained. 
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IV. SOCIAL INVESTMENT CRITERIA FOR PROJECT EVALUATION 
In this chapter we will develop and will analyze the criteria cur­
rently accepted as a basis for a social evaluation of projects. 
Initially we present the method proposed by Marglin, taking as a 
starting point the traditional analysis. Given this, we make all the 
necessary adjustments in order to obtain a general formula that represents 
Marglin's approach. Subsequently we derive the method proposed by Little 
and Mirrlees, maintaining the assumptions utilized in the derivation of 
Marglin's method. Then we compare both methods, pointing out their basic 
similarities and differences. 
Later on we present the method proposed by Chenery. In this section 
we include several criticisms and commentaries made by well-known econo­
mists according to their results in the application of this method. 
Finally we develop the semi input-output method, including some possible 
extensions of the original method. 
A. Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Benefit-cost analysis is undoubtedly the best known and utilized 
method in evaluating investment projects. Even though there exist vari­
ations in the formulation and application of this method, all of them have 
a common objective, i.e. the degree of economic, financial and/or social 
attractiveness of an investment project. The common characteristic of the 
different formulations of benefit-cost analysis stems from its interrela­
tion with the theory of economic welfare. Benefit-cost analysis is there­
fore conceived as an application of resource allocation theory and the 
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compensation principle [57]. If the sum of the compensated variations 
of the gainers exceed the compensated variations of the losers then the 
sum of the compensated variations is considered as a potential Pareto 
improvement. The benefits can be distributed as to make everyone con­
cerned better off. 
In the preceding chapter we verified that benefit-cost analysis 
represents a restatement of the first order optimality conditions of the 
perfectly competitive model. In this section we compare and analyze the 
methodological variants of benefit-cost analysis, i.e. ONUDI [14] method 
and OCDE [46] method. Both will be applied subsequently in relation to 
the portfolio of projects considered for this thesis. 
In Chapter II we reviewed benefit-cost analysis in reference to a 
decision maker in the private sector. In that case the attractiveness of 
the project depended on the surplus between discounted monetary revenues 
and expenditures. The index of profitability was given by relation (2.1) 
which can be written as: 
n B 
B = S  ^- K (4.1) 
t=l (1+i)^  ° 
where 
B^  = net revenue in year t, 
= initial investment, 
i = the rate of discount and, 
n = the life of the project (t = 1, ..., n). 
The benefits and costs associated with the project are calculated at market 
prices. 
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The ONUDI method [14] introduces a number of modifications in this 
procedure. It takes consumption as the numeraire good in evaluating the 
project. In (4.1) represents the increase in global consumption 
attributable to the project in year t. Similarly must be expressed 
in equivalent current consumption units foregone by society. 
Let us assume that each unit of investment or current consumption 
foregone yields a uniform rate of return equal to q dollars per year 
during N years, where q represents the marginal productivity of capital. 
Assume that these annual increments are subsequently consumed. Then the 
present value P, corresponding to an annual productivity q, evaluated at 
a social rate of discount i, would equal 
(p/q)i = ^ (4.2) 
 ^ i(l+i)C 
If the useful life of the initial investment is infinite then (4.2) can 
be shown to equal 
(P/q)J = lim "J- = lim  ^ = 1/i (4.3) 
t-eo i(l+i) t-« 
and hence 
P = q/i (4.4a) 
The shadow price of investment (P^ ^^ ) represents the present value of 
future consumption generated by one unit of additional investment. 
P^ "^^  = q/i (4.4b) 
If the numerator is larger than the denominator then the opportunity cost 
of the investment [(q/i) • K^ ] will be larger than its nominal cost K^ . 
Only under conditions of optimal economic growth will the marginal 
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productivity of capital (q) equal the social rate of discount (i). Given 
this equation (4.1) can be rewritten as 
B = S . K (4.5) 
t=l (1-H) 
We then consider that not all of increased product stream q produced 
by the investment is consumed, and hence a fraction s is reinvested. 
The shadow price is then given by the present value of the sum of the 
contributions to consumption (l-s)q and the contributions related to the 
reinvestments sq, where sq must be evaluated using the .shadow price of 
investment P^ °^ . 
When such investment is infinitely durable, then the shadow price of 
investment equals 
pinv =[(i_g)q + piBv . g . (4.6a) 
i(l+i) 
and using (4.3) we obtain 
(4.6b) >inv _ (l-s)q + P^ ^^ sq _ (l-s)q 
1 i-sq 
Suppose now that the financial resources of the project to be financed 
partially out of current consumption. Equation (4.5) can then be rewritten 
as 
B = Z - (a^ "^  . P^  + a^ °°) K (4.7a) 
t=l (1+i)^  ° 
where a"^  ^represents the fraction of the initial investment cost sub­
tracted from the total investment involved, and a^ °^  the fraction subtrac­
ted from current consumption. Since the consumption good serves as 
numeraire a^ °^  also represents total consumption foregone. 
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In equations (4.1), (4.5) and (4.7a) we assume that the benefits 
are wholly consumed. If we now assume that only part of these annual 
benefits are consumed, (a^ °^^  B^ ) and part is reinvested, (a^ °^^  B^ ), 
valued at the shadow price for investment then, equation (4.7a) becomes 
n (a/°'' + a/'"'' • P^ '^ )B^  
B = Z  ^- (a + a "°^ ) K 
t=l (l+i)t ° ° ° 
(4.7b) 
Finally if we assume that the annual benefits B^  are distributed 
between private investment, public investment, and consumption, and that 
the funds for investment also originate from these sectors, then equation 
(4.7b) can be rewritten as 
n (a pPrl + * 8°" pSo? + , coW) 
B= r -£ 4 £—B 
t=l (1+i) 
- (a PP" + a PS°^  + a =*») K (4.8) 
O 0 0 o 
If we assume that the distributive shares of cost and benefits 
(a?^ ,^ a®°^ , stay constant over time, as well as the shadow prices 
for public and private investment (P^ ^^ , P^ °^ ), then above equations can 
be rewritten as the standard ONUDI evaluation formula 
B = (aP" P"" + a»"" P8"^ + a'"") ë - K ) (4.9) 
t=l (l+i)"^  ° 
where: 
a^ ^^  = fraction of benefits (costs) received (contributed) by 
private investment, 
_ £j.^ j,tion of benefits (costs) received (contributed) by 
public investment. 
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c^on _ fraction of benefits (costs) received (contributed) by 
consumption, 
= shadow price of private investment, 
pgov _ price of public investment, 
= benefits in year t (t=l, n), 
K = initial investment and, 
o 
i = the social rate of discount. 
The differences between the shadow price of public and private 
investment depends on the differences in propensities to save and dif­
ferences in the marginal productivity of capital in the public and private 
sector, Marglin holds that in practice it will be difficult to differen­
tiate between these parameters for the private and public sector. In his 
examples he therefore assumes them to be the same for both sectors. 
Consequently there is also only one common shadow price for investment. 
The proportion of benefits received and sources contributed will not 
be constant over time. If we assume that in the short run current public 
expenditure can not be decreased and that increased tax revenue can not be 
made available, then an expansion of a given investment project must imply 
a postponement of a project of lower priority. Private sector participa­
tion also may be initially negligible. If deficit financing cannot be 
used to shift the burden of financing onto consumption, then the initial 
contribution out of consumption (a^ °^^ ) will also be small. 
With respect to the distribution of benefits received there will be 
a long run tendency for the consumption share to increase, a^ ^^  ^should 
therefore increase over time. But this implies a lesser participation by 
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private investment, Given furthermore a constraint on public 
indebtedness and an upper limit to public versus private activity, it must 
follow that a^ ®°^  decreases over time. All this implies that the shadow 
price for investment must be continuously readjusted as well. 
Little and Mirrlees [46] propose a method quite similar to that of 
Sen, Marglin and Dasgupta. Here however the capital good is chosen as the 
numeraire good. Equation (4.1) then represents the net benefits of a 
project in year t for an initial invested K^ . 
Assuming that part of the net benefits are invested (yB^ ) and part 
consumed (l-y)B^ , we have the problem of conversion of such consumption 
into equivalent investment. We assume as before that K units of invest­
ment yield r^ K units per year. If we assume that all of this is rein­
vested we would have at the end of T years a cumulative reinvestment equal 
to 
(1+r^ )^(l+r^ ) ... (l+r^ _^ ) K 
If we consider that each unit of additional capital generates an addi­
tional consumption of (c^  - m^ ) units, then the net benefits of these 
reinvestments in terms of consumption at the end of I year will equal 
[(l+r^ Xl+Tg) ... (l+r^ )(c^  - m^ )N^ ] (4.10) 
where 
c^  = consumption of the wage earner, year t, 
m^  = marginal productivity of the wage earner, year t, and 
= additional employment of unskilled labor. 
These net benefits in terms of additional consumption discounted to 
the present at the changing social rates of time preference i^  determines 
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the present value of a unit of current investment relative to the extra 
consumption generated by employment. 
That is to say, one dollar of investment is worth S dollars of 
o 
present consumption or alternatively, consumption has a value of 1/S if 
o 
these same resources had been invested. Consequently equation (4.10) 
can be expressed in terms of investment as 
1 
o^ " 1+i^  (c2-™2) + ... (4.11) 
If we assume that the subscripted parameters in (4.11) remain 
constant, and if r is smaller than i, then the sum of the geometric pro­
gression in (4.11) can be written as follows 
$0 = CTw) 
s = (4.1Z) 
o 1-r 
Above result would be applicable to an economy growing at a 
constant rate of growth, with a constant rate of savings and structure 
of production. 
In the above expression we assume that (c-m)N will be constant over 
time. But in the long run N«0, so that m will tend to equal c. If r is 
larger than i, then the economy reinvests at a rate above the social rate 
of discount (i), and the initial terms in (4.11) will increase successively 
with the expectation that at some point in time they will begin to de­
crease, i.e. when N begins to approach zero. Under these circumstances. 
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it will be difficult to predict the value of S^ , because the reinvest­
ments linked to the employment effect will generate additional consump­
tion which can not be translated into the appropriate value for i. 
Little and Mirrlees suggest that if the value of calculated as in 
(4.12) appears to be excessive, then we should reestimate it considering 
that part of public revenue will be used for current consumption. In 
that case is not only the value of investment relative to consumption 
but also an index of the social value of government revenue. 
If we assume that part of public revenue is reinvested, i.e. (1-G^ ) 
at a rate of r^  = (1-G^ ) r^  and that a part is channelled towards 
current expenditure in a proportion v, where v indicates the value of 
government expenditure relative to employment distributed consumption, 
then equation (4.12) becomes 
S = V G + (1-G ) 
o o o o 
t 
1+r 
+ (l+i.)à+i,) "2 + *2 G; + ... (4.13) 
where v^  G^  r^  is the additional benefit in terms of consumption. Given 
I I 
that r^  < r^  one expects that r^  will be less than i^ , such that 
decreases. Assuming that the subscripted parameters in (4.13) remain 
constant over time, we obtain 
S = V G + (1-G) N + V G r 
o i - r 
or 
_ (l-G)(c-m) N + V G (i-Gr) 
o i - r S - : :: (4.14) 
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With reference to equation (4.1) represented the net benefits in 
terms of investment attributable to the project in year t and the 
initial investment. If we consider that part of these benefits are con­
sumed in the form of wages, directly as related to the project or indi­
rectly in a proportion (1-y) then its value in terms of investment 
will equal (1-y) B^ /S^ . The share of net benefits reinvested (yB^ ) and 
the initial investment K are valued at the same rate because the invest-
o 
ment good is used as the numeraire. The benefit-cost relation then 
becomes 
n B (l-y)/S + yB 
B = S — r - K (4.15) 
t=l (1+X) 
where (1-y) and y are the marginal propensities to consume and to save 
respectively. The parameter X represents the shadow interest rate. 
When the project is financed and implemented by the private sector 
then social income generated will depend on the propensity to consume of 
the enterprise in question. Private sector consumption will equal 
(l-y)(B^  - YC) and private sector savings will equal y(B^  - yC) where C 
represents the cost of capital and Y the average rate of return expected 
for that type of investment. 
When we compare the ONUDI and OCDE procedures we find the following 
similarities and differences. Both methods use net present value as an 
index of profitability. But the ONUDI method actualizes this in terms 
of consumption, whereas the OCDE procedure uses investment as a numeraire. 
The ONUDI method converts investment into consumption by means of a shadow 
price for investment. The OCDE method calculates consumption by means of 
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the employment generated through investment. It uses for that purpose 
the shadow price of consumption. 
There is one additional important difference. The OCDE approach 
utilizes border prices in the numeraire whereas the ONUDI method utilizes 
domestic market prices in the numeraire. Both methods reconmend that the 
observed market prices be readjusted by means of appropriate shadow 
prices. But the procedures used for this do not lead to the same results, 
as demonstrated earlier. 
Finally the ONUDI method weights the cost and benefit flows according 
to the distribution of inputs and outputs between the public and private 
sector, whereas the OCDE weighs such flows according to the source of 
financing between the private and public sector. 
B. The Social Marginal Productivity of Capital 
The social marginal productivity of capital method developed by 
Chenery [ll] also aims to cover the deficiencies of partial investment 
criteria. An investment project exerts influence on various aspects of 
the econony, such as employment, production, balance of payments, etc. 
These effects are to some extent competitive. Furthermore, projects of 
different sectors will differ with respect to these economic aspects. 
The isolated selection of a project based on a partial analysis might 
therefore lead to a misallocation of resources. Chenery suggests a method 
of joint valuation in terms of additive social welfare of the separate 
economic effects of the investment project. Specifically Chenery values 
jointly, the capital turnover rate and the balance of payments effect of 
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an investment project. He homogenizes these economic effects in terms 
of a common denominator. Assume the existence of a welfare function that 
reflects the distinct economic aspects related to the project. 
U = U(Y, B, D, ) (4.16) 
where 
U = social welfare index, 
Y = effect on national income, 
B = net effect on balance of payments and, 
D = effect on distribution of incomes. 
The effect of a project in the welfare index can be expressed as: 
= a# dT + )§ w + a5 4° + ... (4.17) 
Since U is measured in units of national income and dividing expression 
(4.17) by = 1 we have: 
dU = dY+|| dB +1^  dD + ... (4.18) 
Limiting the analysis to national income and balance of payments 
effects we rewrite (4.18) as 
dU = SMP = dY + rdB (4.19) 
where dU is defined as the social marginal product of an investment (SMP) 
and r represents the marginal rate of substitution between national income 
and the balance of payments. Since, in underdeveloped countries there 
exist a substantial discrepancy between the social benefits (or costs) and 
private benefits (or costs) market prices must be adjusted so as to 
reflect their real social value. Chenery suggests that one exclude, in 
the valuation of inputs and outputs, the effects related to tariffs, 
taxes and subsidies. Similarly one should use corrected prices for those 
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factors whose social opportunity cost is less than the market price, as 
is the case for economies with surplus labor. 
There are also possible economies external to the project. Galenson 
and Leibenstein [28] suggest the inclusion of indirect costs associated 
with the project; specifically the additional social overhead required to 
maintain the labor force. Relation (4.19) can then be expressed as: 
SMP = I - I + r I (4.20) 
(a) (b) (c) 
Term (a) represents the coefficient of capital turnover, discounting the 
imported inputs. Term (b) shows the total cost of operation per unit of 
investment. That is, terms (a) and (b) represent the annual rate of 
profits per unit of investment. The third term (c) is the effect on the 
balance of payments per unit of investment. 
Combining terms (a) and (b) we can express relation (4.20) in the 
following equivalent form: 
SMP = ^  + r ^  (4.21) 
(a) (d) (c) 
According to this relation, the SMP is defined by the product of the 
percent margin of the social value over cost (term d), by the coefficient 
of the capital turnover and the balance of payments effect, where: 
SMP = average annual increase in national income, plus its 
balance of payments equivalent, 
K = project investment, 
V = domestic social value added = X + E - M^ , 
X = production increased caused by the project. 
f 
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E = additional production due to external economies, 
= cost of imported materials, 
C = total cost of the domestic factors = L + + 0, 
L = cost of labor, 
= cost of the domestic materials, 
0 = overhead expenses including recovery of capital, 
B = total effect on the balance of payments = aB^  + B^ , 
B^  = effect on the balance of payments of the initial invest­
ment, 
B^  = effect on the balance of payments of project operation, 
a = capital recovery factor and, 
r = percentage difference between the shadow price (P^ ) and 
the official price (P^ ) of the rate of exchange 
<»s -
The variables mentioned above are conceived as annual flows, except 
K and B^ . The coefficient r, may be interpreted as the increase in 
national income equivalent to the improvement of the balance of payments 
in one unit, due to the effect of subvaluation or overvaluation of the 
rate of exchange. If the balance of payments were in equilibrium, r would 
be equal to zero. In this particular case the SMP would be determined by 
the capital turnover coefficient. In general, it is expected that in 
underdeveloped countries, the coefficient r will be larger than zero. 
There exist different opinions on the importance and influence of the 
variables associated with the estimation of the SMP. 
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Buchanan [lO] and Polack [59] argue that when projects of separate 
sectors are conjointly analyzed the degree of correlation between SMP and 
the capital turnover coefficient will be negative. They sustain that the 
exports and/or imports substitution is possible only in sectors with a 
low capital turnover rate. This is associated with a dependence on the 
external sector, and neutralizes the net effect on the balance of pay­
ments. Buchanan and Polac state that the most attractive investments are 
those projects with a high capital turnover coefficient. It in itself is 
an appropriate index for the selection of projects. 
Kahn [43] sustains that the SMP is not correlated with the rate of 
turnover. He argues that the sectors and/or projects are characterized 
by their distinct structure of production and costs and that the effect on 
the balance of payments will depend on the structure of the respective 
sector and its degree of dependence on the external sector. 
Chenery is of the same opinion as Kahn when the SMP method is applied 
to a portfolio of available projects. But he sustains that when a 
specific sector is evaluated, the capital turnover rate is preponderant 
in the determination of the SMP, because the discrepancy between costs 
and effects on the balance of payments of the projects is expected to be 
small. Additionally, Chenery sustains that the capital turnover coeffi­
cient serves as a guide in the selection of mutually exclusive projects. 
The conclusions obtained in the application of the SMP method in 
Greece and Italy imply that a positive effect on the balance of payments 
is found for sectors with a high degree of national integration, especi­
ally the agricultural sector, because of a low coefficient of capital and 
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a large value for the balance of payments effect. In the sectors charac­
terized by low capital intensity operating costs are expected to be high. 
The advantage of projects intensive in labor is cancelled by a high cost 
of operation. In this manner a high marginal value is associated with a 
low capital turnover, which implies a negative correlation between V/K 
and C/K. 
The SMP method does not weigh the incidence in the total profit­
ability of the project the length of the gestation period. In the 
calculation of the SMP the initial investment K is taken as a global 
magnitude without considering the number of years required to complete 
the project. It thereby ignores the additional costs that the projects 
may suffer through delays. 
A complete analysis with respect to this is performed by Marglin 
[47]. He analyzes the implications of performing a project in a fast or 
slow manner. We also analyze the incidence of the length of the construc­
tion period on the project profitability. Eckstein [I6] sustains that 
when the SMP criterion is applied to projects of a same sector, the 
fluctuations in fixed costs do not influence the ranking of projects, 
because the ratio of fixed investment to operating cost varies little 
among projects to be compared. Eckstein states that the role performed by 
the interest rate in the SMP criterion is more restricted than in benefit-
cost analysis. In the case of the application of the SMP method to 
projects of distinct sectors, the ranking is based on the interest rate 
stipulated by the planning authorities. A high interest rate will lead 
to the selection of projects of low capital intensity. With a lower rate 
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of interest the SMP of all projects will increase because of the reduc­
tion in fixed costs. Capital intensive projects benefit most and this 
may cause a new ranking of the projects in favor of capital intensive 
projects. 
C. The Semi Input-Output Method 
One of the limitations of the partial models in the social evalua­
tion of projects is the partial analysis of the project in relation to 
a specific objective, without considering its intersectoral effects, that 
is the multiplier and accelerating effects associated with the initial 
investment. The semi input-output method [38] aims to minimize the 
possible distortions of over or undervaluation of the economic effects, 
taking into account intersectoral effects of the project. 
The principal characteristic of the semi input-output method is the 
distinction between national and international sectors [71]. This classi­
fication restricts the multiplier effect of autonomous investment as 
related to investment projects. By classifying the origin of production 
and services according to national and international sectors we can say 
that relative to the supply of international goods the internal market is 
not constrained by national production. There is therefore a separate 
degree of interdependency among these sectors. In the complete input-
output model all sectors are related through the structure of inter­
industry deliveries. If there would be an autonomous change in the pro­
duction of one of the sectors due e.g. to an investment project, then one 
expects induced changes in the production of ail the other sectors. But 
this is not necessarily so with the semi input-output method, because 
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the products of the international sectors are obtainable from 
abroad. 
Consequently, there only exist a limited group of sectors that are 
interdependent, i.e. the sector where the change in production originates 
and the national sectors. 
The merits of the investment project are then evaluated in relation 
to the change in the levels of production of the group of interrelated 
sectors. Benefit-cost analysis can then be applied to the group of inter­
dependent sectors in order to obtain the total profitability of the proj­
ect. 
National sectors are defined as those sectors whose products or 
services can not pass national boundaries due to economic reasons, as e.g. 
due to transportation costs. Clear examples are the construction industry 
and other infrastructure related sectors. In like manner we can classify 
as national sectors, those sectors whose products or services are restric­
ted to internal consumption, for cultural, social, legal, strategic and 
other reasons. Also we can identify as national sectors, those products 
or services which can not be exported or imported due to competitive dis­
advantages. Finally we include as national sectors those products or 
services that supply the internal market but leave no exportable surplus. 
The international sectors are defined as those sectors whose products or 
services can be freely imported or exported without the previously 
mentioned impediments. 
Given this classification of national and international sectors, we 
can divide the input-output matrix in two rectangular sub-matrices that 
serve as base for the application of the semi input-output method. In the 
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conventional input-output model, all sectors are related through a square 
matrix where the intersection of column i with row j represent inter-
industrial deliveries. It is assumed that these purchases are propor­
tional to the level of production X of each sector or algebraically: 
A^. = (4.22) 
The coefficients constitute a square matrix showing the technological 
interdependency among the sectors of the economy. The fundamental ingre­
dients in the input-output analysis are then these technical coefficients 
defined above as inputs per unit of product. 
The common hypothesis in the input-output analysis is that the input-
output relation remains constant at different levels of output. This 
relation is modified in the semi input-output method. 
Suppose that an investment project is to be evaluated. The corre­
sponding investment generates a determinate increase in final output. 
This additional production is due not only to capital as a factor of pro­
duction but in combination with other inputs that ought to be produced by 
the other sectors. The increase in production in the other sectors leads 
to an increase in the utilization of services provided by the capital in 
those sectors, thereby requiring additional investment needed for the 
accomplishment of the original project. The additional investment require­
ments in the other sectors triggered by the project can be calculated 
through the analysis of the sectoral capital-output ratios. The funda­
mental assumption of the semi input-output method is that only the inter­
mediate input produced by the national sectors must be provided by the 
internal production. Other intermediate inputs will be provided through 
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imports. This avoids the improper usage of a scarce factor like capital 
and clears the way for increased employment generation. 
Define X,as the change in the vector of total production and vari­
able Y as the change in the final demand vector. Suppose that the 
production originated by this investment project is entirely classified 
as final demand. Vector Y then represents the change in the production 
levels of the corresponding sectors originated by the investment project 
under consideration. The changes in the intermediate flows will be 
denominated as where i defines the delivery sector (row) and j, the 
recipient sector (column). By definition the total change of the produc­
tion will be equal to the sum of the changes of the intermediate deliv­
eries plus the change in the final demand of each sector. 
X = S S Z.. + Y (4.23) 
i j 
The first term at the right represents the change in the intermediate 
demand which we define as Z. From the technological structure as repre­
sented by the first equation, we deduce a relation between the change in 
the intermediate demand and the change in the production, that is: 
Z = A • X (4.24) 
Substituting (4.24) in (4.23), the general result is: 
X = A • X + Y (4.25) 
Equation (4.25) gives us the relation between the change in produc­
tion (X) and the change in final demand. Equation (4.25) is modified with 
the application of the semi input-output method. The original vector of 
the coefficients of imported inputs is now increased by the sum of the 
rows corresponding to the international part of the matrix A. 
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The national part of the matrix of input coefficients remains valid. 
This part consists in the rows of the matrix A; based on the intermediate 
deliveries by the national sectors, subdivided vertically in a rectangular 
sub-matrix where the recipient industries are the international sectors, 
identified as and a square sub-matrix where the recipient industries 
are the national sectors, identified as A . 
nn 
Equation (4.25) can be rewritten as 
Y, f 
X 
n 
+ Y (4.26) 
n 
and its solution can be written as 
V' • (4.27) 
The solution of this system is given by the values or the increase 
in annual gross production of the national sectors induced by the increase 
in the production of the sector where the investment is originated. When 
the investment project in the first instance does not generate a final 
demand in the national sectors, the vector Y^  will be zero and equation 
(4.27) can be written as: 
X = (1 - A )"1 ' Y (4.28a) 
n nn n 
When the project does not generate a final demand but the intexnaat ional 
sector does then we have 
X = (1 - A )"1 ' (A . - Y-) (4.28b) 
n nn nt r 
Relations (4.27) and (4.28) demonstrate that the change in the gross value 
of production will always be larger than the change in the gross value of 
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the project under consideration. It allows us to calculate the direct 
and indirect effects of the investment project if the matrix to be 
inverted using the semi input-output is of smaller size than the 
original matrix. With the semi input-output method the matrix is of an 
order equal to the number of national industries. 
The next step is to determine the total profitability of the project, 
taking into account the direct and indirect effects of the project in 
the originating and related sectors. We take as representative of the 
benefits the annual gross production by sectors and as a cost the 
autonomous and induced investment in the national sectors. 
We assume that all investments are made in the same year and that 
production in every sector starts at the end of N years. The present 
value of the annual gross production of the corresponding sectors equals : 
b-1 YX k X 
B, = S  ^+ S (4.29) 
t=l (l+r) t=b (1+r) 
where: 
B^  = present value of the accumulated gross production of 
sector i, 
X^  = annual gross production of sector i, at full capacity, 
Y = level of production as a percentage of full capacity, 
b = year in which production in sector i reaches full 
capacity, 
k = useful life of capital goods used in sector i, and, 
r = social rate of discount. 
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Resolving for each sector we obtain the values for the 6^ . To 
calculate total value added or total benefit of the investment project 
we correct the present value of the accumulated gross production of each 
sector by means of added coefficients such that 
n 
B = S Va. • B. (4.30) 
i=l  ^ 1 
where 
B = total benefit, 
B^  = present value sector i, 
Va^  = coefficient of value added sector i, and 
n = total number of national sectors. 
The number of sectors will depend on the degree of disaggregation 
in the sectorization of the input-output matrix and on the classification 
of the national and international sectors. 
The induced investments in the national sectors can be determined 
with the aid of the sectoral capital coefficients. Summation of these 
capital requirements yields the total of required capital. 
c la n 
C = S  ^+ S 0. X (4.31) 
t=l (l+r) i=l 
where 
la^  = autonomous investment year t, 
0^  = capital-output coefficient sector i, 
c = construction period, and 
C = total investment. 
The benefit/cost ratio according to the semi input-output method then 
equals 
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BC 
slo 
= B/C (4.32) 
This result can be compared with the benefit/cost ratio which would 
result without considering the sectoral interrelation and indicates the 
degree of distortion. 
One problem in the calculation of (4.32) is the absence of reliable 
sectoral capital-output ratios. We therefore take as a first approxima­
tion, the capital-output coefficients for machinery, equipment and new 
construction, weighting each coefficient by the estimated proportion of 
equipment and required construction of the induced investment. 
The above method also yields the impact of the project on employ­
ment, the balance of payments and income. Total value added is distrib­
uted as salaries and wages, profits, interests and taxes. 
In this manner the impact of the project on employment can be 
expressed through the following relation: 
where : 
aa = proportion of autonomous investment allocated for wages 
and salaries, 
la = autonomous investment, 
n n 
(4.33) 
= proportion of induced investment allocated for wages and 
salaries sector i, 
= induced investment sector i, 
Vs^  = coefficient of value added in wages and salaries sector 
i, and, 
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= present value of. the accumulated gross production, 
sector i. 
If the shadow price for labor is known then the number of employment 
opportunities created would be: 
n n 
#E =aa la/P, + ( S a . I. + 2 Vs. • B.)/P. (4.34) 
 ^ i=l 1 1 i=l 1 1 1 
where: 
= shadow price of labor in the project originating sector, 
and 
P^  = shadow price of labor in national sector i. 
We assume uniformity in worker's qualifications. If otherwise we 
must specify the proportion of employees by stratum of specialization 
degree and by salaries and wages paid. 
The redistributive income effect of the project can be estimated 
taking the coefficients of value added in relation to taxes so as to 
determine in a global manner the increase in tax revenue by sectors or 
regions. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not discrimi­
nate between the contribution or proportion of taxes paid by each of the 
distinct economic agents. 
The incidence of the project on the balance of payments must be 
determined via the net effect on the use and generation of foreign ex­
change. As source of foreign exchange we must determine which part of 
production contributes to an increase of exports as well as identify 
production that substitutes imports. We use the coefficient between 
exports and final demand to establish which part of the additional • 
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production generated by the national sectors is destined for exports. 
We then determine the import component of total investment and the direct 
and indirect import requirements of the national sectors. In this form 
the net effect on the balance of payments will be: 
n n 
F_ = B* + + S Ed. B. - M I - S M. B. - M B (4.35) 
E a a 1 1 a a 1 1 a a 
where : 
B^  = present value of the exported gross production of the 
autonomous sector, 
B™ = present value of the import substituted gross production 
of the autonomous sector, 
Ed^  = coefficient that relates exports final demand of sector i, 
B^  = present value of the gross production of sector i, 
= import coefficient of the autonomous sector, 
= import coefficient of sector i and, 
B^  = present value of the gross production of the autonomous 
sector. 
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V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
PROGRAM IN PERU, 1968-1975 
With the purpose of obtaining a panoramic view of the Peruvian econ­
omy, we briefly describe the behavior of the principal global and sectoral 
indicators of the economy for the period 1968-1975. 
First, we refer to the behavior and contributions to Gross Domestic 
Product. Subsequently, we analyze the program of public investment, con­
sidering its institutional origin, sectoral and regional distribution and 
financial resources. We include an analysis of the saving-investment 
relation by economic agents. 
Later on we will refer to the priority package of public sector 
projects, their objectives and a brief description of the projects that 
have been selected for this study. 
A. Economic Summary, 1968-1974 
The Peruvian economy experienced during the period 1968-1974 an 
average rate of growth of 5.8 percent. From Table A.l and A.2 it can be 
observed that the growth rate has been fairly constant in the last four 
years. The increase of the product per capita has been around 2.5 percent, 
which compares favorably with other Latin American countries. While the 
behavior of the economy, as measured by GDP can be said to be steady, 
there have nevertheless been important changes in its composition. 
Gross Domestic Investment reflects the notable effort of increased 
capitalization. Gross fixed investment of the public sector has con­
stantly been growing. Its participation in GDP increased from 3,8 percent 
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in 1968 to 8.5 percent in 1974. Its average rate growth was 23.4 percent. 
In absolute terms the public investment in 1974 is fourfold that of 1968. 
This tendency will continue in the next few years, with the completion of 
the public projects in actual execution. 
Public sector consumption with respect to GDP has been stable. 
Private sector consumption briefly increased its share. In percentage 
terms consumption for 1974 represents 88 percent of GDP which is a 3.5 
percent increase with respect to 1968 (Table A.3). Exports were unstable, 
with both increases and decreases in absolute values. Its share with 
respect to GDP decreased from 20.6 percent in 1968 to 16.1 percent in 
1974. As for the quantity of exports there were no significant changes, 
except in fish products, which in 1973 and 1974 decreased strongly because 
of a periodic oceanographic phenomenon. International prices for the 
different exports categories experienced to some extent compensating 
fluctuations. The diversified structure of exports stabilized exports 
earnings. Imports increased, especially in 1974 when its share relative 
to GDP is of 30.6 percent of 5.5 percent higher than of the preceding 
year. Both imports of investment and consumption goods increased, because 
the domestic supply was insufficient to cover demand. The expansion of 
public investment and the increase in international prices of capital 
goods also contributed to the increase in the total value of imports. 
Table A.4 and A.5 give GDP by sector. One observes significant 
changes in its structure. The agricultural sector showed a small decline 
from 14.7 percent in 1968, to 13.0 percent in 1974. This sector had a 
growth rate of 2.4 percent and 2.3 percent in 1973 and 1974 respectively. 
The increase in production was less than the growth in population, and it 
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vas necessary to isçort food. This slow rate of growth is due partially 
to a price policy that depresses agricultural prices, discouraging in­
vestment and production in this sector. The government's effort was more 
over concentrated on irrigation projects, whose effects are of a long-run 
nature. 
The fishing sector in the period 1968-1970 reached very high levels 
of production. Its participation was 2.8 percent of GDP in 1970; a year 
in which the anchovy catch surpassed 12 million metric tons. Due to 
abnormal climatological and biological conditions, the 1971 catch was 
only 4.4 million metric tons, and its participation in GDP declined to 
1.1 percent. 
The mining sector's share in GDP declined from 8.7 percent in 1968 
to 7 percent in 1974. Production volume in this sector was stagnant, 
awaiting an intensive exploitation of mineral resources by means of 
public sector projects. 
The industrial sector increased its participation from 23 percent in 
1968 to 27 percent in 1974. The annual average growth rate equalled 8.7 
percent; or triple that of the economy as a whole. 
The construction sector increased its participation in GDP from 
3.9 percent in 1968, to 5.2 percent in 1974. 
B. The Public Investment Program, 1968-1975 
The Peruvian economy since 1968 has pursued to establish a solid 
base for development through a large scale program of public investment. 
It consists of a package of projects aimed at the intensive and balanced 
exploitation of the country's resources. Prior to 1968 the public sector 
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was circumscribed to infrastructure projects of low immediate productivi­
ty. The extraordinary capitalization effort by the public sector pro­
vides the economy with an important stimulus. Public GFI in 1975 was 
eight times the level of investment in 1968. The share of public invest­
ment in total GFI has increased constantly, from 29.5 percent in 1968 to 
54 percent in 1975. This tendency will continue because the projects in 
execution are of long gestation. Private sector investment increased at 
only 4.8 percent, whereas public sector investment increased at a rate of 
23.4 percent. 
Table A.6 gives the distribution of public investment according to 
institutional origin. Investments of the central government by adminis­
tration or contract, increased from 2,603 million soles in 1968 to 15,504 
million soles in 1975. The investment of public enterprises goes from 
S/ 2,557 millions in 1968 to S/ 32,198 in 1975, or 74 percent of public 
investment for that year. 
The Peruvian Petroleum Company (PETRO PERU) is in charge of the 
industrialization, marketing of petroleum and hydrocarbon products. In­
vestment by this company reached S/ 14,705 millions in 1975. The prin­
cipal projects are the Northern-Peruvian oil pipeline, enlargement of the 
La Pampilla Refinery, Exploration, Negro de Humo plant. Fertilizer plant. 
Catalytic plant and other projects. 
The Mining Company of Peru (MINERO PERU) is in charge of three major 
projects, Cerro Verde I-II, Bayovar I and Ilo I-II Copper Refinery. The 
electricity company of Peru (ELECTRO PERU) is in charge of national 
electrification. Its most important projects are the Mantaro Hydro­
electric Stage I and II and transmission lines. 
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In the industrial sector, the Steel Company of PERU (SIDER PERU) is 
doubling its capacity. The Peruvian Industries Company (INDU-PERU) has 
several projects in portfolio. The most important are: Diesel Motors, 
Machinery and Tools and Paper Plant. 
In the transportation sector the National Telecommunications Company 
(ENTEL PERU) is developing an intensive plan of telephonic and. telex 
extension of national scope. 
Other public companies have undertaken smaller projects which con 
tributed to the development of those sectors. A summary list of the most 
in^ ortant public projects are presented in Table A.7. 
The principal projects of the public sector are directly productive. 
Table A.8 shows that the sectorial structure of investment has changed 
dramatically. In 1968 38 percent of public investment was oriented towards 
basic infrastructure and 26 percent towards the productive sectors. In 
1975 almost 70 percent of investment resources were channelled towards the 
productive sectors. The mining and petroleum sectors absorb 44 percent of 
this. The investments in the social sectors, increased gradually in 
absolute amount, but their participation in the total has decreased, as in 
the basic infrastructure sectors. 
Table A.9 indicates the government's strategy for an equitable allo­
cation of public investment, seeking to exploit at the same time regional 
comparative advantages. In the northern region of the country we find 
important irrigation projects (Chira-Piura, Tinajones, Olmos) and the 
majority of the industrial projects of INDU PERU. In the southern region 
we have Majes, Cerro Verde I and II and the Ilo Refinery. The investments 
in the eastern region are basically those of petroleum exploitation and 
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the Northern-Peruvian oil pipeline. In the central region we have 
Mantaro I and II and several penetration highways. The investments in 
the Lima Metropolitan area, are oriented toward the improvement and 
maintenance of roads, social services and the La Fampilla Refinery. In 
general terms, the public investment has been distributed equally 
between regions, although recently, the eastern region has been the most 
favored. 
Public investment was financed in part externally. For the period 
1968-1975 external savings contributed 44 percent. The public 
treasury contributed with 40 percent and revenues generated by the respec­
tive public companies contributed 12 percent. Table A.10 shows the 
behavior of the different sources of financing for the period analyzed. 
One notes a negative correlation between internal and external sources. 
From 1968 on external resources undergo a gradual decrease, reaching a 
minimum in 1971, related to the difficulty of attracting external loans 
on acceptable terms. During this period the public treasury increased its 
support to the investment projects and programs, so as to avoid stagna­
tion. The sector favored by external resources was the energy and mining 
sector due to the nature of its projects. In 1974 and 1975 these sectors 
absorbed 34 percent and 53 percent respectively of the total of the public 
investment. The agricultural sector is next in importance. 
This remarkable increase in investment has not been accompanied by 
a parallel increase in national savings. As it can be seen from Table 
A.11 from 1970 on national savings has deteriorated in relation to the 
gross domestic investment. While national savings grew at an annual 
average rate of 10.7 percent, gross domestic investment grew at 22.4 
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percent. The savings/investment ratio was 1.16 in 1970 and only 0.39 in 
in 1975. In that year savings decreased in absolute terms. One reason 
for this low rate of savings is to the large difference between the 
interest rate and the inflation rate, which resulted in negative real 
returns. Nominal returns have been lower than the rate of change in con­
sumer prices, which increased by 9.5 percent and 17 percent in 1973 and 
1974 respectively. 
Current government revenue increased at an annual average rate of 
18.6 percent while current expenditure increased at 21.7 percent annually 
during the period 1969-1975. Savings on current account of the central 
government were not sufficient to cover capital expenditures, causing an 
increasing annual deficit. For 1975-1976, that deficit reached 67,000 
million soles (Table A.12). One observes a strong increase in internal 
financing in the latter years. Part of the increase in current expendi­
ture is due to subsidies interest payments on the public debt. Public 
companies also decreased their savings in current account, mainly 
because of the price stabilization policy adopted by the government. 
The negative effect of this price policy is reflected in Table A.13, where, 
in 1974 the public companies taken together, had a deficit of S/ 2,676 
millions. Due to this financing public investment has depended increas­
ingly on external savings which increased at 50 percent annually. 
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VI. ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF SELECTED PROJECTS 
The most outstanding aspect of the Peruvian economy during the period 
1968 througji 1975 is without a doubt the extraordinary effort with respect 
to investment. Particularly in the field of public investment, which in 
the year 1975 was almost eightfold the level of public investment real­
ized in 1968. This capitalization effort is the result of the increased 
scope of state activity in terms of the creation of new public enterprises 
and the increase of installed capacity of already existing state enter­
prises as related to the respective ministries. Because of this the 
participation of the public sector in gross investment has increased con­
stantly. In 1975 it represented 54 percent of total gross investment 
equivalent to an increase of 25 percent over a period of seven years. One 
can expect that this tendency will continue, because the principal public 
investment projects are still in their construction stage, consequently 
numerous projects are still under construction. 
On the other hand we must mention that while prior to the year 
1968 the public projects were mostly channelled towards investment in 
infrastructure, since that year the emphasis has been put on projects that 
are directly productive. With reference to 1975 directly productive 
investments represent 70 percent of total public investment. This new 
orientation of public projects corresponds to the intention of the govern­
ment to exploit in intensive and balanced form the potential resources 
of the country so as to generate the required resources for a balanced and 
sustained growth. Also one must emphasize that these public investments 
correspond to the intention of trying to exploit in an equilibrated 
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fashion the comparative regional advantages of the country. In doing 
this one thereby avoids an excessive concentration of investments in a 
determined zone or region. In other words the public projects are 
located in rational form throughout the national territory of the 
country. 
In general we can classify the public projects in three well-defined 
groups. First we have projects which are basically oriented towards the 
generation of foreign exchange, as in the case of mining and hydrocarbonic 
projects. Secondly we have projects that aim at increasing the domestic 
supply of goods and conmodities, such as agricultural and industrial 
sector projects. Finally we also observe projects that support above 
directly productive projects. 
With respect to the selected projects for their economic evaluation 
we would like to indicate the following. First such projects have been 
selected with the conviction that they are the most representative and 
that they reflect the strategy followed by the government. Given this we 
have selected twelve public projects respectively related to the agricul­
tural, mining and industrial sectors. 
In absolute amounts of investment these twelve projects constitute 
70 percent of the total investment actually realized. Also the selected 
projects in each sector reflect the typical project and technology that 
predominate in their respective sectors. In other words these projects 
are prototypes of the investments realized in each sector in terms of 
technology and the nature of production. Also the projects in question 
are the most important within their respective sectors, having received 
92 
first priority on behalf of the authorities in charge so as to assure 
the execution of these projects within the time horizon foreseen. We 
would like to point out that the oil pipeline project in northern Peru 
has not necessarily reflected this criterion even though it is one of the 
most important projects in the hydrocarbon sector. The reason for this is 
that the project is more closely identified with the transportation sector 
and not really with the directly productive sectors as usually defined. 
In the following sections we will apply methods of evaluation from a 
social point of view whose methodological and conceptual basis have been 
considered in some detail in previous sections. The application or evalu­
ations try to establish as to whether the public sector projects whose 
decisions for implementation were based on traditional investment criteria 
maintain their priority and social contribution when such projects are 
evaluated in terms of social-economic criteria. 
First we will evaluate the projects separately and then we will make 
a comparison between projects and obtain the corresponding ranking of 
projects according to each criterion adopted. With this in mind we pro­
ceed initially to evaluate the selected projects using the methodology 
proposed by ONTJDÏ [14]. In this alternative we proceed step by step to 
initially evaluate each project from the commercial point of view and then 
add the elements or concepts that convert this type of evaluation to that 
of a social benefit-cost analysis. 
That is we first will take the flows of benefits and costs to compute 
the profitability of the project using market prices; this variant we will 
call Alternative I. Subsequently we proceed to make the necessary 
93 
adjustments In the market prices so that they reflect their proper social 
opportunity cost. This variant constitutes our Alternative II. After 
this we will identify the role of the separate economic agents with 
respect to their contribution and participation in the costs and benefits 
associated with the project. In other words we will establish the dis­
tributional shares associated with each of those groups. This variant 
constitutes our Alternative II. 
We have to indicate that for each alternative we will proceed by cal­
culating the net present value, the benefit-cost ratio and the internal 
rate of return and making the necessary con^ arisons between projects. 
Subsequently we will proceed to apply the method proposed by Little and 
Mlrrlees [46] maintaining the assusçtlons utilized with respect to the 
social rate of discount, the shadow wage for labor and the shadow price 
for foreign exchange. The fundamental change is with respect to the 
numeraire. With the method proposed by Little and Mlrrlees we take 
investment as the numeraire good. For that purpose the salaries and 
wages for the period of construction as well as for the period of opera­
tion we will be converted in terms of investment utilizing the opportunity 
price of Investment as already estimated in the model proposed by Marglln. 
This variant of Little and Mlrrlees constitutes our Alternative IV 
and will also be calculated in terms of net present value, benefit-cost 
ratio and Internal rate of return. 
We then apply the method formulated by Chenery [11], according to 
three possible variations. In the first alternative we proceed to cal­
culate the social marginal productivity of capital, considering the total 
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amount of investment as given and without considering the value of money 
over time. With respect to the production flows, the costs of operation 
and the effects on the balance of payments we will take the amounts which 
will correspond to the full utilization of the project. Also we do not 
consider the possible effects of discounting above revenue and expendi­
tures streams. In alternative II of this method we will proceed to 
express the cost of the project in terms of its annual equivalent value. 
That is we will discount at the pertinent rate of discount the annual 
investment flows during the period of construction and then expressed in 
its annual equivalent value. With respect to the production flows, the 
national value added and costs of operation we will express these in 
terms of their annual equivalent. For that purpose we will calculate the 
present value of annual flows and subsequently we will express them in 
their annual equivalent. In Alternative III we will apply Chenery's 
method as in Alternative II, except that we will correct the market prices 
and utilize instead the previously calculated appropriate shadow prices. 
Finally we will apply the semi input-output method [72], utilizing 
for that purpose the input-output matrix constructed for Peru for the year 
1968 [36]. The initial matrix contains 34 sectors which we have reduced 
to 9 sectors as published by the Instituto Nacional de Planification [35]. 
This matrix of 9 sectors will be utilized in the application of the above 
mentioned criterion. Utilizing this method we will obtain the benefit-
cost ratio considering both the direct and indirect effect of the initial 
investment. 
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Once we have applied the above mentioned evaluation methods we will 
make a comparison and ranking of the projects altogether. The purpose of 
this comparison is to determine and identify the degree of sensitivity of 
each project when we apply one or another evaluation method. Finally we 
apply a sensitivity analysis for alternative III as proposed by Marglin. 
This because an integral social evaluation method. In that analysis we 
try to establish the relationship between the social rate of discount, 
the opportunity price of investment and the shadow price of employment and 
the shadow price of foreign exchange and their effects on the selection 
and ranking of the projects. 
A. Description of the Selected Projects 
MUES The MAJES irrigation project [18] is located in the 
southern coast of Peru in the department of Arequipa (Figure 5). Accord­
ing to the feasibility studies this project will allow for the incorpora­
tion of 57,600 new hectares in the Majes Pampas (34,680 has) and Siguas 
(22,020 has) respectively. The total cost of the project at 1974 prices 
equals 10.9 billion soles or 154.3 million dollars, of which 6.1 billion 
soles correspond to agricultural development. The foreign exchange 
requirements are approximately 13.7 percent of the total cost of this 
project. The projection is to construct the engineering works within 
seven years, which are divided into two stages. In the first stage one 
hopes to construct the capture and derivation of the Siguas-Pampas of the 
Majes river, the main Majes canal and the system of distribution. The 
detail of the engineering works and their corresponding costs are listed 
in Tables B.ll and B.13. 
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We must observe that the construction of this project will allow for 
the generation of 500,000 kilowatts of electricity, utilizing for that 
purpose the waterfall between the terminal tunnel and the Bocatomas which 
derives the water from the Majes and Siguas areas. With respect to gross 
benefits one can see from Table B.12 that the gross annual production, at 
full production, is projected to reach 3.6 billion soles annually of which 
2.0 billion soles corresponds to agricultural production and the remainder 
to livestock production. The project is expected to reach full production 
thirteen years after the conclusion of the civil engineering works. The 
total of cultivated hectares are estimated at 75,000» which implies an 
average utilization coefficient of land equal to 1.3. The project will 
benefit directly more than 10,000 families with an average farm size equal 
to six hectares. 
CHIRA-PIURA The CHIRA-PIURA irrigation project [38, 39] is 
located in the northern coast of Peru in the department of Piura 
(Figure 5). According to the feasibility studies this project will im­
prove the irrigation of the Chira Valley to the extent of 28,114 hectares 
and allow for the new irrigation of 7,471 hectares. In the lower and 
middle Piura valleys one hopes to improve the irrigation of 43,560 hec­
tares and incorporate 1,040 new hectares. The total cost of the project 
in terms of 1967 prices equals 4.0 billion soles or 56.7 million dollars, 
the foreign exchange component equal to 47 percent. In Tables B.l and 
B.4 one can see the total cost of the project according to the civil 
engineering works required. The derivation of CHIRA-PIURA, by means of 
Poechos Dam and the Imichira Canal is a vital importance for both 
Figure 6.1. Map of Peru and 
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valleys, absorbing 29 percent of the investment. The direct investment 
attributable to the Chira Valley equals 1.7 billion soles. The direct 
investment attributable to the middle Piura Valley is only 51 million 
soles, specifically the construction of the Parales Canal. The remaining 
1.0 billion soles are directly attributable to the lower Piura Valley. 
With respect to gross annual benefits, at full capacity, these are 
expected to reach 1.8 billion and 2.5 billion soles respectively for the 
Chira and Piura Valleys. The details as to production are listed in 
Tables B.2 and B.3. The project is expected to reach full production 
after sixteen years. The total number of hectares cultivated in both 
valleys are estimated to equal 127,371 hectares, implying an average 
utilization coefficient for land equal to 1.7 and 1.5 for the Chira and 
Piura Valleys respectively. 
0LMC6 The OLMOS irrigation project [4l] is located in the 
northern coast of Peru, in the department of Lambayeque (Figure 5). 
According to the feasibility studies this project will allow the incor­
poration of 85,751 new hectares. The total concept of the OLMOS project 
also includes two electricity generation plans with a capacity equal to 
520,000 kilowatts and additional investment in agricultural product 
processing plants. In this project the public sector cooperates with the 
private sector and within the private sector the contribution by the 
farmers are also of importance. 
The contribution of the public sector equals 7.3 billion soles and 
the contribution of the private sector is estimated to equal 2.9 billion 
soles. The investments under the responsibility of the public sector 
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refer to the irrigation works and the electricity generation plants. 
For the purposes of evaluation we excluded this later aspect. The total 
cost of the irrigation project in 1966 prices equals 6.3 billion soles, 
of which imported cost components represents 41 percent. With reference 
to Tables B.8 and B.IO, we observe that the system of water distribution 
and the transandean tunnel absorbs 53 percent of construction costs. The 
associated agricultural development cost represents on the other hand, 
41 percent. The period of construction of the project is estimated to 
equal twenty-six years. With respect to gross annual benefits, at full 
capacity, these are expected to reach 4.6 billion soles annually 
(Table B.9). It is expected that full production will be reached twenty-
six years after the conclusion of the engineering works. The total of 
hectares cultivated are estimated to equal 94,951, which implies an 
average utilization coefficient of land equal to 1.1. 
JEQUETEPEQUE The Jequetepeque irrigation project [si] is located 
in the northern coast of Peru in thé department of La Libertad with areas 
extending into the department of Cajamarca (Figure 5). According to the 
feasibility studies this project will allow the incorporation of 10,400 
new hectares and improve the irrigation of 49,600 hectares. The total 
cost of the project at 1972 prices will equal 33.2 billion soles or 46.2 
million dollars. The foreign exchange cost of the project equals 46 per­
cent of the total cost. This project is to be executed in two successive 
stages. In the first stage one will construct the Gallito Ciego Dam and 
the primary irrigation canals for a total of 2.0 billion soles. In the 
second stage the Cajamarca and Namora derivations will be constructed, 
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representing 30 percent of the total investment. The agricultural 
development cost represents approximately 237.8 million soles. In Tables 
B.5 and B.7 we can see the decomposition of total investment. With 
respect to gross annual benefits, at full capacity, these are expected to 
reach 2.9 billion soles annually (Table B.6). It is expected that full 
production will be reached twenty-eight years after the initiation of the 
engineering works. The total of hectares cultivated are estimated to 
equal 105,782, which implies an average utilization coefficient of land 
equal to 1.7. 
ILO II The Ilo Copper Refinery Project [20] is located in the 
southern coast of Peru in the department of Moquegua (Figure 5). Accord­
ing to the feasibility studies this project will allow an increase in the 
production of refined copper of 150,000 metric tons annually, from which 
50 percent will be in the form of wire bars. Additionally it is expected 
to recuperate silver, selenium, tellurium and gold from the anodic mud. 
The total cost of the project at 1975 prices will equal 5.1 billion soles 
or 73.1 million dollars. The foreign exchange cost of the project equals 
68 percent of the total cost. The components of the initial investment 
are found in Tables B.14 and B.15, The period of construction has been 
estimated in three years. The basic primary material for the Ilo Refinery 
is the blister copper provided by the Ilo foundry which processes the 
copper concentrated at the Cuajone and Toquepala mines. The gross bene­
fits of this refinery are generated by the refining services implied in 
the blister operations which are provided by the Southern Peru Corpora­
tion. For purposes of this thesis we have estimated as the most 
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probable price for a ton of refined copper as equal to 225 dollars. The 
project will reach its full capacity of refinery production equal to 
150,000 tons annually. After an initial period of three years it 
will be operated with a capacity of 127,000 metric tons. The revenue 
generated by this refinery service is entirely in terms of foreign 
exchange. 
CAJAM^ QUILIA The zinc refinery of Cajamarquilla [19] is located 
in the central region of Peru (Figure 5). The cost of the project in 
terms of 1976 prices equals 11.5 billion soles or 164 million dollars. 
The machinery and equipment cost represent 61 percent of total cost. The 
decomposition of the different components of this investment are repre­
sented in Table B.16. It is expected that the project can be concluded 
in five years. The project is conceived with the purpose of processing 
199,000 tons of zinc concentrate annually, which actually are being 
processed abroad. In this manner one will increase the value added of 
zinc exports. The installed capacity of the refinery allows for the 
processing of 101,500 tons per year of refined zinc. With respect to 
the revenue of this operation it will be provided in 83 percent by the 
zinc refining services and as to the rest by the production of sulphuric 
acid, cadmium, copper cement, zinc and residual lead dust and silver 
dust. The details of the quantities and expected revenues are presented 
in Table B.17. It is expected that the project will enter in production 
in the last year of construction and then reach full capacity of produc­
tion in the following year. The gross annual benefit generates foreign 
exchange equivalent to 3 billion soles annually or 43 million dollars if 
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we can assume a base price of thirty-seven cents per pound of refined 
zinc. 
CERRO VERDE II The copper project CERRO VERDE II [68] is located 
in the southern coast of Peru, in the department of Arequipa (Figure 5). 
This project is the continuation of the first stage of the Cerro Verde 
Project which has an annual capacity of 36,000 metric tons of copper. 
This second stage is by far the largest copper mining project in Peru. 
According to the studies it will have an annual production of 160,000 
metric tons of copper. Moreover it is expected to produce molybdenum and 
sulphuric acid. The details as to production are presented in Table B.21. 
We have assumed that for the benefit-cost calculations we can work with 
a price of seventy-five cents per pound of copper. The total cost of the 
project in 1975 prices equals 81.6 billion soles or 1.6 billion dollars; 
where 52 percent will have to be financed in terms of foreign exchange. 
The decomposition of cost structure is represented in Table B.20. The 
period of construction is estimated to be four years and it is anticipated 
that full capacity of production will be reached ten years after initiat­
ing the engineering works. We should observe that whereas the first stage 
of Cerro Verde recovers copper on basis of a sulphuric acid process, but 
the second stage will use a process based on oxidation. 
MICHIQUILIAY The Michiquillay Project [2l] is located in the 
central zone of Peru (Figure 5). According to the feasibility studies it 
will allow an increase in copper production by 91,454 metric tons annually 
and it also will allow for the economical recuperation of gold and silver. 
In order to calculate gross benefits we have assumed as a base price 
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seventy-five cents per pound of copper. The details as to production are 
represented in Table B.19. The total cost of the project in terms of 
1975 prices equals 29.9 billion soles or 427.3 million dollars, where 
43 percent will have to be financed in terms of foreign exchange. The 
decomposition of investment costs are represented in Table B.18. The 
period of construction is expected to equal six years. Full capacity of 
production is expected to be reached sixteen years after starting the 
engineering works. 
lA PAMPILIA The enlargement of the La Pampilla Refinery [23] 
is located in the central coast of Peru in the department of Lima 
(Figure 5). The total cost of the project in terms of 1974 prices equals 
3.9 billion soles or 57 million dollars. Machinery and equipment is the 
most important cost category absorbing 40 percent of total cost. The 
period of construction is estimated to equal four years. The details as 
to the decomposition of this investment are given in Table B.22, The 
gross annual benefits, at full capacity, are derived from the refining of 
60,000 barrels of crude daily. The refining process will produce sub-
products such as 84 octane gasoline, fuel for turbo engines, diesel fuel 
number 2, residual fuel number 6 and kerosene. The expected revenues from 
operation are detailed in Table B.23. It is expected that 69 percent of 
production will be used for the domestic market and the remainder will be 
exported. The project can enter into production in the fourth year of 
construction with 30 percent of installed capacity. In the subsequent 
year full capacity of production can be obtained. 
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The Chimbote Steel Plant The enlargement of the Chimbote Steel 
Plant [24] is located in the northern coast of Peru in the department of 
Ancash (Figure 5). According to the feasibility studies the project has 
an annual production equal to 1.6 billion tons of steel products per year. 
The detail of quantities and value of production are presented in Table 
B.25. The total cost of the project at 1974 prices equals 47.8 billion 
soles or 684 million dollars, of which the foreign exchange cost reprer 
sents 40 percent. The period of construction is fifteen years. The 
decomposition of costs are listed in Table B.24. The project begins to 
produce starting in the fifth year. It will reach full production sixteen 
years after the initial start of construction. 
The Yura Cement Plant The enlargement of the Yura Cement Plant 
[33] is located in the southern zone of Peru in the department of 
Arequipa (Figure 5). According to the feasibility studies this project 
will allow cement production to increase by 430,000 tons annually. The 
actual domestic capacity to produce is not sufficient to cover existing 
demand and Peru has had to import an increasing volume of cement in 
recent years. The total cost of the project at 1975 prices equals 1.1 
billion soles or 15.5 million dollars, of which the foreign exchange cost 
represents 44 percent. The period of construction has been estimated at 
three years. Full production will be reached in the first year of 
operation. The details of the costs associated with this investij«nt are 
listed in Tables B.28 and B.29. 
The Fertilizer Plant The Fertilizer Plant [22] is located in the 
northern coast of Peru in the department of Piura (Figure 5). According 
to the feasibility studies this project is designed to produce 168,000 
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tons of urea annually. For such purposes it is necessary to construct an 
ammonia plant with a capacity of 99,000 tons annually. This provides the 
basic raw material for the production of urea. Currently all urea is 
imported. The total cost of the project in terms of 1971 prices equals 
1.9 billion soles or 26.7 million dollars. Of the total cost 55 percent 
will be in terms of foreign exchange. The period of construction is ex­
pected to be two years. Full capacity of production will be reached 
thirteen years after initiation of operations. The details as to invest­
ment costs are listed in Tables B.26 and B.27. 
B. Review of the Feasibility Studies and Statistical Adjustments 
1. General observations 
The starting point for the presentation of the benefit and cost flows 
of the selected projects are based on the respective feasibility studies. 
In principle we accept these studies with respect to their engineering 
aspects, the proposed processes of production and the technological 
alternative selected as being the most economical for each type of 
project. The revision of the technical aspects and eventual modifications 
therein can not be considered for the purposes of this study, because it 
would require comprehensive technological knowledge which can be provided 
only by a team of qualified professionals in each of the fields related to 
the projects mentioned above. 
With respect to the preparation of these feasibility studies one 
observes that there has been a substantial change in the preparation of 
these. Prior to 1968 it was generally necessary to contract foreign 
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consultants or firms for the preparation of these. It put into relief 
the technical limitations of national consulting offices. But after 1968 
the respective ministries or public enterprises that prepare feasibility 
studies are also the entities charged with implementation of these feasi­
bility studies. One observes that in the discussion as to costs and 
financial resources that such figures are based upon these up-to-date 
studies. It has also impressed upon the planning authorities that due to 
the scarcity of domestic currency and foreign exchange these projects in 
all their associated aspects must be carefully studied. 
Nevertheless we must indicate that for several reasons the feasibili­
ty studies tend to overestimate the profitability of projects. With re­
spect to overestimation of benefits these are related to the tendency to 
always present the projects with at least a minimum degree of profitabili­
ty. This is reinforced because the concerning authorities know that the 
priority of the projects is dependent to a large extent on ti^ e degree of 
its profitability. On the other hand we must be aware of the limitations 
with respect to reliable budgetary and cost estimates of these projects. 
Generally the authorities concern will tend to underestimate the cost 
if only to be able to be accommodated within the projected budget for the 
coming year. Hirschman [32] has treated the above aspects in detail. 
Given this tendency of overevaluation of benefits and underestima­
tion of costs, we proceeded to review and to revise these feasibility 
studies to verify the consistency of the costs, quantities and prices of 
final products. 
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With respect to total construction costs we proceeded by verifying 
as to whether the engineering works, equipment and associated costs 
referred to in the feasibility studies are consistent with that stipulated 
in the calendar of operation. With this in mind we visited the imple­
menting agencies at their location in the respective geographic areas of 
Peru, because there always was the possibility that some important 
engineering aspect or piece of equipment had been excluded. In this 
respect we cite the Majes irrigation project where one included a number 
of engineering works related to housing and roads which should have been 
excluded. Also the machinery and equipment for the construction phase 
were purchased by the ministry of agriculture rather than consider­
ing the cheaper alternative of renting such equipment. This alternative 
was not considered in the feasibility study but we have included the 
alternative for purposes of evaluation. 
After verification of the investment aspects of the projects we pro­
ceeded to express the amount of money involved in terms of 1976 prices. 
We refer to this as adjusted costs in the respective tables. This adjust­
ment is necessary because for a comparison between different projects 
we needed a common annual base of comparison. 
When we refer to prices according to feasibility studies this always 
refers to the year in which these studies took place. Previously we 
already mentioned the dates of these studies. For the purposes of estab­
lishing a common base year we have used the deflators listed in Table 6.1 
provided by official statistical sources. At the bottom of each deflator 
we have indicated the respective source. With respect to construction 
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costs we have tried to identify the most important categories using the 
appropriate deflator. Similar operations took place for machinery, equip­
ment, construction, material and labor. In this we have identified that 
part which can be paid for entirely by domestic currency and that part 
which will require foreign exchange. In the tables by projects we show 
these figures and the deflators utilized and the corresponding figures in 
terms of 1976 adjusted cost. 
For some projects we have used the information as stipulated in the 
budgets associated with the feasibility studies. The reason for this is 
that the figures stipulated in feasibility studies differ very much from 
the figures associated once the project started. In this case one cannot 
justify the use of actualized figures based on deflators because there 
exist an unexplainable gap, not because of the increase in the costs but 
rather because of a substantial underevaluation of the original cost. 
For the projects for which we make this type of adjustment we will make 
the respective references. With respect to the costs of operation we have 
proceeded with the same methodology. That is, after verifying the speci­
fied costs in the studies we then proceeded to express the figures in 
terms of 1976 prices. The corresponding tables are presented jointly 
according to detail by studies and items and according to deflators used. 
On the side of benefits we proceeded to verify the productive capacity of 
each project. After verification of the physical volume of production 
we proceeded to value this production in terms of 1976 prices. We must 
observe that in the case of irrigation projects we first verified whether 
the yields stipulated in the studies differ substantially from the average 
Table 6.1. Price indexes of investment goods, labor and principal Inputs, 
1966-1976 (percentages) 
Capital Goods Construction Materials Labor 
Year Imported^  National® Imported^  National® All Groups^  
1966 50.7 46.9 49.3 50.5 26.6 
1967 51.2 47.4 50.0 51.5 30.0 
1968 51.8 47.8 50.5 52.8 33.7 
1969 52.6 48.3 59.7 54.7 36.3 
1970 53.7 49.0 51.2 55.4 38.5 
1971 55.1 49.5 53.8 56.1 41.4 
1972 60.9 50.2 58.1 58.1 46.2 
1973 70.1 60.0 68.3 60.4 52.0 
1974 80.1 68.4 82.2 66.7 59.2 
1975 93.9 80.0 93.9 76.4 71.0 
1976 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
S^ource [55]. 
S^ource [4]. 
S^ource [38]. 
S^ource [34]. 
S^ource [5]. 
S^ource [25]. 
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Electricity® Petroleum Copper^  Steel Cement^  Urea^  Services^ 
and . Products^  
Subproducts^  
37.9 11.1 36.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
37.9 11.1 40.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
44.2 14.8 55.7 n.a. 45.1 58.8 n.a. 
44.7 14.8 63.7 n.a. 51.2 50.3 n.a. 
44.7 14.8 61.6 n.a. 52.0 43.3 n.a. 
44.7 20.8 43.3 n.a. 52.0 41.3 44.8 
44.7 20.8 42.6 46.5 52.4 53.2 58.1 
49.5 25.0 73.6 50.3 52.4 85.1 65.4 
49.5 25.0 92.0 62.0 52.4 160.2 74.1 
65.8 70.4 50.4 77.7 60.6 177.6 83.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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yields of the agricultural areas surrounding that project. After some­
times necessary adjustments we then proceeded to express the value of 
production in terms of 1976 prices. 
On the other hand we must state that the review of feasibility 
studies all comply in general with the principal features and economic 
aspects of the projects. In other words such studies do contain the 
fundamental elements necessary for the circumstances leading to deter­
mining as to whether the investment is worthwhile. Nevertheless there 
obviously exist some heterogeneity as between projects. For example 
construction costs in some cases are summarized in a few lines items 
whereas in other studies they are available in greater detail. 
We also observed that there did not exist complete homogeneity with 
respect to the usual conventions used in executing and evaluating the 
economic feasibility of the projects selected for this study. In some 
instances the benefits and costs are expressed in terms of present values, 
annual equivalent and even future equivalent values. Also when refer­
ring to the discounting process there are differences as to the choice of 
the base year. In some instances the year zero is defined as the first 
year of construction and in other instances year zero is synonymous with 
the year in which production starts. This does not necessarily change 
the profitability of the projects but it does make it impossible to 
conçare one project with another project. 
For the purposes of our economic evaluation we have tried to stan­
dardize the format of the flows of benefits and costs and also we 
standardized the methodologies used in evaluating the respective projects 
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involved. With respect to the evaluation methodologies used, virtually 
all feasibility studies were based on a commercial profitability criterion 
with predominance of standard benefit-cost analysis and the internal rate 
of return. Also, we have observed that in the application of the benefit-
cost ratio some studies used the conventional method and other studies 
do introduce certain modifications. For example the costs of operation 
are sometimes added in the denominator which is the conventional method, 
and for other projects are subtracted from the numerator which is a modi­
fication of the traditional procedure. 
With respect to the rate of discount used this varies between proj­
ects from 6 percent in the case of the Olmos irrigation project and 20 
percent for the Jequetepeque irrigation project. Similarly there exist 
discrepancies with respect to specification of the benefits. In some 
instances these refer to net income, value added, sales, gross value of 
production, etc. 
For the purposes of our evaluation we have standardized the figures 
of benefits by taking the gross value of production attributable to the 
project in their respective years. On the basis of this we then pro­
ceeded to apply the several evaluation criteria explained before. We 
must indicate that in the process of standardization we are considering 
the corresponding investment categories relevant for an economic evalua­
tion. That is, certain financial outlays must be excluded from an 
economic evaluation even though they are part of a financial evaluation. 
For such purposes we have followed the procedures suggested by QNUDI 
[14] and Gittinger [29]. 
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First we have to consider the treatment of taxes within a context of 
an economic evaluation. In a financial evaluation the taxes are con­
sidered as a cost to the enterprise, because they effectively constitute 
expenses for that firm paid to the government and they logically diminish 
the net revenue associated with the project. In the case of an economic 
evaluation taxes are not considered as a cost but rather as a transfer of 
income of the project to the government. The government for its part is 
responsible to make the proper use of such funds as the representative of 
society. In other words in the economic evaluation taxes are part of 
benefits and should not be subtracted as a cost attributable to the 
project. 
In the case of subsidies these constitute a transfer payment of 
society to the project, and this implies a cost imputable to the project. 
For an economic evaluation the market prices must sometimes be adjusted 
so as to reflect the amount of the subsidy. In a financial evaluation no 
such adjustment is required because the firm operates according to the 
prices which prevail in the market. 
In relation to interest payments we have that in a financial evalua­
tion these costs must necessarily be met. They therefore must be deducted 
from gross revenue before we can establish net revenue. In the case of an 
economic evaluation such interest payments are not considered as a cost 
attributable to the project. It is precisely in the computation of the 
profitability of the project that one looks for the rate of return on 
capital that society has decided to allocate for the project. As in the 
case of taxes, interest payments are not considered as a cost but rather 
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a transfer payment. In the case of the projects considered here we do not 
consider interest payments during the period of construction because these 
payments are capitalized and subsequently are part of the principal. 
In the case of foreign loans the interest payments constitute a cost 
imputed to society as a whole. This is because there does not exist an 
additional cost to society because we assume that the economy requires a 
continuous flow of foreign savings and that in the absence of the project 
such funds would be utilized for other purposes or projects. However 
what has to be taken into account is that the costs of construction 
imputed to the project when the expenditures are being met during the 
construction stage and not when one repays the principal during the period 
of amortization. This because such funds represent a cost for society 
from the moment that one begins to construct the project. 
On the other hand, depreciation constitutes an accounting figure 
rather than a cost as such. When we apply a financial evaluation, depre­
ciation influences the calculation of taxes. In the case of an economic 
evaluation this is excluded. 
Finally the financial evaluation is based on market prices whereas 
with an economic evaluation for some projects is maybe necessary to adjust 
some of these so that they reflect the true social opportunity cost. 
2. Adjustments in agricultural projects 
Beginning with the Majes project it was necessary to recur to addi­
tional sources of information in order to determine with greater precision 
the expected costs and benefits. For those purposes we have utilized the 
report of the ORDESUR Committee [13], presented during the negotiation of 
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the project. We have also used the periodic reports prepared by the 
Executive Committee of the Majes Project [l5]. 
According to feasibility studies the engineering costs had been 
estimated in 3.7 billion soles which we did take initially as a base for 
our evaluation. But that figure would differ significantly from the 
initially prepared budget as to construction costs. This difference is 
not entirely attributable to an underestimation or increment in costs. 
When we reviewed the additional information we found that the feasibility 
studies had not included certain necessary investments. Principally 
those referring to infrastructure and the acquisition of construction 
equipment. It is to be observed that the acquisition of such equipment 
is the direct result of the nature of the negotiations pursued. 
In Table B.ll we present the decomposition of costs in terms of 
machineiry, materials and labor both in national currency and the foreign 
exchange components. In the same table we present jointly the costs in 
terms of 1974 prices and in terms of 1976 adjusted costs. 
On the other hand the value of production has been adjusted accord­
ing to the average yield of the zone within which the project is located. 
For those purposes we utilized the information provided by the Agricul­
tural Development Bank [3]. Specifically the basic budgets by crops as 
prepared by the bank agencies located in Ocona, Arequipa and Camana. 
These budgets present In detail and for one year to the next the yields 
and costs per hectare for different types of crops. It must be observed 
that the Agricultural Development Bank uses this information prepared by 
its own technicians as a basis for extending agricultural credit to the 
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farmers in the zone in question. For purposes of our research we con­
sidered something like 200 reports, all referring to the above mentioned 
agencies located within the zone of the project. With this information 
we then proceeded to verify as to whether the yields estimated in the 
studies are consistent with the yields traditionally reported for that 
zone. After verification and adjustment of such yields we then proceeded 
to calculate the gross value of production by crop in terms of 1976 
prices. 
On the side of operation costs we proceeded in a similar manner 
again utilizing the information of the Agricultural Development Bank with 
respect to labor cost, fertilizer, machinery and other inputs. This 
allows us to compare the costs per hectare referred to in the studies and 
those obtained according to the reports prepared by the bank. In Table 
B.12 we present the costs and yields per hectare for each type of crop 
according to the studies [13] and at 1976 adjusted prices. 
With respect to the Jequetepeque project it was not necessary to 
refer to additional sources of information. In other words we used with­
out substantial modification the figures prepared by the feasibility 
studies [6l]. In Table B.5 we present the costs of the project at 1972 
prices decomposed by major components such as machinery, labor, materials 
and also in terms of national currency and the foreign exchange costs. 
In the same table we present the adjusted costs indicating the respective 
deflators. We have not considered interest costs during the period of 
construction. 
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Oa the other hand the value of production has been adjusted accord­
ing to the average yields of the zone of the project. Similarly we have 
utilized the reports of the loan division of the Agricultural Development 
Bank as prepared for the agencies located in Facasmayo, Cajabamba, 
Chilete, Cajamarca and Huamachuco. These reports gave us the relevant 
information about yields and costs of production per hectare for the 
zone in question. According to this information we adjusted the yields 
and costs stipulated in the studies. In total we used a sample of 150 
crop reports. Once we had made the necessary adjustments for each crop 
we then proceeded to express the value of production in terms of 1976 
adjusted prices. In Table B.6 we present jointly the yields and costs 
per hectare according to the initial studies, after having made the 
necessary adjustments. We must indicate that we have only considered the 
Jequetepeque irrigation project and not the hydroelectric power plant of 
Gallito Ciego and San Juna. In the feasibility studies both hydroelectric 
stations are mentioned but they are not considered in the financial evalu­
ation. 
With respect to the Olmos project the information utilized comes from 
the feasibility studies [41]. For purposes of our evaluation we are only 
considering the irrigation project which is financed entirely by the 
public sector. In Table B.8 we can see the costs of the project accord­
ing to the original feasibility study and in terms of adjusted prices. 
Again we did not include interest payments during the period of construc­
tion. The yields and costs per hectare of the original feasibility study 
were adjusted according to the reports of the Agricultural Development 
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Bank, specifically those prepared for the agency in Jayanca which covers 
the totality of the area of the project. After having made such adjust­
ments we proceeded to express the value of production in terms of 1976 
adjusted prices. The details of costs and revenues per hectare and by 
crops are presented in Table B.9. 
With respect to the Chira-Piura project the statistical source of 
information again comes from the feasibility studies but according to the 
different versions prepared by the same consulting firm. This because 
the project was initially presented as the integral development of the 
river basins of Chira, Fiura and Tumbes. Subsequently such projects were 
evaluated in greater detail separately. For our purposes we are consid­
ering only the Valleys of Chira, Middle and Lower Piura, since they have 
the major infrastructure works in common. 
With respect to the construction costs we based our information on 
that provided by the integral feasibility study [39]. In Table B.l we 
present jointly the costs according to the original feasibility study and 
in terms of 1976 adjusted prices. Again we do not include interest pay­
ments during the construction phase. With respect to yields and costs, per 
hectare these have been evaluated separately for each valley and sub­
sequently we have aggregated these estimates so as to obtain the corre­
sponding estimates for the whole of the project. With respect to the 
necessary adjustments in volumes and costs of production for the Chira 
Valley we have utilized the feasibility study of the Chira Valley [40]. 
In Table 6.3 we present the yields and costs per hectare for the Chira 
Valley in terms of 1976 adjusted prices. This adjustment has taken into 
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account the reports of the Agricultural Development Bank for the agencies 
located in Fiura and Catacaos. The sample used for this purpose vas 
100 reports. 
On the other hand in order to make the adjustments in revenues and 
costs per hectare for the middle and lower Fiura Valleys ve have used the 
feasibility study of the Fiura Valley [38]. The respective adjustments 
vere made utilizing the information of the Agricultural Development Bank 
vith respect to the agencies located in the Fiura Valley. The details of 
revenues and costs according to the original study and in terms of 1976 
adjusted prices are presented in Table B.2. One should be aware of the 
fact that the Chira-Fiura project is an integral project, because both 
valleys are dependent 100 percent on the Poechos Reservoir and the 
Imichira Canal. One can not therefore meaningfully evaluate each valley 
separately. 
Finally, we must indicate that we have not changed for all of the 
irrigation projects mentioned the estimated hectares to be irrigated or 
improved or their estimated cropping intensity. 
3. Adjustments in the mining projects 
The basic information for the Cerro Verde II project has been taken 
from the corresponding feasibility study [68]. In Table B.20 we present 
the costs of the project in terms of 1975 feasibility study prices and 
according to 1976 adjusted prices. For each cost component we also report 
the corresponding deflator used. From this table one can also obtain the 
decomposition of costs associated with the project according to equipment, 
machinery and labor and again specifying the national and foreign exchange 
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components. As for the other projects we have not Included the interest 
payments to be paid during the construction period of the project. Also 
the construction costs are imputed to the project at the moment that the 
engineering works are executed and not when one amortizes the correspond­
ing loans. That is we ignore in this instance the period of grace which 
is associated with the loan which will finance this project. In the 
feasibility study the costs of the project are imputed according to the 
amortization of the principal. In Table B,20 we present jointly the costs 
of operation according to the feasibility study and according to 1976 
adjusted prices. Such costs of operation do not include taxes or interest 
payments. With respect to the value of production we have not made any 
adjustments. We therefore accepted the quantities and prices foreseen in 
the feasibility study. 
With respect to the enlargement of the Ilo refinery we have accepted 
the feasibility studies [20] which were completed taking 1974 as a base 
year. In Table B.14 we can appreciate the decomposition of the costs of 
the project according to the original study and according to 1976 adjusted 
costs. Again we do not include interest payments during the period of 
construction. With respect to production we have accepted as given the 
quantities specified in the studies. Nevertheless we must indicate that 
the revenue generated by this operation are related to the further refin­
ing of copper provided to the Ilo refinery by the Southern Peru Corpora­
tion and not by the direct sale of copper. 
The price for refining the blister copper agreed between Minero Peru 
and the Southern Peru Corporation is equal to $194 per metric ton plus 
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an additional cost related to labor and energy equal to $10.47 per shift 
and 2.2 cents per kilowatt-hour respectively. With an additional adjust­
ment clause to reflect variations in the cost of labor and energy the 
basic refining cost of $194.00 per metric ton increases by 0.6 percent and 
0.15 percent respectively. The value of annual production has been esti­
mated considering a refining service charge equal to $225.00 per metric 
ton. This price allows for an increase of one dollar per shift and for 
four cents per kilowatt-hour utilized. 
With respect to the Cajamarquilla Zinc Refinery [19] we dispose of 
the 1976 feasibility study. For this reason it was not necessary to 
adjust the proposed investment costs and operation costs. In Table B.16 
we present the details of this project. With respect to the revenue we 
have verified the quantities foreseen with respect to production as well 
as for the refining of zinc and corresponding subproducts. The revenue 
to be obtained for refined zinc are based on thirty-seven cents per 
pound for the so-called prime western quality. Again the income postu­
lated is related to the service provided by refining the zinc and because 
of the sale of the product as such. The operational costs are listed in 
Table B.16. We have not included interest payments and taxes. 
With respect to the Michiquillay mining project the information for 
the study again was based on the corresponding feasibility studies [21]. 
In Table B.18 we listed the costs of the project in terms of 1975 and 
1976 adjusted prices. Again we excluded interest during the period of 
construction. Also the cost of the project is calculated according to the 
actual calendar of disbursements and not according to the calendar of 
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amortization of principal. In the costs of operation we have excluded 
the corresponding items related to taxes, depreciation and interest pay­
ments. In Table B.18 we listed the details of the costs of operation 
according to the feasibility study prices and according to 1976 adjusted 
prices. With respect to the anticipated production we have not made any 
adjustment and have therefore accepted the figures as presented by the 
feasibility studies. 
4, Adjustments in the industrial projects 
The basic information for the evaluation of the enlargement of the 
La Pampilla petroleum refinery was obtained entirely from the corre­
sponding feasibility studies [23]. In Table B.22 we present the details 
of the costs of the project both in 1974 and 1976 adjusted prices. With 
respect to the costs of operation we excluded depreciation and taxes. In 
the same table we present the costs of operation in terms of 1974 and 
1976 adjusted prices. With respect to revenue calculations we indicate 
first of all that the quantities of production foreseen and the value of 
this production have been taken from the feasibility studies. The gross 
value of production was estimated according to the price of gasoline and 
subproducts then existing. The sale price was calculated considering a 
price of $2.50 per barrel when the international price was already more 
than $11.00 per barrel. For the purposes of evaluation we considered the 
prices of these products as they existed in 1976. 
With respect to the enlargement of the Chimbote Steel Plant the basic 
information was provided by the corresponding feasibility studies [24]. 
In Table B.24 we present the costs of the project in terms of 1974 and 
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1976 adjusted prices. No adjustment was necessary in terms of the costs 
listed. The adjustment of prices has been based on the prices provided 
by the steel plant as foreseen for 1976. It must be observed that in the 
feasibility studies the financial evaluation takes the steel plant as a 
whole; that is, actual productive capacity plus the enlargement of this. 
One does not specify which part of the value of production is imputable 
to the project. 
With respect to the Yura cement project again the feasibility studies 
provided the basic necessary information [33]. In Table B.28 we present 
both the cost of the project and the operational costs according to the 
feasibility study prices and according to 1976 adjusted prices. We also 
indicate the costs in terms of domestic and foreign currency respectively. 
These flows do not include taxes, depreciation and interest payments. The 
figure of revenues are based upon the assumption of a 20 percent increase 
in the price of cement. 
The feasibility studies related to the Fertilizer Plant [22] consider 
two production alternatives. The first one is based on an annual produc­
tion equal to 188,000 metric tons of ammonia and 168,000 metric tons of 
urea annually. The second alternative which was actually adopted, con­
siders an annual production of 99,000 metric tons of ammonia, without a 
reduction in the previously stated production of urea. The difference is 
due to the fact that with the second alternative all of the ammonia pro­
duced is used for the production of urea. In Table B.26 we present the 
construction costs for the alternative selected at both 1971 and 1976 
adjusted. Operation costs again exclude taxes and interest payments. 
123 
Finally, we must observe that in making these adjustments for each 
project we have never considered as costs taxes, interest payments or 
amortization during the period of construction. For all projects the 
foreign exchange adopted was that which existed at the end of 1976, 
that is S/. 70.0 = $U.S. 1.00. 
C. Social Evaluation of the Selected Projects 
1. Marglin approach 
Initially we will proceed to apply the method proposed by ONUDI 
[l4] in successive steps in order to appreciate the influence on the 
profitability of the projects of the different assumptions and adjust­
ments that convert a financial evaluation into an economic or social 
evaluation. In other words we will start applying the traditional 
analysis, which we refer to as Alternative I, and then we proceed to 
realize the necessary adjustments in the market prices, which constitute 
our Alternative II. Subsequently we proceed to identify the participa­
tion in costs and benefits of the different economic groups associated 
with the project. Once this has been done we will estimate the profita­
bility indexes in terms of the consumption generated, according to the 
marginal propensities to save and invest of each economic group associated 
with the project. This constitutes our Alternative III. 
It must be observed that in each alternative we will estimate for 
each project the net present value, the benefit-cost ratios and the 
internal rate of return. In each case we will compare the outcomes for 
each alternative verifying if the application of one or another 
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profitability index produced a different ranking of projects. In this 
way we proceed to estimate the profitability indexes without making any 
adjustments in the market prices. From now on we will refer to this 
alternative as Alternative I. The estimation of the respective profit­
ability indexes are based on the following relations: 
n (B - C ) n K 
NPV = S r - S c = 1, n (6.1) 
t=l (1 + i) t-1 (1 + i)^  
n (B - C ) y n K 
B/G = S  ^/ S  ^ (6.2) 
t=l (1 + i)^  / t=l (1 + i)^  
n (B - C ) n K 
S —  ^- S  ^= 0 (6.3) 
t=l (1 + r) t=l (1 + r) 
Bt = + B^  + (6.4) 
C" = C* + (6.5) 
C = + C* + C° (6.6) 
Kt = KJ + (6.7) 
K° = K° + KJ + K" + K® (6.8) 
where: 
NPV = net present value at market prices, 
B/C = benefit/cost ratio at market prices, 
r = internal rate of return, 
i = social rate of discount. 
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= annual gross production, year t, 
= annual gross production in domestic currency, year t, 
= annual gross production in foreign currency, year t, 
= salvage value, year t, 
= annual operating costs at market prices, year t, 
= annual operating costs in domestic currency, year t, 
= operating inputs and material costs, year t, 
W 
= operating labor cost, year t, 
= administrative, maintenance and replacement costs, year t, 
= annual operating costs in foreign currency, 
K = total investment at market prices, year t, 
t 
= construction and equipment costs in domestic currency, 
year t, 
= machinery and equipment costs in domestic currency, year t, 
K™ = construction material costs in domestic currency, year t, 
W 
= construction labor cost, year t, 
= associated and administrative cost, year t and, 
= construction and equipment cost in foreign currency. 
Next, we proceed to estimate the net effect on the project taking 
into consideration the shadow price of labor and the shadow price of 
foreign exchange. From now on we will refer to this alternative as 
Alternative II. The estimation of the respective profitability indexes 
are based on the same relations 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, but adjusting the annual 
flows B^ , and according to the following relations. 
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B* = + 08^  + Vj (6.9) 
* f w 
+ 0C^  + xc^  (6.10) 
* f w 
+ 0K^  + XKj. (6.11) 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
where each additional term is defined as follows 
* 
= annual gross production at shadow prices, year t, 
* 
= annual operating costs at shadow prices, year t, 
* 
= total investment at shadow prices, year t, 
0 = foreign exchange premium, 
Pg = shadow price of foreign exchange, 
= official foreign exchange rate, 
X = labor premium, 
W 
P^  = shadow price of labor and, 
W P = market price of labor. 
Finally, from Alternative II we proceed to identify the distributive 
shares of benefits and costs imputed to each economic agent associated 
with the project. We are considering as economic agents the private 
sector (P), the public sector (G), the wage earners (L) and farmers (A). 
The process of identification and assigning of the distributive 
* * 
shares, consists of determining which part of the annual flows B^ , C^ , and 
* 
are enjoyed or paid by each economic group. This distribution will 
depend on the way the project is financed and who operates the project. 
o 
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The assignment of the distributive shares and the estimation of the 
respective profitability indexes, in terms of consumption, are based on 
* * * 
the same relations 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 but the annual flows B^ , and 
are redefined according to the following relations: 
B* = B*^  + B*^  + B*^  + B*^  (6.14) 
C* = + C*^ + C*^ + C*^ (6.15) 
K* = K*^  + + K*^  + K*^  (6.16) 
where: 
(B-
- K*^ )((l - Sg) + Sg (6.17) 
t^ " (Bf -e - K*^ )((l - s^ ) + s^  pi™) (6.18) 
CBf - K*F)((1 - Sp) + Sp P™) (6.19) 
II 
- K*^  )((1 - s^ ) + s^  pi™) (6.20) 
St = (6.21) 
*G *P *L *A . 
B^  , B^  , B^  , B^  = distribution of benefits (B^ ) towards the 
public sector, private sector, wage earners 
and farmers respectively, year t, 
*P *T ** * 
Ct , Ct , Ct , Ct = distributions of operating costs (C^ ) 
towards the public sector, private sector, 
wage earners and farmers respectively, 
year t. 
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= distribution of total investment (K^ ) 
towards the public sector, private sector, 
wage earners and farmers respectively. 
year t. 
Sg, Sp, s^ , s^  = marginal propensities to save of the public 
sector, private sector, wage earners and 
farmers respectively. 
P inv = shadow price of investment and. 
S 
t 
= social value of net aggregated consumption. 
year t. 
We must mention that relation 6.20 determines the net present value 
for our Alternative III. For purposes of estimating the benefit-cost 
* * * 
ratio and the internal rate of return the annual flows B^ , C^ , and must 
be weighted according to relations 6.17, 6.18, 6.19 and 6.20. 
2. Results of Alternative I 
In this first alternative we proceeded to estimate the indexes of 
profitability taking as a point of reference the prices as existing in the 
market. In Appendix B we detail the costs of the projects indicating the 
more important components of investment. 
With respect to the agricultural projects we observe that the invest­
ment categories are more or less the same between projects. The share of 
labor fluctuates between 12 percent for Majes and 19 percent for 
Jequetepeque. On the other hand the foreign exchange component represents 
approximately 35 percent of total project costs. The costs corresponding 
to agricultural development are approximately 30 percent of total cost. 
129 
With respect to industrial projects a similar observation holds true, but 
one nevertheless observes a decrease in the share of labor costs. The 
share of labor cost fluctuates between 12 percent for the Steel Plant in 
Chimbote and 7 percent for the Fertilizer Plant in northern Peru. The 
item for equipment constitutes the largest investment item, equalling on 
the average 40 percent. The foreign exchange component is highly corre­
lated with the participation of machinery in the total cost of the 
project. On the other hand mining projects tend to have a high capital 
intensity, such that this represents at least 60 percent of the proposed 
investment. The budgeted import requirements are closely linked to this. 
The cost for the labor utilized during the period of construction repre­
sents on the average only 6 percent of the total cost of the project. In 
Appendix B one can obtain an overview of the annual revenues and operation 
costs for the selected projects. For the agricultural projects these are 
specified in Tables B.l - B.13 and they also provide the annual value of 
production and yields and costs per hectare for each crop. 
The Chira-Piura and Olmos projects have the highest yields per 
hectare respectively equalling 80,000 and 53,000 soles per year. The 
exported component of these projects fluctuates between 13 percent for 
Majes and 29 percent for Chira-Piura. In Table 6.2 we specify the per­
centages which are destined for exports or will substitute for current 
imports. With respect to operation costs labor share is calculated to 
participate on an average of 41 percent. The imported component is not 
really significant for agricultural projects, equalling less than 1 per­
cent of operation costs. 
Table 6.2. Labor costs, foreign exchange cost and returns as a propor­
tion of total investment, operating costs and gross output 
Labor Costs as 
Construction Production a % of 
Period Period Total Operating 
Project (Yrs) (Yrs) Investment Costs 
Chira-Piura 12 57 13.6 41.3 
Jequetepeque 9 50 19.5 35.5 
Olmos 26 56 15.8 44.4 
Maj es 14 50 11.9 40.8 
Michiquillay 6 20 4.5 19.2 
Hon 3 20 12.1 23.3 
Cerro Verdell 4 15 5.8 8.0 
Cajamarquilla 4 15 5.4 25.5 
Steel Plant 15 21 12.9 10.2 
La Pampilla 3 20 7.4 0.6 
Yura 3 15 8.7 10.9 
Fertilizer 2 15 7.3 4.7 
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Foreign Exchange Costs as Foreign Exchange Earnings as 
a % of a % of 
Total Operating Gross 
Investment Costs Production 
31.1 0.3 28.9 
43.3 0.6 26.0 
40.0 0.3 26.8 
13.7 0.4 12.4 
24.9 27.8 100.0 
54.8 43.8 100.0 
49.6 9.7 95.0 
60.1 30.3 100.0 
35.7 1.5 42.6 
61.0 1.3 9.4 
44.1 0.6 100.0 
54.3 0.4 100.0 
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On the other hand the industrial projects are highly technical and 
labor costs amount to less than 10 percent of costs of operation. The 
production of these projects is basically destined to satisfy domestic 
demand. Nevertheless the fertilizer project substitutes in 100 percent 
current urea imports. The import requirements of industrial projects 
fluctuates between 1 percent and 2 percent of the costs of operation. 
The mining projects will produce entirely for export purposes. The 
requirements of goods and services to be imported equal on the average 
25 percent of the costs of operation, labor costs equal approximately 20 
percent. In Appendix B we present the flows of costs and benefits 
associated with the total economic life of these projects selected for 
further study. The periods of construction have been taken from the 
feasibility studies and also reflect to some extent the priority assigned 
to them by the government. The periods of production correspond to the 
conventional averages for these types of projects and not to the economi­
cally useful life of physical assets. For the purposes of the calcula­
tion of the net present value, benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate 
of return we assumed a social rate of discount equal to 10 percent. This 
value has been estimated following the procedure suggested by Marglin [48] 
according to the following relationship: 
i = (1 + v)(s/y)(y/k) (6.22) 
where : 
i = social rate of discount, 
(1+v) = negative of the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption, 
s/y = saving-output ratio and. 
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y/k = output-capital ratio. 
We assigned a value of 1.25 to the parameter (1+v), which is consistent 
with the value of the money flexibility estimated by Van de Wetering for 
Peru [74]. In the study referred to the parameter (1+v) was calculated at 
the national level as being between -1.01 and -1.44. The value adopted 
here represents the average of this range. 
The savings rate was calculated according to the official statistics 
of the Central Reserve Bank [ 5]• The computed value equals 18 percent 
corresponding to the average of the years 1967 through 1974. It may be 
observed that this value is consistent with that realized by Christian 
[12]. On the other hand we assigned a value of 2.2 to the capital-output 
ratio. This ratio was calculated by Taylor [66] in his estimation of the 
stock of capital and the rate of return on the stock of capital for Peru. 
For the purposes of calculating the indexes of profitability we have 
assumed that both the costs and the benefits correspond to the end of the 
year of the project. The discounting process starts in year zero. In 
Table 6.3 we present the net present value according to Alternative I 
taking as a base existing market prices. The results with respect to 
agricultural projects indicates the Chira-Piura project as the most 
profitable. The only project which obtains a negative net present value 
is the Majes irrigation project. With respect to the industrial projects 
both the Steel Plant and the La Pampilla oil refinery stand out because of 
the large value of their net present value where the steel plant actually 
ranks first. 
Table 6.3. Net present value and ranking of the selected projects 
Marglin Approach 
Project Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III 
(million soles) 
Steel Plant 24617.5 42751.8 81654.9 
La Pampilla 19679.7 28750.9 54937.7 
IloII 5273.9 10312.4 19728.0 
Chira-Piura 3149.5 8799.5 8900.3 
Olmos 2444.8 5197.3 3934.8 
Cajamarquilla 1379.9 5597.8 10763.0 
Michiquillay 1359.6 19020.0 36904.0 
Jequetepeque 1268.9 4780.7 3965.3 
Fertilizer 683.3 3625.2 6924i2 
Yura 196.3 65.6 125.6 
Maj es -747.8 702.8 -4936.5 
Cerro Verdell -4509.1 26075.4 51688.9 
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Little-Mirrlees Approach Ranking 
Alternative IV Alt. I Alt. II Alt, III Alt. TV 
(million soles) 
49167.9 1 1 1 1 
29130.7 2 2 2 3 
11240.5 3 5 5 6 
11644.5 4 6 7 5 
9101.9 5 8 10 7 
6640.2 6 7 6 8 
21768.4 7 4 4 4 
6566.1 8 9 9 9 
3915.1 9 10 8 10 
210.8 10 12 11 12 
1126.5 11 11 12 11 
30373.5 12 3 3 2 
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Among the mining projects the Ilo refinery obtains the largest net 
present value. On the other hand the Cerro Verde project has a negative 
net present value. If we take the twelve projects together we can 
appreciate from Table 6.3 that the steel plant, the La Pampilla refinery, 
the Ilo copper refinery and the Chira-Piura irrigation project obtain the 
first four positions in the ranking whereas the Cerro Verde and Majes 
projects occupy the last two positions respectively. 
In Table 6.4 we present the results of the benefit-cost ratio ob­
tained for the twelve projects selected. With respect to the agricultural 
projects and mining projects we observe that the ranking of the projects 
are similar to that obtained for the net present value. On the other hand 
for the industrial projects, the La Pampilla refinery now has a larger 
benefit-cost ratio than the Chimbote Steel Plant. This because the 
investment required for the Steel Plant extension is much larger than that 
for the La Pampilla refinery. If we take the twelve projects together, 
then the La Pampilla, Ilo, Chira-Piura and the Steel Plant occupy, in that 
order, the first places in the ranking. This ranking corresponds to those 
which were previously obtained for the net present value ranking. The 
Cerro Verde and the Majes projects again occupy the last places in this 
ranking. 
In Table 6.5 we present the results of the internal rate of return. 
In the mining sector and industrial sector the ranking obtained is the 
same as that obtained with the benefit-cost ratio. On the other hand in 
the agricultural sector the Olmos project now obtains an internal rate of 
return larger than that obtained for the Chira-Piura project as a result 
Table 6,4. Benefit-cost ratio and ranking of the selected projects 
Marglin Approach 
Project Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III 
La Pampilla 5.56 6.12 6.13 
IloII 2.09 2.67 2.68 
Chira-Piura 1.66 2.55 1.82 
Steel Plant 1.63 1.93 1.93 
Olmos 1.60 2.04 1.41 
Jequetepeque 1.31 2.02 1.45 
Fertilizer 1.22 1.92 1.92 
Yura 1.16 1.04 1.04 
Cajamarquilla 1.16 1.49 1.49 
Michiquillay 1.05 1.66 1.67 
Cerro Verde II 0.94 1.29 1.31 
Majes 0.90 1.09 0.70 
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Little-Mirrlees Approach Ranking 
Alternative IV Alt. I Alt. II Alt. Ill Alt. IV 
6.36 1 
2.92 2 
3.23 3 
2.12 4 
2.98 5 
2.53 6 
2.02 7 
1.15 8 
1.59 9 
1.76 10 
1.35 11 
1.15 12 
1 1 1  
2 2 4 
3 5 2 
6 3 6 
4 9 3 
5 8 5 
7 4 7 
12 11 11 
9 7 9 
8 6 8 
10 10 10 
11 12 12 
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of a lesser amount of investment required and because of a larger period 
of construction. If we take the twelve projects together we observe that 
the first four places in the ranking are occupied by La Pampilla, Ilo, the 
Steel Plant and Olmos. The last places are again occupied by Cerro Verde 
and the Majes irrigation project. 
In general we therefore can state that with this alternative there 
is not a definitive superiority as between agricultural, mining and 
industrial projects. That is, according to the criteria adopted, there 
are certain changes in the respective rankings obtained. Both with 
respect to the net present value, benefit-cost ratio and the internal 
rate of return criterion the first five positions and the last two posi­
tions are taken by the same projects. 
We must indicate that while the production of the mining projects 
were based on prices determined by the international mechanism of supply 
and demand, the prices for agricultural products are determined to some 
extent by the domestic government policy aimed at maintaining low prices 
to the consumer for these products. In the industrial sector the La 
Pampilla refinery and the Steel Plant have significantly improved their 
profitability because of recent adjustment in prices. In the initial 
feasibility studies the internal rates of return for these projects were 
less than 10 percent. 
3, Results of Alternative II 
For the computation of the indexes of profitability with respect to 
this alternative it was necessary to readjust the market prices of labor 
and foreign exchange. For the determination of the appropriate shadow 
Table 6.5, Inteimal rate of return and ranking of the selected projects 
Marglin Approach 
Project Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III 
(percentage) 
La Pampilla 50. 82 58. 15 58. 27 
IloII 21. 08 25. 69 25. 76 
Steel Plant 16. 57 18. 38 18. 47 
Olmos 14. 38 16. 65 13. 03 
Chira-Piura 13. 71 21. 60 16. 13 
Fertilizer 13. 01 21. 40 21. 51 
Yura 12. 33 10. 58 10. 67 
Cajamarquilla 12. 10 16. 08 20. 57 
Jequetepeque 12. 03 16. 10 12. 69 
Michiquillay 10. 55 15. 75 15. 96 
Majes 9. 15 10. 71 7. 93 
Cerro Verdell 8. 36 12. 71 12. 87 
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Little-Mirrlees Approach . Ranking 
Alternative IV Alt. I Alt. II Alt. Ill Alt. IV 
(percentage) 
59.73 1 1 1 1 
26.04 2 2 2 3 
19.76 3 5 5 5 
19.38 4 6 8 7 
27.91 5 3 6 2 
22.38 6 4 3 4 
12.06 7 12 11 12 
15.75 8 8 4 9 
19.50 9 7 10 6 
16.50 10 9 7 8 
12.15 11 11 12 11 
13.43 12 10 9 10 
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price of labor we followed the procedure suggested by Marglin [14]. 
Under this focus we define the shadow wage rate as the approximation to 
the opportunity cost involved. We do not include in the value of the 
shadow wage rate the indirect costs and factors related to income distri­
bution. For the purposes of this computation we have assumed that the 
incentive necessary to mobilize labor from the traditional rural sector 
towards the modem rural sector or to the modern urban sector will be 
constant, independent of the amount of mobilization involved. For the 
estimation of the shadow wage rate we have determined that there exists 
a difference of 20 percent between wages received in urban areas and rural 
areas. This percentage has been derived from the statistics of the 
Ministry of Labor, the office of wage rates which tabulate the minimum 
wage rates received by urban and rural areas for the different departments 
of the country. In this form we determined the shadow wage rate as 60 
percent of the market wage rate. Subsequently we calculated according to 
relation (6.13) the premium to be given to labor, which was calculated to 
equal 0.4. This value allows us to discount the cost of construction and 
the costs of operation to the extent that they refer to unskilled labor 
starting with the data underlining the calculations in Alternative I. 
In the case of mining and industrial projects we determined the per­
centage of unskilled labor utilized in the period of construction at only 
10 percent of the total labor involved. This value is the result of the 
visits realized to the zone of these projects where we found that the 
laborers employed were actually permanent employees of the construction 
firms. For the period of operation we have assumed that all of the 
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employees were skilled because of the advanced technological aspects 
involved in the production of these projects. In the case of agricul­
tural projects we have assumed that 20 percent of labor was unskilled 
during the period of construction and 100 percent during the period of 
operation. 
Peru has utilized since 1968 a rigidly controlled system of foreign 
exchange. This nonmarket oriented allocation of scarce foreign exchange 
has tended to protect domestic industries by means of tariffs and 
increased restrictions on the importation of goods and services. Even 
with such measures the econony continues to suffer a deficit on the 
current balance of trade, perhaps because of the actual structure of 
production of the country. The increasing public debt has also been a 
strategic variable influencing the availability of foreign exchange. The 
annual repayments of the foreign debt now equal 50 percent of exports 
earnings and are projected to increase beyond that. 
Taking this into consideration we have estimated conservatively that 
the shadow price for foreign exchange will fluctuate between 1.5 and 1.7 
times the actual market rate. Given the statistical limitations it was 
not possible to estimate above value according to more refined methodolog­
ical procedures but nevertheless we must mention that the application of 
relationship 3.17 as formulated by Bruno for these twelve projects yielded 
a value of 2.0 as the resource cost of generating one dollar of foreign 
exchange. The foreign exchange premium has been determined according to 
relation 6.12 as being equal to 0.5. This value allows us to discount 
the costs of construction and the costs of operation the imported or 
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exported components given the initial results obtained under 
Alternative I. 
In Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 we list the results obtained for the 
net present value, the benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate of 
return for the twelve projects selected. With respect to the agricul­
tural projects the three indexes of profitability maintain the same 
ranking. However the Chira-Piura project now stands out as being very 
profitable. These results are to be expected because of the similarity 
between the employment and balance of payments effects. It is worth 
mentioning that the Majes irrigation project now has a positive index 
of profitability. In the industrial projects the benefit-cost ratio and 
the internal rate of return have the same ranking, where the La Pampilla 
refinery project occupies the first place. On the other hand the net 
present value ranking again puts the Chimbote Steel Plant as first. 
The ranking under Alternative II is therefore exactly the same as that 
ranking obtained with the profitability indexes calculated under Alterna­
tive I. Nevertheless, while the industrial projects improve their indexes 
of profitability the Yura cement project reflects a decrease in profita­
bility because of the negative effect of the shadow exchange rate. The 
mining projects also maintain their similar ranking with respect to the 
profitability indexes calculated under Alternative I. 
When we take the twelve projects together we see that the net present 
value ranking takes the first four spots away from the agricultural 
projects, nevertheless, in the benefit-cost ratio ranking the third and 
fourth place are occupied by Chira-Piura and Olmos irrigation projects. 
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The internal rate of return ranking does not affect the first three posi­
tions but now assigns the Fertilizer project as being the fourth most 
profitable project. As a final observation relative to the analysis 
implied in Alternative II we must indicate that the mining projects are 
the most favored because the premium of foreign exchange is applied to 
100 percent of their production. As can be seen that the Cerro Verde 
project now occupies the third place in the ranking in terms of net 
present value, when under Alternative I it occupied the last place with a 
negative net present value. The reestimated price for labor increases 
the profitability of agricultural projects but it is not sufficient to 
offset the foreign exchange effect of mining projects. 
4. Results of Alternative III 
The first step in the estimation of the indexes of profitability of 
this alternative consist in the assignment of costs and benefits as 
between economic groups that participate in the project. For the agricul­
tural projects the value of annual production (B^ ) has been allotted to 
farmers (B^ )^ because they are the owners of the land and also work the 
land and hence receive all of the benefits. In the case of the Chira-
Piura and the Jequetepeque irrigation projects the agricultural income 
*A foregone is already subtracted from B^  . On the other hand the premium 
to be allotted to the exported component of production or the import sub-
f *G 
stituted for (0B^ ) has been alloted to the government (B^  ) because the 
public sector pays to the farmers the official exchange rate and retains 
for itself the surplus. The cost of construction, equipment and engineer-
ing (K^ ) are allotted to the government (K^  ) because the implementation 
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of the project is undertaken by the public sector. Similarly we have 
imputed to the government the additional costs related to the premium to 
be paid for the imported component (0K^ ) associated with the investment. 
W 
On the other hand the premium associated with unskilled labor (0.2XK^ ) 
has been imputed to workers. The coefficient 0.2 corresponds to the 
percentage of unskilled labor utilized in these projects during the stage 
of construction. 
We must indicate that normally public projects are financed under 
the mode of "pari passu" operation. That is part of the project is 
financed by international institutions and credit suppliers and part by 
the national government. The allocation of resources on the part of the 
government is realized partially by available public funds and rarely 
does one create a specific tax so as to finance a specific project. With 
this we want to indicate that the private sector does not directly absorb 
the financing of a public project. Nevertheless we assume that the pri­
vate sector indirectly finances part of the national component of invest­
ments, equivalent to the annual increment in the capital transfer which 
receives the sector responsible for the project, either a ministry or a 
public enterprise from the treasury. We assume that the resources of the 
treasury are obtained via taxes. 
For the agricultural sector we have determined that according to the 
budgetary allotments in the period 1968-1975 [53] that the average annual 
increase in funds obtained from the treasury represent 9 percent of 
capital expenditures. This percentage distributed between all of the 
projects in the agricultural sector determines that part financed. 
*p 
indirectly by the private sector (K^  ). 
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The amounts allotted to the private sector are on the average not 
very significant. For the agricultural sector projects they represent 
less than 2 percent of total costs. The inclusion of the private sector 
given the foregoing assumption can be easily revocable but we thou^ t it 
convenient to include the private sector in this type of analysis because 
the government could create on a short run basis legal disposition either 
in the form of a tax or a loan specifically aimed at the financing of a 
public project. In this case the private sector then must assume the 
responsibility of financing the project. 
With respect to the cost of operation (C^ ) we have imputed direct 
cost of production to the farmers (C^ )^ because they are the owners of the 
W land. The premium for unskilled labor (XC^ ) is equally allotted to 
farmers whereas the premium related to foreign exchange (0C^ ) is imputed 
to the government. The salvage value and working capital (V^ ) are 
assigned to the government because the works are of a public character 
and the working capital is provided by government institutions. The 
respective distributive share are found in Table 6.6. 
* * 
Once one has calculated the assignment of costs and benefits, B , C 
* 
and K between the different economic groups we can then determine the 
distributional shares S^ , S^ , and in terms of consumption generated 
according to the proportions that each of these groups allot for consump­
tion and investment. For this purpose we have determined the shadow price 
of investment according to the following relation: 
jinv ^  (1 - s)q (6.23) 
1 - sq 
where 
Table 6.6. Present value* of benefits and costs in year zero and 
distributive shares 
Present Values 
Proj ect 
Total 
Output 
Total 
Investment 
(Public) (Other) 
(million soles) 
Chira-Piura 
(distributive shares) 
4761.5 4706.0 
(K*G) 
55.5 
(K*P) 
Jequetepeque 
(distributive shares) 
16950.1 
(B*&) 
4109.5 (4052.6) 
(K*G) 
(56.9) 
(K*P) 
Olmos 
(distributive shares) 
15754,2 4057.2 (4016.8) (40.4) 
(K*") 
Maj es 
(distributive shares) 
14199,5 7724.4 (7595.8) 
(K*G) 
(128.6) 
(m 
Michiquillay 
(distributive shares) 
48243.5 
(B*A) 
25662.8 (24525.5) 
(K*G) 
(1137.3) 
(K*P) 
IloII 
(distributive shares) 
14683.6 
(B*A) 
4858.5 (4764,1) 
(K^ G) 
(94,4) 
(K 
Cerro Verdell 
(distributive shares) 
107334.6 
(B*A) 
71197.8 (67331.8) 
(K*G) 
(3866.0) 
(K*^ ) 
Cajamarquilla 
(distributive shares) 
15283.0 
(B*A) 
8827.5 (8662.8) 
(K*G) 
(164.7) 
(K*P) 
Steel Plant 
(distributive shares) 
136848.0 
(B*4 
38774.7 (38539.0) 
(K*G) 
(235.7) 
La Pampilla 
(distributive shares) 
82868.6 
(B*4 
4312.0 (4249.2) 
(K*G) 
(62.8) 
(K*^ ) 
Yura 
(distributive shares) 
2831.0 
(B*A) 
1207.1 (1200.5) 
(K*G) K 
Fertilizer 
(distributive shares) 
7645.6 
(B-'A) 
3080.9 (3067.7) 
(K*G) 
13.2 
(K*F) 
S^ocial rate of discount = 10%. 
Foreign exchange premium = 50% of the market rate. 
L^abor premium = 40% of the market rate. 
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Operating Foreign Exchange Labor Premium^  Salvage Value 
Costs Premium, Net Construction Production and 
Period Period Working Capital 
15m-8 
(C*G) 
2764.5 
(B*G) 
70.5 
(B^ &) 
11573.1 
(C*A) 
1807.1 
(B*G) (B^ ) 
9252.2 
(C*A) 
1623.9 
(.C*A) 
-
00
 
209.6 
(B*G) (B~®) 
21471.9 
(C*A) 
17639.3 
(B*G) 
-
4604.7 
(C*A) 
- (I*GJ 
42242.4 
(C*A) 
-
5320.4 
(C*A) 
4198.8 
(B*G) 
-
74358.0 
(C*A) 
17962,5 
(B*G) (% - 902.4 (B*G) 
58938.7 
(C*A) 
9057.9 
(B G) 
- 62.2 
(B*G) 
1442.2 
(C*A) 
-134.9 
(B*G) 
-
4030.4 
(c*K) 
2932 9 
(B*G) (-K^ ) 
- SK 
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s = marginal propensity to save. 
q = marginal rate of return. 
i = social rate of discount and, 
= shadow price of investment. 
The value of the parameter q has been determined as equal to 0.15 
according to Taylor [66] for Peru. The value of 0.41 assigned to the 
parameter s comes from the consumption function obtained in the model 
constructed by Christian [12]. The solution of relationship (6.23) yields 
a value for the price of investment equal to 2.3 if the social rate of 
discount equals 10 percent. 
The social value of the consumption generated by the farmers is 
given by relation (6.20) where the second term on the right ((l-s^ ) 
+ s^  P^ °^ )^ gives us the social weight assigned to consumption by farmers. 
Given a marginal propensity to save of farmers equal to 0.13 and a shadow 
price of investment equal to 2.3 the distributive share of farmers in 
terms of consumption generated can be expressed as follows: 
Also the social value generated by the public sector corresponding to 
a marginal propensity to save equal to 0.70 can be expressed according to 
relation (6.17) as follows: 
The distributive share corresponding to the private sector with a 
marginal propensity to save equal to 0.30 can be expressed according to 
relation (6.19) as follows: 
(6.24) 
(6.25) 
146 
= 1.39 (- K*^) (6.26) 
Finally the distributive share corresponding to the wage earners 
with a marginal propensity to save equal to 0.12 can be expressed accord­
ing to relation (6.18) as follows: 
S ^ = 1 . 1 6 ( - K * b  ( 6 . 2 7 )  
Given the statistical limitations it was not possible to estimate 
above values according to more refined methodological procedures but 
nevertheless we must mention that those parameters have been calculated 
following one of the procedures suggested by Marglin [14]. In the case 
of the marginal propensity to save of the public sector we have taken as 
a first approximation the ratio of incremental investment (28.5 billions 
of soles) to incremental expenditure (41 billions of soles) for the 
period 1969-1974 [5]. This ratio determines the value of 0.70 assigned 
to Sg. In the case of the marginal propensity to save of the private 
sector we have taken the ratio of incremental retained earnings (6.8 
billions of soles) to incremental after-tax profits (22.7 billions of 
soles) for the same period [54]. This ratio determines the value of 0.30 
assigned to s^ . With respect to the marginal propensities to save of 
farmers and wage earners we have taken as reference the ratio of incre­
mental retained earnings to after-tax profits for several agroindustries 
[54]. This ratio determines the values of 12 percent and 13 percent for 
and s^  respectively. In Table 6.7 we listed all the parameters 
utilized under this alternative. 
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Table 6.7. Values of general parameters 
Parameter Value 
Marginal propensity to import m = 0.25 
Marginal propensity to save s = 0.41 
Return to capital g = 0.15 
Capital output ratio k/y = 2.2 
Negative of the elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption (l+v) = 1.25 
Social rate of discount 
§
 
II •
rl 
Marginal propensity to save: 
public sector Sg = 0.70 
private sector Sp = 0.30 
wage earners Sl = 0.12 
farmers s^  = 0.13 
Weigh on aggregate consumption: 
public sector [(1-Sg) + Sg P^ ^^ ] = 1.91 
private sector [(1-Sp) + Sp P™^ ] = 1.39 
wage earners [(1-s^ ) + s^  = 1.16 
farmers [(1-s^ ) + s^  P^ ^^ ] = 1.17 
Unskilled labor premium 
o
 
II 
Foreign exchange premium  ^= 0,5 
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The Indexes of profitability net present value, benefit-cost ratio 
and the internal rate of return have been determined for the agricultural 
projects according to relations 6.24 - 6.27. The assignment of the costs 
* * * 
and benefits 6 , C and K for the industrial and mining projects we 
assumed an homogeneous form because all of these projects are in the hands 
of respective public authorities. 
The value of annual production (B^ ) and the premium of foreign 
f *G 
exchange (0B^ ) have been assigned to the public sector (B^  ). Equally 
we impute the total cost of the project (K^ ) and the premium correspon­
dent to the imported component (0K^ ) to the public sector. On the other 
W hand the premium for unskilled labor (0.10 XK^ ) is assigned to the wage 
*L 
earners (K^  ). The coefficient 0.10 corresponds to the percentage of 
unskilled labor that intervenes in the period of construction. 
The amounts imputed to the private sector for the mining projects 
correspond to an annual increase of public fund equivalent to 22 percent 
of total capital expenditure. The corresponding amounts represent on the 
average six percent of total costs. 
For the industrial projects we determined an annual increase from 
public fund equivalent to 5 percent of capital expenditures. The 
corresponding quantities represent on the average 1 percent of total 
costs. The costs of operation (C^ ) are imputed entirely to the public 
sector and also the premium related to the imported component. 
With respect to mining and industrial projects only the public 
sector, the private sector and wage earners are to be identified as 
participants in costs and benefits. Because of this the profitability 
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indexes such as the net present value, benefit-cost ratio and the 
internal rate of return can be calculated on the basis of the relation­
ship (6.25), (6.26) and (6.27). 
The results obtained for the net present value are listed in Table 
6.3 and we also list their corresponding ranking. Within the agricul­
tural projects the Chira-Piura project maintains its first place but the 
Jequetepeque project moves up one place and leaves the Olmos project now 
in third place. This change is the result of the larger capital inten­
sity of the Olmos project. Observe that the net present value of the 
agricultural projects has decreased with respect to the values obtained 
under Alternative II. This decrease is caused by a disproportions! 
increase in capital expenditures with respect to the benefits. That is 
to say while the investment costs and the premium to be paid for foreign 
exchange have increased by 90 percent the benefits have increased by 
17 percent due to the weight given to consumption by farmers. The Majes 
irrigation project is again the lowest in terms of this ranking and 
once again obtains a negative net present value. 
Within the industrial projects we maintain the same ranking as 
we obtained under Alternative I and Alternative II but the net present 
value has increased considerably because both the costs and benefits have 
increased by 90 percent but the premium of foreign exchange is what 
determines this increase because a very hi^  percentage of production is 
destined for exports. In the mining projects we observe a very funda­
mental change. The Cerro Verde project now obtains the first place. If 
we take the 12 projects together we find that the Chimbote Steel Plant, 
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the La Fampilla oil refinery, the Cerro Verde and Michiquillay mining 
projects now obtain the first four positions of the ranking obtained for 
the net present value. The agricultural projects now stand around the 
third section of the ranking. 
The mining and industrial projects have improved their positions 
in terms of the absolute value of net present value and proportionally 
to the weight given to consumption by the public sector. The agricul­
tural projects on the other hand have not been able to compensate for 
the increased investment costs and the increased premium of foreign 
exchange and labor. That is the weighting factor assigned to the 
government is greater in the construction phase than in the weight given 
to the consumption of farmers during the operation phase. 
In absolute terms the range of net present value is very large, 
oscillating between 81 billion soles for the steel plant and -4.9 billion 
soles for the Majes irrigation project. The results in terms of the 
benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate of return are presented in 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5. 
For the agricultural projects the benefit-cost ratio maintains the 
ranking obtained for the net present value criterion, nevertheless for the 
internal rate of return the Olmos project again occupies the second 
place. For the industrial projects both the benefit-cost ratio and the 
internal rate of return have similar rankings. For the mining projects 
the Ilo refinery again occupies the first position and Cerro Verde again 
passes to the last position. If we take all the projects together then we 
see that the La Pampilla, Ilo, the Steel Plant and the Fertilizer project 
151 
occupy the first four positions of the benefit-cost ratio ranking and for 
the internal rate of return criterion the Steel Plant is displaced by the 
Cajamarquilla project. It is iz^ ortant to observe that the benefit-cost 
ratio results do not produce a large range of variation between projects. 
Furthermore the indexes obtained by the utilization of the benefit-cost 
ratio are quite similar to Alternatives I and II. On the other hand the 
net present value results differ considerably from those obtained when 
calculating Alternative II. 
On the other hand we observe that the present value criterion 
improve the projects operated-maintained by the public sector. The in­
vestment costs increased by 89 percent which is the average of the weights 
assigned to the consumption of the public sector whereas the benefits 
increased by 91 percent, in which the premium assigned to foreign exchange 
has the principal influence. The larger projects with the larger flow of 
annual benefits are those which mostly influenced in this alternative. 
With respect to agricultural projects the investment costs increased more 
than benefits because of a disproportional increase between investment 
costs and benefits. In general all projects except Majes were classified 
as socially profitable under Alternative III. 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
The application of a sensitivity analysis has been done only for 
Alternative III according to the method proposed by ŒîUDI [14]. First 
we have assumed as representative value for the flexibility of the 
marginal utility of income the extreme values lying between 1.01 and 1.44 
estimated by Van de Metering [73]. The estimation of the social rate of 
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discount corresponding to these values is based on relation (6.22) which 
then gives us two values for i, 8 percent and 12 percent respectively. 
Subsequently we proceeded to determine the shadow price of invest­
ment according to relation (6.23). The values found were 4.78 and 1.51 
respectively corresponding to rates of discount equal to 8 percent and 
12 percent. Having the values for the shadow price of investment we have 
recalculated the social weighting of consumption for each participating 
group. This has been done according to the second term on the right 
hand side of relations 6.17 - 6.20. 
With respect to the shadow price of labor we have included the 
direct opportunity cost and also induced effects according to the follow­
ing relationship 
SWR* = Z + Sp - 1) W (6.28) 
where : 
Z = direct opportunity cost of labor, 
Sp = marginal propensity to save of the private sector, 
= shadow price of investment, 
W = market wage rate, and, 
* 
SWR = shadow price of labor including indirect effects. 
On the other hand we have increased from 1.5 to 1.7 the shadow price 
of foreign exchange. In Table 6.8 we present jointly the parameters 
which will serve as a basis for the reestimation of the profitability 
indexes of net present value and the benefit-cost ratio. We are con­
sidering six analytical variants which are the results of separate com­
binations between the social rate of discount, the shadow wage rate and 
Table 6.8. Values of the parameters considered for the sensitivity 
analysis 
Variants 
Parameters I II III 
Negative of the elasticity of 1.25 1.25 1.44 
marginal utility of consumption 
( 1 + V) 
Social rate of discount (i) 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Shadow price of investment 2.30 2.30 1.31 
(pinv) 
Weights on aggregate consumption: 
Public sector (cG) 1.91 1.91 1.36 
Private sector (Cf) 1.39 1.39 1.15 
Wage earners (C^ ) 1.16 1.16 1.06 
Farmers (C^  1.17 1.17 1.07 
Shadow wage rate as a percentage 60. 99. 60. 
of market rate (SWR) 
Shadow exchange rate as a percentage 150. 170. 150. 
of official exchange rate (SER) 
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IV 
1.44 
0.12 
1.51 
1.36 
1.15 
1.06 
1.07 
75. 
170. 
Variants 
v" 
1.01 
0.08 
4.78 
3.65 
2.13 
1.45 
1.49 
60. 
150. 
VI 
1.01 
0.08 
4.78 
3.65 
2.13 
1.45 
1.49 
173. 
170. 
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the shadow price for foreign exchange. Referring to the same Table 6.8, 
we have that variants I, II and III correspond to rates of discount equal 
respectively to 8 percent, 10 percent and 12 percent. The values assigned 
to the shadow wage rate and the shadow price for foreign exchange have 
been set at 0.6 and 1.5 respectively. In variants IV, V and VI we 
utilized the same rates of discount but we included in the shadow wage 
rate the indirect effects and we increased the shadow price for foreign 
exchange to 1.7. One should observe that the weighting of the consump-
change the rate of discount. 
The results for variants I, II and III are presented for the twelve 
projects in Table 6.9. To the extent that the social rate of discount 
decreases from 12 percent to 8 percent the shadow price of investment 
increases from 1.51 to 4.78. This implies that with larger rates of dis­
count the weighting of consumption of the different economic groups come 
closer together. -That is to say there no longer exists much discrepancy 
between the values for C^ , C^ , C^ , and C^ . 
For a value of i equal to 12 percent the consumption weight of 
government consumption and agricultural consumption equal 1.36 and 1.07 
respectively. But when we assign to i a value equal to 8 percent the 
weight given to public consumption increases because of the effect of the 
price of investment to 3.65 whereas the weighting of consumption for 
farmers only increases to 1.45. This demonstrates the great degree of 
sensitivity between the shadow price of investment and the weights 
assigned to consumption by different groups when we vary the rate of 
tion of each participating group 
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discount. The group mostly affected are the farmers, because while their 
benefits are quantified by the value in consumption, their investment 
costs are weighted by the consumption generated by the government, which 
is always larger. This indicates that the performance of the agricultural 
projects will iiiq>rove to the extent that the social rate of discount i 
increases. 
With respect to the agricultural projects we observe that when the 
social rate of discount decreases the net present value increases, but 
nevertheless the benefit-cost ratio decreases because the capital cost 
increases in a larger proportion than the benefits because of the 
differential weighting given to government consumption. The ranking of 
agricultural projects always maintains the Chira-Piura project as the 
most profitable. Nevertheless one observes that to the extent that the 
social rate of discount i increases the Olmos project displaces the 
Jequetepeque project because of the longer period of construction 
associated with the Olmos project. 
The industrial and mining projects increase both the net present 
value and the benefit-cost ratio when the social rate of discount 
decreases. The ranking of these projects is not altered for the situa­
tion studied under Alternative III. In variant IV, V and VI we maintain 
the values for the social rate of discount but the shadow wage rate was 
determined according to relation 6.28. As we can observe that to the 
extent the price of investment increases the shadow price of labor which 
allows for the inclusion of indirect effects will also increase. When we 
assume a social rate of discount equal to 8 percent the shadow wage rate 
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represents 1.73 times the market wage. This indicates that the indirect 
effects tend to increase the shadow wage rate according to the values 
obtained for the shadow price of investment. This implies that for 
certain values of the rate of discount i, the shadow wage rate may be 
actually larger than the market wage. 
With respect to the agricultural projects we can compare in Table 
6.8 the values of the shadow wage rate when one considers the indirect 
effects associated with the use of labor. We observe clearly that both 
the net present value as well as the benefit-cost ratio decrease because 
of the inclusion of indirect effects in the shadow wage rate. One 
observes that the Olmos project now obtains a negative net present value 
because its labor costs increased by 73 percent. The Chira-Piura and 
Jequetepeque projects partially neutralize the effect of the shadow wage 
rate because of the premium given to foreign exchange. 
On the other hand the mining and industrial projects increase their 
net present value and benefit-cost ratio. In Table 6.9 one can conq>are 
the results for different rates of discount. Generally we observe that 
the mining and industrial projects are favored because of the premium 
given to foreign exchange. The indirect effects as included in the 
computation of the shadow wage rate do not influence this result very 
much because of the low labor Intensity of these projects. The agricul­
tural projects on the other hand are influenced by the weight given to 
consumption by the government. This negative influence is intensified 
for smaller values of the social rate of discount. Equally the inclusion 
of indirect effects in the shadow wage rate decreases the profitability 
Table 6.9. Sensitivity analysis results, Marglin Alternative III 
Social rate of discount 
8% (Var. V) 10% (Var. I) 12% (Van III) 
Net Benefit Net Benefit Net 
Present Cost Present Cost Present Cost 
Project Value* Ratio Value* Ratio Value* Ratio 
Steel plant 241427 2.31 81655 1.93 36172 1.63 
Cerro Verde II 175850 1.52 51689 1.31 11751 1.10 
Michiquillay 113963 2.01 36904 1.67 14021 1.38 
La Pampilla 85413 4.97 54938 6.13 38321 6.30 
IloII 50260 3.15 19728 2.68 7675 1.94 
Cajamarquilla 31572 1.72 10763 1.49 8683 2.06 
Fertilizer 17914 2.20 6924 1.92 5189 2.00 
Chira-Piura 16368 1.70 8900 1.82 4252 1.62 
Jequetepeque 9508 1.53 3965 1.45 1706 1.29 
Olfflos 7764 1.34 3935 1.41 2043 1.35 
Yura nil 1.20 126 1.04 -153 0.92 
Maj es -10195 0.70 -4936 0.71 -3611 0.64 
M^illion soles. 
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87. (Var. VI) 
Net Benefit 
Present Cost 
Value Ratio 
Social rate of discount 
107. (Var. II) 
Net Benefit 
Present Cost 
Value Ratio 
127. (Var. IV) 
Net Benefit 
Present Cost 
Value Ratio 
251647 2.27 
212927 1.56 
131859 2.11 
95072 4.88 
54345 3.01 
33750 1.68 
22394 2.37 
5358 1.21 
3315 1.17 
-277 0.99 
491 1.08 
-18750 0.50 
95078 2.01 
72197 1.39 
49765 1.86 
61853 6.30 
23453 2.83 
13745 1.57 
9153 2.11 
7728 1.66 
3416 1.36 
2798 1.27 
32 1.01 
-5851 0.64 
42744 1.69 
25361 1.20 
21239 1.55 
41267 6.21 
9776 1.98 
10931 2.22 
7126 2.26 
4259 1.58 
1735 1.28 
1853 1.29 
-233 0.89 
-3941 0.62 
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of these projects because on the average they are quite intensive in the 
use of labor. 
6. The Little and Mirrlees approach 
The social evaluation of projects according to the method proposed 
adjustments adopted as for Alternative II proposed by Marglin. That is 
to say we will maintain similar values assigned for the shadow price of 
labor, the shadow price of foreign exchange and the rate of discount. 
Nevertheless we must remember that in Marglin's method the numeraire is 
consunçtion, whereas in Little and Mirrlees method the numeraire is 
investment. The additional adjustment required is the conversion of the 
consumption generated by employment during the construction period and 
during the period of operation in terms of investment. In other words 
the cost of labor during the construction and operation periods must be 
expressed in terms of investment. 
The estimation of the respective indexes of profitability are based 
on the same relationships 6.1, 6,2 and 6.3 as calculated for Alternative 
* II as proposed by Marglin s method. Except that the annual flows and 
ic 
in relations 6.10 and 6.11 are redefined so as to express the cost of 
labor in terms of investment. We must observe that relation 6.9 does 
by Little and Mirrlees [46] will be done under the assumptions and 
* * 
not change. We then can rewrite and as: 
C^ * = C* + 0C^  + C^ /P ,SWR y-inv (6.29) 
SWR/ninv (6.30) 
where: 
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irk 
= annual operating costs in terms of investment, year t, 
* 
= annual operating costs at shadow prices excluding labor 
costs, year t, 
= annual operating costs in foreign currency, year t, 
0 = foreign exchange premium, 
gSWR_ operating labor costs valued at shadow prices, 
year t, 
shadow price of investment, 
** 
K = total investment in terms of investment, year t, 
C -
* 
= total investment at shadow prices excluding labor costs, 
year t, 
= construction and equipment cost, in foreign currency, and 
SWR 
= construction labor costs valued at shadow prices, year t. 
The results obtained for the net present value can be found in 
Table 6.3 where we can compare the results with the alternative proposed 
by Marglin. As we can see all projects increase their net present value 
according to the extent that labor is involved in the period of construc­
tion and operation. Agricultural projects because they are more 
intensive in the use of labor, increase their profitability in a greater 
proportion than the projects in the mining and industrial sector. 
The ranking of the net present value is similar to that as obtained 
by Marglin'8 Alternative II except that the Cerro Verde mining project 
now occupies the second position displacing the La Fampilla refinery 
project to a third place, because the Cerro Verde project does involve 
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a larger percentage of utilization of labor in both the construction and 
operation stage of the project. 
The ranking of the benefit-cost ratio are listed in Table 6.4 and 
this can be compared with the results obtained in the Alternative II of 
Marglin's method. Observe that the first five positions under both 
alternatives are taken by the same projects but Chira-Piura and the Olmos 
irrigation project now occupy the second and third place respectively. 
The results for the ranking of the internal rate of return are pre­
sented in Table 6.5. The ranking obtained reserves for the first five 
places the same projects as under Alternative II for Marglin, except that 
the Chira-Piura project pushes the Ilo copper refinery project to third 
place. In general one observes that Alternative IV increases the indexes 
of profitability of all projects according to their percentages of 
utilization of labor. The agricultural projects because they are inten­
sive in labor are favored in a larger proportion than the mining and 
industrial projects. The ranking of the projects within the same sector 
are the same as under Alternative II and IV, but when we compare the 
twelve projects jointly the agricultural projects tend to improve their 
relative position. 
B. The Social Marginal Productivity of Capital 
The social marginal productivity of capital criterion as formulated 
by Chenery [ ii] tries to evaluate the profitability of a project according 
to its contribution to the national product and to the balance of pay­
ments. The theoretical basis for this method of evaluation were presented 
earlier. In this section we will proceed to apply the social marginal 
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productivity criterion to twelve projects. In general we can define the 
social marginal productivity by the following relationship: 
SMP = K " K  ^ (6.31) 
Where the term V/K is the output-capital ratio, the second term C/K is the 
domestic cost-capital ratio and the last tern rB/K is the balance of 
payments effect per unit of capital. 
Before proceeding to define the variables involved in each of the 
terms in relation (6.31) we must state that the social marginal produc­
tivity criterion will be applied under three alternatives. In Alternative 
I the variables of relation (6.31) will be considered without taking into 
account the time value of capital. For the situation of annual variables 
these will be referred to as the average annual value. In Alternative II 
the total cost of the project K as well as the annual flows V and C are 
expressed in terms of their annual equivalent values. In Alternative III 
the total cost of the project as well as the variables V and C are 
expressed in terms of their annual equivalent values but we also include 
the shadow price for labor. Taking these considerations into account we 
can define the variables of relation (6.31) for Alternative I as: 
SMP = annual increment in national income per unit of invest­
ment plus the balance of payments effect, 
K = total cost of investment, 
V = average annual domestic output = X + E -
X = average annual gross output, 
E = externalities, 
= imported materials. 
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C = average annual domestic cost = L + + 0, 
L = average annual labor cost, 
= average annual domestic materials costs, 
0 = average annual all other cost including maintenance and 
replacement, 
B = balance of payments effect, and, 
r = premium accounting for the overvaluation (subvaluation) 
of the official exchange rate. 
The inconvenience of the first alternative is related to the fact 
that one does not consider the time value of capital. First we consider 
the total cost of the project without considering the gestation period. 
In other words one does not discriminate between projects which may take 
one, two or more years. Also by taking the annual benefits and annual 
costs as an annual average we lose sight of the period of production on 
useful economic life of the project. That is, we do not consider whether 
one project or another project has a longer period of productive life. 
In the case of projects within the same sector there probably will 
not be too much of a distortion because one might reasonably assume equal 
economic life for all projects. But when we evaluate projects for 
different sectors the economic horizon is likely to be quite different. 
Also in Alternative I one does not take into account whether the annual 
flows are larger in, for exançle, earlier years than in later years. 
In Alternative II we try to correct for these deficiencies. Hence 
we redefine the social marginal productivity criterion according to the 
following relationships: 
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SMP* = ^  - % + (6.32) 
K K K 
K = 2  ^• a (6.33) 
t=l (1+i) 
* n V 
V = S  ^• a (6.34) 
t=l (1+i) 
* n C 
C = S ^ • a (6.35) 
t=l (1+i) 
a = ^  (6.36) 
(1+i)'^  - 1 
and with each additional term defined as: 
* 
SMP = equivalent annual increment in national income and the 
balance of payments effect per unit of the equivalent 
annual value of investment, 
* 
K = equivalent annual value of total investment, 
* 
V = equivalent annual value of domestic output, 
* 
C = equivalent annual value of domestic costs, 
a = capital recovery factor for a given discount rate and 
project life, 
i = rate of discount and, 
* 
B = balance of payments effect. 
Finally Alternative III considers the shadow price of labor and 
also expresses the initial investment and the annual values V, C and B 
in their equivalent annual values. Because of this expression (6.32) 
can now be redefined as follows: 
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* * * * *  
SMP** = ^  ^ (6.37) 
K K K 
and with each additional term defined as: 
** 
SMP = equivalent annual increment in national income and 
the balance of payments effect per unit of the equiva­
lent annual value of investment considering the shadow 
wage rate, 
** 
K = equivalent annual value of investment considering the 
shadow wage rate, 
* 
V = equivalent annual value of domestic output, and, 
** 
C = equivalent annual value of domestic costs considering 
the shadow wage rate. 
On the other hand the total balance of payments effect is given by the 
following relationships: 
B(K, X) = a (K) + (X) + B^  (X) (6.38) 
Bi = m^  K - mz (1 - nu) K (6.39) 
Bg = e (1 - mp) X - c ^  X - g (mp*- mp) (6.40) 
B 
where : 
2 = - mg Bg - mzf (1 - mp) (6.41) 
B • = balance of payments effect, defined as a function of 
X and K, 
B^  = investment effect, defined as a function of K, 
Bg = direct operating effect, defined as a function of X, 
B^  = indirect operating effect, defined as a function of X, 
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â = capital recovery factor, 
= proportion of total investment requiring imports, 
m = marginal propensity to import, 
z = the investment multiplier = 1/m + s, 
s = marginal propensity to save, 
e = proportion of output in exports or import substitutes, 
mp = imports per unit of outputs, 
c = proportion of output going to domestic markets, 
g = proportion of output replacing current consumption, 
= imports per unit of output replaced, and, 
f = proportion of output financed by inflationary mean. 
We must observe that the sum of the parameters e, c and f should be 
equal to unity. Also we have to remember that because the balance of 
* ** 
payments effect is related to K and X therefore B and B must be 
computed according to the redefined relations for K and X. That is B is 
defined for Alternative II and Alternative III as follows: 
* 
B = the annual value effect on the balance of payments 
valued at market wages, and, 
** 
B = the annual value effect on the balance of payments 
valued at shadow wages. 
On the other hand we must mention that we only have considered the 
shadow price of labor and not that for foreign exchange because the over 
or undervaluation of the exchange rate is already included in r. 
In Alternative I we consider the initial investment K of the projects 
as absolute figures ignoring any possible discounting process as related 
166 
to the period of construction. The value added of national factors (V) 
is determined as the difference between the annual average production 
(X) and the annual average value of imported inputs (nu). The values 
for m^  have been extracted from the feasibility studies. We do not 
consider internal and external economies of the project, and hence we 
have assigned a value of zero to E. The total cost of the national 
factors of production (C) is given by the sum of the annual average cost 
of labor (L), the inputs and national materials (M^ ) and the fixed costs 
of operation (0). 
In Table 6.10 we present for the twelve projects the values obtained 
for the capital turnover coefficient (V/K), the total cost of operation 
per unit of investment (C/K) and the percentage margin of social value 
over cost (V-C)/V. The effect on the balance of payments B have been 
determined according to relation (6.38). The direct effects of invest­
ment on the balance of payments B, are defined according to relation 
(6.39). The imported component of the initial investment (m^ ) has been 
extracted from the feasibility studies. The marginal propensity to import 
(m) has been determined as point 0.25, which is consistent with the values 
estimated in the econometric models constructed for the Peruvian economy 
by Christian [12] and Thorbecke andCondos [69]. The investment multiplier 
(z = 1/m+s) has been estimated as 1.52 where the value (s) represents the 
marginal propensity to save defined and determined earlier as equal to 
0,41. For the agricultural projects the direct effect of the initial 
investment on the balance of payments is given by the following relations: 
Table 6.10. Social marginal productivity of investment*, market wages and 
alternatives shadow exchange rates (Alternative I) 
(A) (B) (C) 
Cost Value 
Capital Turnover Ratio Margin 
Proj ect (V/K) (C/K) (V-C)/V 
La Pampilla 2.99 1 1.90 0.36 
IloII 0.35 7 0.07 0.80 
Steel Plant 0.54 3 0.28 0.48 
Jequetepeque 0.61 2 0.35 0.42 
Fertilizer 0.39 5 0.20 0.49 
Cajamarquilla 0.25 11 0.08 0.68 
Olmos 0.41 4 0.24 0.41 
Cerro Verdell 0.24 12 0.10 0.58 
Michiquillay 0.26 10 0.13 0.52 
Chira-Piura 0.38 6 0.23 0.39 
Yura 0.33 8 0.17 0.48 
Majes 0.28 9 0.15 0.46 
O^utput and operating costs are defined as the values attained when 
the project reaches full output and total investment is taken as its 
face value. 
= ranking. 
S^MP = (A) + (B) + (D) = (A) X (C) + (D). 
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(D) 
Balance of Payments Effect 
(r B/K) 
r = .5 r = .7 
Social Marginal Productivity 
o r = .5 r = .7 
0.32 0.45 1.09 1.41 1 1.54 
0-03 0.04 0.28 0.31 2 0.32 
0.03 0.04 0.26 0.29 3 0.30 
0.01 0.02 0.26 0.27 4 0.28 
0.08 0.11 0.19 0.27 5 0.30 
0.01 0.02 0.17 0.18 6 0.19 
0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 7 0.17 
0.03 0.04 0.14 0.17 8 0.18 
0.04 0.05 0.13 0.17 9 0.18 
0.00 0.01 0.15 0.15 10 0.16 
0.03 -0.04 0.16 0.13 11 0.12 
-0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.12 12 0.11 
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Chira-Piura 
h -
= - 0. w
 1 0.38(1-0.31)K = - 0. 57K (6.42a) 
Olmos = - 0. 50K - 0.38(1-0.50)K = - 0. 69K (6.42b) 
Jequetepeque = - 0. 43K - 0.38(1-0.43)K = - 0. 65K (6.42c) 
Majes • - 0. 14K - 0.38(1-0.14)K = - 0. 47K (6.42d) 
Clearly one observes that the imports requirements are larger for the 
Olmos and Jequetepeque projects. In order to represent in terms of 
national income units, we must multiply the values by the capital 
recovery factor a. The value of this parameter is the same for all 
agricultural projects and was determined as being equal to 0.10 according 
to the useful life of these projects. For the industrial projects we 
have determined the direct effect of B^  according to the following 
relationships : 
La Pampilla -- - 0.61K - 0.38(1-0.61)K = - 0.76K (6.43a) 
Steel Plant = - 0.40K - 0.38(1-0.40)K = - 0.63K (6.43b) 
Fertilizer = - 0.54K - 0.38(1-0.54)K = - 0.71K (6.43c) 
Yura 
h -
= - 0.44K - 0.38(1-0.44)K = - 0.65K (6.43d) 
The La Pampilla project and the Fertilizer Plant have the largest 
investment import component. Observe that the B^  effect is larger for 
industrial projects than for agricultural projects. In order to convert 
B^  in units of national income we must multiply B^  by the capital recovery 
factor (a). In the industrial projects the capital recovery is different 
for each project because of substantial differences in the useful life 
of these projects. For the mining projects we have determined the values 
of B^  according to the following relationships: 
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Cerro Verde = - 0.50K - 0.38(1-0.50)K = - 0.69K (6.44a) 
Michiquillay = - 0.24K - 0.38(1-0.24)K = - 0.53K (6.44b) 
Cajamarquilla = - 0.60K - 0.38(1-0.60)K = - 0.75K (6.44c) 
Ilo B^  = - 0.58K - 0.38(1-0.58)K = - 0.74K (6.44d) 
Taking the twelve projects together we observe that all projects 
require a high percentage of imports that surpass 50 percent of total 
investment. The mining projects have the highest import component. 
The direct effects of operation on the balance of payments (Bg) are 
functionally related to X and can be determined according to relation 
(6.40). The first term on the right hand (e(l-^ ) X) determines the net 
foreign earnings. The parameter (e) defines the proportion of production 
which is destined for the foreign sector or which substitutes for imports. 
Their respective values have been extracted from the feasibility studies. 
Also the imports requirements per unit of production (i^ ) have been 
determined according to the studies. The respective parameters are listed 
in Table 6.2, The second term of relation (6.40) determines the import 
requirements per unit of production destined for internal consumption. 
The coefficient (c) is the proportion of production destined for domestic 
consumption. The last term in relation (6.40) measures the import 
requirements of production destined to replace previously consumed commod­
ities. Given the impossibility of identifying the proportion of produc­
tion which replaces previously consumed commodities we assigned a value 
of zero to the parameter (g). For the agricultural projects the direct 
effect of operation B^  is given by the following relationships: 
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Chira-Piura = 0.29 (1-0.002)X - (0.71)(0.002)X = 0.288X 
(6.45a) 
Olmos = 0.27 (1 0.002)X - (0.73)(0.002)X = 0.268X 
(6.45b) 
Jequetepeque B^  = 0.26 (1-0.003)X - (0.74)(0.003)X = 0.257X 
(6.45c) 
Majes Bg = 0.12 (1-0.002)X - (0.88)(0.002)X = 0.118X 
(6.45d) 
With the exception of the Majes project the direct effects on the 
balance of payments are very similar for the agricultural projects. The 
effect is the largest for the Chira-Piura project because of the propor­
tionally larger export component in its production. The direct effect 
Bg of the industrial projects are given by the following relationships: 
La Pampilla B^  = 0.385(1-0.013)X - (0.615)(0.013)X = 0.372X 
(6.46a) 
Steel Plant B^  = 0.385(1-0.02)X - (0.615)(0.02)X = 0.365X 
(6.46b) 
Yura B^  = 0.10(1-0.02)X - (0.90)(0.02)X = 0.08X 
(6.46c) 
Fertilizer B^  = 1.00(1-0.02)X = 0.998% (6.46d) 
With the exception of the Yura cement project the B^  effect is larger 
for the industrial projects than the agricultural projects, (fcserve that 
the Fertilizer project substitutes 100 percent for current urea imports. 
For the mining projects we also determined the B^  effect according to 
relationship (6.40) as follows: 
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Cerro Verde = 0.95 (1-0.03)X - (0.05)(0.03)X = 0.92X 
(6.47a) 
Michiquillay = 1.00 (1-0.29)X = 0.71X 
Cajamarquilla B^  = 1.00 (1-0.30)X = 0.70X (6.47c) 
(6.47b) 
Ilo B^  = 1.00 (1-0.44)X = 0.56X (6.47d) 
The production of the mining project with the exception of the Cerro Verde 
copper mining project, are defined totally by the external market, hence 
B^  is determined exclusively by the first term of relation (6.40). When 
we compare the projects jointly we observe that the mining projects have 
the largest B^  effect on the balance of payments because of the nature of 
their production. 
The indirect effect B^  associated with the operation of the projects 
has been estimated according to relation (6.41), but we excluded in this 
computation the second term to the right, because we are assuming that 
the government will maintain in the long run balance budget. Hence the 
zero value assigned to the term (f). 
Taking that assumption into account the indirect effect is defined 
by the first term of the relationship (6.41) which is the same for all 
projects. 
The total effect on the balance of payments is represented for all of the 
projects in Table 6.10. The results of the values and the ranking 
generated by the social marginal productivity criterion. Alternative I, 
is also represented in that table. 
Bg = - 0.38 Bg (6.48) 
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With respect to the agricultural projects the social marginal 
productivity criterion is stable for the different values assigned to the 
shadow foreign exchange rate (r). Jequetepeque and Olmos projects occupy 
the first two places. Observe that the balance of payments effect for 
the Majes project is quite small and the value rB/K is actually negative. 
For the industrial projects the ranking suggested by the social 
marginal productivity criterion is also stable for different values of 
(r), even though the balance of payments effect is larger for the 
industrial projects with the exception of the Yura project, which has a 
negative effect. The La Pampilla and the Steel Plant project occupy the 
first two places. 
In the mining projects Ilo and Cajamarquilla are the most profitable, 
and they also maintain these positions independent of the different 
values assigned to (r). On the other hand we must indicate that the 
hypothesis formulated by Chenery is fulfilled, that is to say that the 
ranking of the projects within the same sector is determined exclusively 
by the capital turnover coefficient (V/K), dispensing with the balance 
of payment effects. 
If we take all the projects together we see that the social marginal 
productivity ranking is only stable for the La Pampilla, Ilo, Steel Plant 
and Fertilizer projects. When we vary (r) there are significant changes 
in the position of the remaining projects. For the projects as a whole 
the ranking suggested by the capital turnover criterion differs from that 
suggested by the social marginal productivity criterion. This of course 
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is related to the different balance of payments effects as between 
projects in different sectors. 
For Alternative II as related to the application of the social 
marginal productivity criterion we have proceeded to express the vari­
ables K, V and C in their annual equivalent values according to rela­
tions 6.33, 6.34 and 6.35. In Table 6.11 we present for the twelve 
projects the values obtained for the capital turnover coefficients, the 
cost of operation per unit of investment and the percentage margin of 
social value over cost. The balance of payments effect since it is 
related to X and K continue to be defined by relations 6.42 - 6.48, even 
though we now define them in terms of annuities. 
The results of the values and the ranking of the social marginal 
productivity criterion, Alternative II, are listed in Table 6.11. With 
respect to the agricultural projects one observes that there has been a 
variation with respect to the ranking obtained under Alternative I, the 
first place is now given to the Chira-Piura project. The percentage 
margin of social value over cost give us an indication of the direction 
of the change in the ranking with respect to Alternative I. If this 
percentage margin increases significantly then the benefits have increased 
more than the costs when we considered the discounting process. It is 
for this reason that the Jequetepeque project has now been assigned to 
the second place given that its percentage margin of social value over 
cost decreases from 0.48 to 0.42. 
The ranking of the agricultural projects is stable for different 
values assigned to the foreign exchange rate. The hypothesis of Chenery 
Table 6.11. Social marginal productivity of investment, market wages 
and alternatives shadow exchang3 rates (Alternative II) 
(A) 
Capital Turnover 
(B) 
Cost 
Ratio 
(C) 
Value 
Margin 
Project (V/K) (C/K) (V-C)/V 
La Pampilla 19.04 1 13.49 0.29 
Chira-Piura 5.49 2 3.36 0.39 
Jequetepeque 4.61 3 2.82 0.39 
Hon 2.61 6 0.53 0.80 
Steel Plant 3.50 5 1.89 0,46 
Fertilizer 2.48 7 1.31 0.47 
Olmos 3.87 4 2.28 0,41 
Cajamarquilla 1.64 10 0.51 0.69 
Michiquillay 1.63 11 0.70 0.57 
Cerro Verdell 1.49 12 0.58 0,61 
Yura 2.34 8 1.20 0.49 
Majes 1.84 9 0.94 0.49 
 ^= ranking. 
'^ SMP = (A) + (B) + (D) = (A) X (C) + (D). 
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(D) 
Balance of Payments Effect 
( r B/K) 
r = .5 r = .7 
Social Marginal Productivity 
(SMP) 
r = 0 r = .5 r = .7 
2,28 3.19 5.55 7.83 1 8.74 
0.46 0.65 2.13 2.59 2 2.78 
0.34 0.48 1.79 2.13 3 2.27 
0.48 0.68 2.08 2.56 4 2.76 
0.36 0.50 1.61 1.97 5 2.11 
0.72 1.01 1.17 1.89 6 2.18 
0.29 0.41 1.59 1.88 7 2.00 
0.33 0.46 1.13 1.46 8 1.59 
0.38 0.54 0.93 1.32 9 1.47 
0.39 0.54 0.91 1.30 10 1.45 
0.01 0.01 1.14 1.15 11 1.15 
0.04 0.06 0.90 0.94 12 0.96 
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that the capital turnover ratio determines the same ranking within the 
same sector as the social marginal productivity criterion is hence once 
again confirmed. 
In the industrial and mining projects we observe a similar ranking 
as that obtained for Alternative I and also Chenery hypothesis again is 
confirmed in this particular instance. If we take the twelve projects 
together we observe that the social marginal productivity ranking is 
different with respect to Alternative I. Only the first four projects 
maintain their positions when one varies the foreign exchange rate. 
The ranking suggested by the capital turnover criterion is diamet­
rically different from that given by the social marginal productivity 
criterion. This because the balance of payments effect is different for 
the different sectors. With the exception of the Majes project the 
performance of the agricultural projects improve under this second 
alternative. 
In general Alternative II determines a ranking different from that 
obtained under Alternative I, but the displacements are with respect to 
changes of positions of projects within the same sector, with exception 
of the Chira-Piura irrigation and the Ilo project. 
Finally in Alternative III we have included the shadow price for 
labor in the determination of the social marginal productivity criterion. 
As one can appreciate from Table 6.12 the agricultural projects improve 
significantly their percentage margin of social value over cost, whereas 
the industrial and mining projects maintain the same values of Alternative 
Table 6.12, Social marginal productivity of investment, shadow wage at 
60 percent of market wage and alternative shadow exchange 
rates (Alternative III) 
(A) (B) (C) 
Cost Value 
Capital Turnover Ratio Margin 
Project (V/K) (C/K) (V-C/V) 
La Pampilla 19.10 1 13.53 0.29 
Chira-Piura 5.57 2 2.81 0.50 
Jequetepeque 4.72 3 2.47 0.48 
I loll 2.62 6 0.53 0.80 
Olmos 3.93 4 1.91 0.51 
Steel Plant 3.52 5 1.90 0.46 
Fertilizer 2.48 7 1.31 0.47 
Cajamarquilla 1.64 10 0.51 0.69 
Michiquillay 1.63 11 0.70 0.57 
Cerro Verdell 1.49 12 0.58 0.61 
Yura 2.34 8 1.20 0.49 
Majes 1.85 9 0.80 0.57 
 ^= ranking. 
S^MP = (A) + (B) + (D) = (A) X (C) + (D). 
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Balance of Payments Effect 
fr B/K) 
Social Marginal Productivity^  
(SMP) 
r = .5 r = .7 r = 0 r = .5 Ra H II 
2.28 3.19 5.57 7.85 1 8.76 
0.47 6.66 2.76 3.23 2 3.42 
0.35 0.49 2.25 2.60 3 2.70 
0.47 0.65 2.09 2.56 4 2.74 
0.30 0.42 2.02 2.32 5 2.44 
0.36 0.50 1.62 1.98 6 2.12 
0.72 1.01 1.17 1.89 7 2.18 
0.33 0.46 1.13 1.46 8 1.59 
0.39 0.54 0.93 1.32 9 1.47 
0.39 0.54 0.91 1.30 10 1.45 
0.01 0.01 1.14 1.15 11 1.15 
0.05 0.07 1.05 1.10 12 1.12 
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II. This result is the product of the intensity of unskilled labor 
utilized for the agricultural projects during the period of construction. 
The results of the values and ranking of the social marginal 
productivity criterion, Alternative III, are listed in Table 6.12. The 
ranking of the agricultural projects is similar as that obtained under 
Alternative II, even though each project increases its profitability 
indexes significantly because of the shadow wage effect. The mining and 
industrial projects also maintain the same ranking as obtained under 
Alternative II, but their profitability indexes as measured by the social 
marginal productivity criterion does not change significantly. If we 
take all the projects together we observe that the social marginal 
productivity ranking is virtually stable with respect to Alternative II, 
except with respect to the Olmos project which now displaces the Steel 
plant project to the sixth position. The first four positions are 
occupied as in the former alternative by the La Pampilla, Chira-Piura, 
Jequetepeque and Ilo projects respectively. 
C. Semi Input-Output Method 
The conceptual basis of the semi input-output method, was developed 
in detail in Chapter IV. In this section we will proceed to evaluate the 
twelve selected projects and to determine the advantages and limitations 
of this particular method. In principle the semi input-output method is 
an attempt to incorporate explicitly in the evaluation of projects the 
intersectoral benefits associated with an initial investment. 
For the application of the above mentioned method we have selected 
the input-output table of the Peruvian economy for the year 1968 [40]. 
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This table was prepared by the National Planning Institute and is 
actualized from one year to the next, in order to serve as an additional 
support element in the preparation of macroeconomic projections. One of 
the advantages of this table is its level of sectoral disaggregation. In 
its original version we have 74 sectors, 34 sectors and 9 sectors, with 
detailed commentaries as to the procedures followed in aggregating these 
sectors. For the purposes of this evaluation we have considered the 1968 
input-output table, actualized in terms of 1974 prices, and aggregated 
for 9 sectors [35]. In Table 6.13 and 6.14 we present the coefficient 
matrix and its corresponding inverse. 
For the application of the semi input-output method we start with 
the initial technical coefficient matrix without differentiating between 
national and international sectors. This because the sectors generally 
are strongly related to the external sectors. Because of this we will 
estimate the intersectoral effect of the initial investment and once we 
have obtained the induced production, these will be adjusted according 
to the average propensity to import for each sector. If we follow the 
methodology developed in Chapter IV the intersectoral effect of an invest­
ment project is given by the following relation: 
n 
n = 1 
• • • > 9 (6.49) 
where : 
X = vector of sectoral gross output 
n 
Y = initial production. 
n 
A = technical coefficients, and, 
rin ' n
(I-A ) ^ = inverse matrix. 
nn 
Table 6.13. Input coeficients for the semi-input-output application^  
Sector Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agriculture (1) 0,1301 0.0 0.0001 0.0 
Fisheries (2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mining (3) 0.0017 0.0 0.2218 0.0 
Power (4) 0.0 0.0 0.0127 0.0 
Industry-
Consumption Goods 
(5) 0.0469 0.0468 0.0006 0.0051 
Industry 
Intermediate Goods 
(6) 0.0271 0.0561 0.0771 0.0919 
Industry 
Capital Goods 
(7) 0.0009 0.0593 0.0833 0.0658 
Construction (8) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Services (9) 0.33649 0.3116 0.065 0.0001 
Total Inputs 0.54319 0.4738 0.4606 0.1629 
(Imports) 0.095 0.0 0.0516 0.0 
Value Added 0.45681 0.5262 0.5394 0.8371 
P^eru Input-Output Table 1974 [36]. 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
0.1462 0.0152 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0026 0.0825 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0006 0.1586 0.0 0.0018 0.0 
0.0053 0.0093 0.0055 0.0 0.007 
0.1468 0.0252 0.012 0.0127 0.0204 
0.1235 0.1851 0.2147 0.3126 0.0321 
0.023 0.0314 0.1925 0.0435 0.0244 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0144 
0.286 0.1439 0.3362 0.0 0.166 
0.734 0.6512 0.7609 0.3706 0.2613 
0.1293 0.2435 0.5351 0.0 0.0 
0.266 0.3488 0.2391 0.6294 0.7387 
-1 
Table 6.14. Inverse matrix (A-I) for the semi-input-output application 
Sector Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agriculture (1) 1.16446 0.01456 0. 00577 0.00502 
Fisheries (2) 0.00711 1.01102 0. 01491 0.01220 
Mining (3) 0.01967 0.02684 1. 32179 0.03006 
Power (4) 0.00528 0.00581 0 .  02084 1.00289 
Industry 
Consumtion Goods 
(5) 0.07996 0.07298 0. 01469 0.01450 
Industry 
Intermediate Goods 
(6) 0.08369 0.13121 0. 18031 0.14737 
Industry 
Capital Goods 
(7) 0.02604 0.09928 0. 15302 0.09425 
Construction (8) 0.00600 0.00540 0. 00238 0.00088 
Services (9) 0.52637 0.47339 0. 20875 0.07744 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
0.20706 
0.02306 
0.05062 
0.01373 
1.20690 
0.24151 
0.06991 
0.00661 
0.57984 
0.03257 
0.10858 
0.26798 
0.01902 
0.05700 
1.31430 
0.10108 
0.00412 
0.36167 
0.01468 
0.03190 
0.07859 
0.01628 
0.04722 
0.38522 
1.28578 
0.00712 
0.62495 
0.01346 
0.03565 
0.09021 
0.00686 
0.03522 
0.43100 
0.08869 
1.00169 
0.14798 
0.00697 
0.00627 
0.01534 
0.01005 
0.03370 
0.07489 
0.04522 
0.01423 
1.24810 
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Subsequently we will assume that the Induced productions will 
immediately achieve full production. We also assume that the period of 
production in the induced sectors is the same as that in the autonomous 
sector. In this form the present value of sectoral production can be 
summarized by the following expression: 
T X 
= S  ^ t = 1, T (6.50) 
t=l (1+i)^  
where : 
= present value of annual gross production, sector n, . 
= annual gross production of sector n, year t, 
i = rate of discount. 
In order to obtain representative figures for total benefits we must 
correct the present value of gross sectoral production (B^ ) using the 
respective value added coefficients. This adjustment is effected by 
utilizing the following relationship: 
9 
B = S Va • B (6.51) 
n=l ° * 
where each additional term is defined as: 
B = total benefit, and. 
Va = value added coefficient, sector n. 
n 
With respect to the induced investments we are assuming that all the 
investment costs are incurred given a similar period of construction 
for all investment projects. Also given the statistical limitations 
with respect to investments by sectors, we will use the capital-output 
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ratio for the whole economy and assuming that this is applicable to 
each sector separately. Under these assumptions the total costs of 
investment are then given by the following relationships: 
C = R • X (6.52) 
n n 
T Ca 8 T Cn 
C = S  ^+ S S  ^ (6.53) 
t=l (1+i) n=l t=l (1+i) 
where : 
C = total investment, 
C = sectoral investment, 
n 
C = autonomous investment, 
a ' 
= sectoral gross output, and 
R = global capital-output ratio. 
The application of this variant of the semi input-output method 
and the calculation of the benefit-cost ratio will be done for each 
project separately and we will then compare the results obtained 
with the methods previously discussed. 
The increases in sectoral production, as determined by relation­
ship 6.49 are listed in Table 6.15. The gross production of the 
autonomous sector refers to the annual average production of the 
projects stipulated in the feasibility studies. Once we have 
obtained the sectoral production we then proceeded to determine the 
present value, taking as the economic horizon the useful life of 
the autonomous project. That is to say, if the autonomous project 
has an economic life equal to 50 years then the same figure is 
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applied also to the investment projects associated with induced 
production. Once we have obtained the preseac values utilizing a 
10 percent discount rate, we then proceeded to calculate the value 
added of the autonomous project and that of the induced production 
according to the technical coefficients which have been listed in 
Table 6.13, The representative figure of benefits, given by relation­
ship 6.51 is determined by subtracting from the value added figures 
the necessary imports required for each sector. The sum of the 
sectoral benefits determines the total benefit of the project. 
With respect to costs we have assumed for all projects the 
same period of construction as that of the autonomous project. That 
is if the autonomous project requires five years of construction, 
then the same period is assumed to hold for the induced sectoral 
costs. We assume that the investments are made in equal annual 
installments. The sectoral investments have been determined by 
utilizing the global capital-output ratio previously defined and 
determined as being equal to 2.2. The sum of these sectoral 
investments determines the total cost of the project. 
The results obtained in terms of the benefit-cost ratio for 
each project separately and considering the intersectoral effects 
are listed in Table 6.15. The values and ranking obtained are com­
pared with respect to Alternative I of Marglin, because in both 
cases we utilize market prices for the quantization of costs and 
benefits. 
Table 6.15. Benefit-cost ratio of the selected projects derived from the 
semi-input-output method 
Project La Pampilla Jequetepeque 
(million soles) 'output Capital Output Capital 
Sector Effect Requirement Effect Requirement 
Agriculture 553.5 1217.7 3639.3* 5922.0% 
Fisheries 1844.8 4058.6 25.9 57.0 
Mining 4553.3 10017.3 71.6 157.5 
Power 323.1 710.8 19.2 42.2 
Industry Consumption 
Goods 
968.4 2130.5 291.0 640.2 
Industry Intermediate 
Goods 
16990.8* 5633.gb 304.6 670.1 
Industry Capital 
Goods 
1717.5 3778.5 94.8 208.6 
Construction 70.1 154.2 21.8 48.0 
Services 6145.0 13519.0 1915.6 4214.3 
Net Benefit 84950.8 - 21385,0 -
Net Cost - 34171.7 - 9478.1 
Benefit Cost Ratio^ : 
Project Alone 6.14 2. 17 
Global 2.49 2. 25 
P^roject annual gross production. 
P^roject total investment. 
S^ocial rate of discount = 10%. 
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Chira-Piura Olmos Steel Plant 
Output Capital Output Capital Output Capital 
Effect Requirement Effect Requirement Effect Requirement 
4422.8* 11780.6b 4691.1® 11396.4% 1165.9 2565.0 
31.4 69.1 33.4 73.5 3886.1 8549.4 
87.0 191.4 92.3 203.1 9591.4 21101.1 
23.3 51.3 24.8 54.6 680.6 1497.3 
353.6 777.9 375.1 825.2 2040.0 4488.0 
370.1 814.2 392.6 863.7 35791.1® 65907.7% 
111.2 244.6 122.2 268.8 3617.9 7959.4 
26.5 58.3 28.1 61.8 147.6 324.7 
2328.0 5121.6 2469.2 5432.2 12944.4 28477.7 
!6093.7 - 22832.5 - 165618.1 -
- 15143.4 - 13920.9 - 111639.1 
1.33 1.34 1.07 
1.72 1.64 1.48 
Table 6.15, Continued 
Project IloII Fertilizer 
(million soles) Output Capital Output Capital 
Sector Effect Requirement Effect Requirement 
Agriculture 13.6 29.9 46.3 101.9 
Fisheries 35.2 77.4 154.5 339.9 
Mining 2362.5* 5891.9^  381.3 838.9 
Power 49.2 108.2 27.1 59.6 
Industry Consumption 
Goods 
34.7 76.3 81.1 178.4 
Industry Intermediate 
Goods 
426.0 937.2 1423.0* 3634.8^  
Industry Capital 
Goods 
361.5 795.3 143.8 316.4 
Construction 5.6 12.3 5.9 13.0 
Services 493.2 1085.0 514.6 1132.1 
Net Benefit 11041.4 - 6991.1 -
Net Cost - 7472.3 - 5741.7 
Benefit Cost Ratio^  
Project Alone 1.58 0. 75 
Global 1.48 1. 22 
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Majes Michiquillay Yura 
Output Capital Output Capital Output Capital 
Effect Requirement Effect Requirement Effect Requirement 
4114.3a 14757.6% 64.3 141.5 16.1 35.4 
29.3 64.5 106.2 365.6 53.8 118.4 
80.9 178.0 11144.0% 35752.5% 132.8 292.2 
21.7 47.7 232.3 511.1 9.4 20.7 
329.0 723.8 163.7 360.1 28.2 62.0 
344.3 757.5 2009.3 4420.5 495.4* 1467.7^  
107.1 235.6 1705.2 3751.4 50.1 110.2 
24.7 54.3 26.5 58.3 2.0 4.4 
2165.6 4764.3 2326.4 5118.1 179.2 394.2 
.8165.6 - 40862.4 - 2212.6 -
- 15009.8 - 30639.4 - 2076.7 
0.84 1. 06 0.61 
1.21 1. 11 1.06 
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Table 6.15, Continued 
Project 
(million soles) Cajamarquilla Cerro Verdell 
Output Capital Output Capital 
Sector Effect Requirement Effect Requirement 
Agriculture 17.3 38.1 125.4 275.9 
Fisheries 44.8 98.6 323.9 712.6 
Mining 3002.8* 11504.9% 21721.0* 90435.7I 
Power 62.6 137.7 452.8 996.2 
Industry Consumption 
Goods 
44.1 97.0 319.2 702.2 
Industry Intermediate 
Goods 
541.4 1191.1 3916.4 8616.1 
Industry Capital 
Goods 
459.5 1010.9 3323.7 7312.1 
Construction 7.1 15.6 51.7 113.7 
Services 626.8 1379.0 4534.4 9975.7 
Net Benefit 11940.9 - 86088.8 -
Net Cost - 12261.3 - 94418.5 
Benefit Cost Ratio^ ; 
Project Alone 0.87 0. 81 
Global 0.97 0. 91 
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With respect to agricultural projects the overall benefit-
cost ratio selected the Jequetepeque project as being the most 
profitable, whereas the Majes irrigation project again occupies 
last place. All projects obtain a benefit-cost ratio larger than 
unity. The same ranking is obtained for the agricultural projects 
when one does not incorporate the intersectoral effects. However, 
the Majes project obtains a benefit-cost ratio of 0.84 which is 
close to that obtained by the Marglin's method. 
In the industrial projects the overall benefit-cost ratio 
selects the La Pampilla project and the Steel Plant project as the 
most profitable. All projects now obtain a benefit-cost ratio 
larger than unity. If we take the benefit-cost ratio without con­
sidering the intersectoral effects we obtain a similar ranking, but 
the fertilizer project and the Yura cement project now obtain a 
benefit-cost ratio less than unity. The ranking of the industrial 
projects obtained with the semi input-output method is identical to 
that obtained for the Alternative utilizing Marglin's method. With 
respect to the mining projects, the overall benefit-cost ratio 
indicates that the Ilo and Michiquillay refineries are the most 
profitable. The Cajamarquilla and Cerro Verde projects now obtain 
a benefit-cost ratio less than unity. Observe that the benefit-
cost ratio of Cerro Verde (0.91) is very similar to that obtained 
by Marglin under Alternative I (0.94). 
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If we take the twelve projects together, then the La Pampilla, 
Jequetepeque, Chira-Piura, Olmos and the Steel Plant occupy the 
first five positions of the ranking. If we compare this result 
with that obtained under Alternative I as suggested by Marglin we 
obseirve that the same projects with the exception of Jequetepeque 
obtain those same five positions. One should observe therefore that 
the indexes obtained by both methods are quite similar. 
In general we can therefore state that the results obtained 
by this method are highly correlated with that of the value of 
production of the autonomous project. That is to say when the 
annual production of the project is greater the greater will be the 
intersectoral effects. Nevertheless the final figure of annual 
benefits is also influenced by the period of construction and the 
period of operation of the autonomous project. 
With respect to the agricultural projects we observe that 
the Olmos project obtains the largest sectoral production effect 
because of its largest annual production, but the Chira-Piura 
project nevertheless generates the largest total annual benefits 
because of its largest period of production and shortest period of 
construction. 
If we do not take into account a discounting process, then 
the projects with a larger annual production and larger period of 
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construction will be significantly affected, because with this method the 
induced investments are also basically determined the levels of sectoral 
production. 
The same phenomenom can be observed in the industrial and mining 
sectors. That is to say the largest final benefits are not necessarily 
given by those projects which have the largest annual production. How­
ever, for a similar sector the homogeneity of the periods of production 
and operation guarantee that the project with the largest annual produc­
tion will also be the most favored. With respect to intersectoral effects 
the service sector, mining and intermediate goods generate the larger 
total amount of benefits because of their large technical coefficients. 
On the other hand we must indicate that the size of the benefits 
and costs depend on the degree of disaggregation of the initial input-
output matrix, even though the benefit-cost ratio can be expected to be 
stable because of the assumption of fixed technical coefficients. In 
conclusion we must mention that the semi input-output method allows us 
to discriminate between profitable and nonprofitable projects, generating 
thereby an acceptable ranking given the relatively small amount of infor­
mation which is necessary to implement this method. If we compare the 
results of this method with that of Alternative I as suggested by Marglin 
we can see that the values of the benefit-cost ratio are very similar and 
indeed give almost the same ranking for the projects within a given 
sector. 
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D. The Comparative Ranking of Selected Projects 
In this section we proceed to make the comparisons between the 
different investment criteria and the resulting rankings of these, both 
at the sectoral level as well as for the twelve projects taken together. 
When we make these comparisons we will explain in each case the reasons 
which cause the displacements in sectoral ranks and with respect to the 
total ranking, as related to the utilization of one or the other method 
of evaluation. 
First we will analyze the results obtained with the three alterna­
tives as suggested by Marglin, comparing for each alternative the rank­
ings yielded by the profitability indexes such as net present value, 
benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate of return. Subsequently we will 
compare the same method of Marglin as between these three alternatives, 
so as to establish how the assumptions of each one influences in the sec­
toral ranking of the projects. The same type of analysis we will apply 
with respect to the method proposed by Little and Mirrlees, called 
Alternative IV and the social marginal productivity method proposed by 
Chenery and the semi input-output method. 
The comparison between criteria for the global ranking will be done 
on the basis of Alternative II and III of Marglin, subsequently called 
Mil and Mill and Alternative III of Chenery, subsequently called SMPIII. 
We have selected these three variants given that they contain the assump­
tions and basic methodological element for a social benefit-cost analysis 
of the project. Consequently all these alternatives do include a shadow 
price for labor and foreign exchange. With Alternative Mill we also 
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include different weighting factors for consumption according to the 
different economic groups which participate in benefits from the project. 
We eliminated Alternative I as proposed by Marglin because the 
quantification of costs and benefits in this method are based on market 
prices. We also eliminated Alternative IV as proposed by Little and 
Mirrlees because that method is equivalent to the alternative by Marglin 
except that the costs of labor in both the construction and operation 
periods are expressed in terms of consumption rather than in terms of 
investment as with the Marglin method. 
Also Alternatives I and II of Chenery have been excluded for purposes 
of this global comparison because the first alternative does not take 
into account the discounting process and the second alternative is based 
on market prices. 
Similarly we have excluded the semi input-output method because of 
the statistical limitations which force us to apply rather naive applica­
tion of this model based on market prices and a global capital-output 
ratio for all sectors. 
On the other hand while the comparative sectoral analysis will be 
based on the consideration of the separate indexes of profitability, we 
will for the global analysis only consider the data or results generated 
by the utilization of the benefit-cost ratio. 
This selection does not signify our preference of the benefit-cost 
ratio over the net present value or the internal rate of return in the 
evaluation of projects, because each index of profitability gives us an 
additional element in the preparation of a program of investments. In 
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principle for each project which has been evaluated separately we will 
obtain a positive benefit-cost ratio, and hence we also would expect to 
obtain a positive net present value or positive internal rate of return. 
But when we make comparisons between projects that are so heterogenous in 
their structure as well as in the amount of investments and benefits 
expected as between different projects between different sectors of pro­
duction the ranking based upon net present value will obviously favor 
these projects that are somewhat larger in scale. 
An example that supports this argument can be found in such projects 
which maintain a certain proportionality between costs and benefits so 
that the net present value will be the larger for the project that 
involves more investment. This argument can also be confirmed with 
respect to the Cerro Verde project, which when it was evaluated commer­
cially will result in the last position with actually a negative net 
present value. But when we considered a shadow wage rate and a shadow 
price for foreign exchange this project then occupies the third position 
in the net present value ranking. Nevertheless if we evaluate this 
project with respect to its benefit-cost ratio it continues to maintain 
one of the last positions in the global ranking. 
With respect to the results obtained with the internal rate of return 
we can forward a similar argument, because it is possible to obtain a rate 
of return equal to 100 percent with a small investment and a 15 percent 
return on a large investment. In any case the inteimal rate of return 
allows us to compare the indexes obtained with the grant equivalent or 
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with the social rate of discount so as to be able to answer questions 
related to the cost of. capital involved. 
Finally the last argument which favors the utilization of the 
benefit-cost ratio with the social marginal productivity criterion is the 
similarity of coefficients obtained. In both cases the numerator repre­
sents benefits and the denominator the initial investment costs which 
makes the comparison more or less equivalent. 
1. Sectoral ranking 
For the irrigation projects we observe that the ranking of Alterna­
tive I (Tables 6.3 and 6.4) based on market prices is identical for the 
net present value and the benefit-cost ratio, putting the Chira-Piura 
project and the Olmos project in the first two positions whereas the 
Majes irrigation project occupies the last and fourth position. The 
ranking furnished by the internal rate of return (Table 6.5) causes an 
interchange between the Chira-Piura and the Olmos project, because of the 
larger construction period of the last project. With the exception of the 
Majes project, the irrigation projects obtain an index of commercial 
profitability which is positive. 
When we include shadow prices for labor and foreign exchange as in 
Alternative II (Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5) the three indexes of profita­
bility coincide in the ranking of the four mentioned irrigation projects. 
This result is the same as that obtained for the net present value and 
the benefit-cost ratio of Alternative I. In this alternative all the 
projects of irrigation obtain a positive social profitability. When we 
include weighting factors as related to consumption in Alternative III, 
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the ranking furnished by the net present value and the benefit-cost ratio 
are identical, but the Jequetepeque project displaces to third position 
the Olmos irrigation project, which is affected because of its larger 
investment requirements and because of the weighting of in favor of 
government consumption. In this alternative with exception of the Majes 
project all irrigation projects again obtain a positive social profita­
bility. In summary the ranking obtained by the net present value and 
benefit-cost ratio are equivalent in all alternatives. On the other 
hand, with the ranking as generated by the internal rate of return we do 
observe differences between Alternative II and Alternative III. 
With reference to the industrial projects we observe in the same 
Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 that the ranking under Alternative I is identical 
for the benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate of return, placing the 
La Pampilla oil refinery and the Steel Plant in the first two positions, 
whereas the Fertilizer project and the Yura cement project now occupy the 
two lowest positions. On the other hand for the net present value rank­
ing the Chimbote Steel plant will be selected as the most profitable proj­
ect, but this is the result of the larger value of production of the 
Steel plant relative to the La Pampilla project. Again all industrial 
projects are profitable from a commercial point of view. 
When we include a shadow wage rate and a shadow price of foreign 
exchange as in Alternative II (Tables 6.3 - 6.5), each index of profita­
bility give us a different ranking. Nevertheless both the net present 
value and the benefit-cost ratio ranking do give us the same results as 
under Alternative I. On the other hand the ranking furnished by the 
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internal rate of return criterion places in second position the Ferti­
lizer project, which is due to the premium assigned to foreign exchange. 
All projects again are profitable from a social point of view. 
When we incorporate weighting factors of consumption as under 
Alternative III we observe in Tables 6.3 - 6.5 that the indexes of social 
profitability generate a ranking which is different but comparable with 
that of Alternative II. In summary the ranking provided by net present 
value selects the Steel Plant and the La Pampilla project as being the 
most profitable, and maintaining a similar ranking for all three alterna­
tives. The benefit-cost ratio also is similar for the three alternatives, 
but interchanges places between La Pampilla oil refinery and the Steel 
plant. The internal rate of return will select the La Pampilla project 
as the most profitable project and at the same time displaces the Steel 
plant to a third position. In all the alternatives and indexes of 
profitability utilized, the Yura cement project obtains the last enforced 
position. 
With respect to the mining projects we observe in the same Tables 
6.3 - 6.5, that the indexes of profitability of Alternative I yields the 
same ranking, placing Ilo and Cajamarquilla projects in the first two 
positions and the Cerro Verde project in the last position with actually 
a negative profitability. When we incorporate shadow prices for labor and 
foreign exchange as under Alternative II each index of profitability 
yields a different ranking, as can be seen in Tables 6.3 - 6.5. With 
respect to the net present value ranking, the Cerro Verde and Michiquillay 
project now occupy the first two positions because of the premium given to 
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foreign exchange and because of the amount of annual production which 
are significantly larger than the Ilo and Cajamarquilla projects. 
On the other hand when we consider the initial investment in the 
denominator that is the benefit-cost ratio, the Ilo project maintains 
its first position and Cerro Verde is now displaced to the last position. 
The ranking as related to the internal rate of return is similar to that 
obtained as under Alternative I. All mining projects are profitable from 
a social point of view under this alternative. 
If we incorporate weighting factors for consumption as in Alterna­
tive III, the ranking generated for each index of profitability con­
tinues to be different, as can be seen in Tables 6.3 - 6.5. Nevertheless, 
both the net present value, the benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate 
of return give us similar results to that obtained as under Alternative 
II. Again all mining projects prove to be socially profitable under this 
alternative. 
On the other hand we have the method proposed by Little and Mirrlees 
as under Alternative IV, which we have already identified as being 
equivalent to Alternative II of Marglin, because the assumptions and 
parameters utilized are the same except that under Alternative IV the 
numeraire is in terms of consumption. The ranking obtained for the net 
present value, the benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate of return 
(Tables 6.3 - 6.5) is exactly the same as that obtained under Alternative 
II of Marglin for the mining and industrial projects. In the iirrigation 
projects the net present value and the benefit-cost ratio also yield 
similar results. Nevertheless with respect to the ranking as related to 
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the internal rate of return, the Jequetepeque project now occupies the 
second place. This displacement is produced because of the longer con­
struction period of the Olmos project. That is because when we express 
labor in terms of consumption and divide the annual capital and consump­
tion flows by the price of investment, the resulting present values are 
reduced to a proportionally greater extent for the costs of the 
Jequetepeque project than for the Olmos project. In this particular 
alternative all twelve investment projects are socially profitable. 
When we utilize the social marginal productivity criterion we only 
consider that alternative of each variant of analysis which assumes a 
premium of 0.5 for foreign exchange. That is we do not restate the 
results obtained for the social marginal productivity criterion which 
assume that r * 0 or alternately where r = 0.7. In alternative I of the 
social marginal productivity criterion (Table 6.10), we consider the 
total investment as an absolute figure without considering a discounting 
process. The ranking of this alternative places the Jequetepeque and 
Olmos project in the first two positions, and assigns last place to the 
Majes project. All irrigation projects obtain a social marginal produc­
tivity larger than the social rate of discount, which implies that all 
are socially profitable. 
In Alternative II (Table 6.11) we do include a discount factor with 
respect to the initial investment, costs and benefits and we observe that 
the Chira-Piura project now pushes the Jequetepeque project to a second 
position. This displacement is due to the larger annual benefits of the 
Chira-Piura irrigation project, both in absolute amounts as well as to 
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the period of reference through which they are to be received. 
Alternative III of the social marginal productivity criterion also 
includes a shadow wage rate but this inclusion does not influence the 
ranking of the irrigation projects as obtained under Alternative II. 
When we compare the results of Alternative III utilizing the social 
marginal productivity criterion and the method proposed by Marglin we 
observe that the ranking of the net present value and the benefit-cost 
ratio are equivalent to those obtained by the social marginal productivity 
criterion. Nevertheless with Alternative II as proposed by Marglin, the 
Olmos project occupies second position, which is placed in third position 
by the social marginal productivity criterion. This difference is due to 
the fact that the social marginal productivity criterion under Alternative 
II does not include a shadow wage rate which affects the Olmos project 
relative to the Jequetepeque project. 
In the industrial projects the social marginal productivity ranking 
for the three alternatives are identical (Tables 6.10 - 6.12), placing the 
La Pampilla and the Steel plant project in the first two positions, and 
the Yura cement plant in fourth position. This result is similar as that 
furnished by the benefit-cost ratio on all possible alternatives of the 
method proposed by Marglin. But when we utilize the net present value 
ranking we do have an interchange between the first and second position 
between the steel plant and the La Pampilla refinery. 
On the other hand the social marginal productivity ranking of the 
mining projects are identical for the three alternatives (Tables 6.10 -
6.12), placing the Ho project, Cajamarquilla and Michiquillay project in 
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the first three positions and the Cerro Verde project in last position. 
This result is similar to that obtained with the internal rate of return 
criterion and all the alternatives considered under Marglin's method, 
but when we utilize the benefit-cost ratio criterion we observe an inter­
change of the Michiquillay and Cajamarquilla projects. The results ob­
tained with the net present value criterion are very different from that 
with the social marginal productivity criterion which as previously 
indicated is due to differences in monetary income, that is to say the 
projects which have larger annual benefits automatically obtains larger 
net present values. 
The irrigation projects as well as industrial and mining project 
prove to be socially profitable under all three alternatives suggested 
by the social marginal productivity criterion. 
With respect to the ranking furnished by the semi input-output 
method (Table 6.15), the ranking of the irrigation projects differs from 
that obtained by the previous methods, because it places the Jequetepeque 
project in first position. Also similarly to the previous methods the 
Majes project is placed last. The ranking of industrial projects is 
similar to that obtained by the social marginal productivity criterion, 
but for the mining projects we do observe an interchange of the positions 
between the Michiquillay and the Cajamarquilla project. But the Cerro 
Verde project again maintains its fourth and last position. According 
to the benefit-cost ratio obtained by the semi input-output method all 
projects prove to be profitable. 
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2. Global ranking 
For the purposes of a comparative analysis between the ranking 
generated by Alternatives II and III of Marglin, subsequently called Mil 
and Mill and Alternative III of Chenary, subsequently called SMPIII, 
we will describe and justify the locations of the ranking and the dis­
placements which occur when making a comparison between one alternative 
and another. We must emphasize that we are considering the ranking 
furnished by the utilization of the benefit-cost ratio and for the 
marginal productivity criterion we are considering the variant which 
assigns a premium of 50 percent to the utilization of foreign exchange. 
First we must compare the results between alternatives Mil and SMPIII 
and subsequently include the results of Alternative Mill. 
The La Pampilla oil refinery is considered to be the most profit­
able project under the three alternatives. This result is due to the 
relative small amount of investment required relative to the annual value 
of production generated. This project has been favored by the internal 
price policy which has increased fivefold the prices of petroleum deriva­
tives in the last two years. In the other hand the input for maintenance 
and operation are of national origin and can be provided by the same 
enterprise that operates the project. That is to say, the cost per barrel 
of crude oil is calculated according to the cost of exploitation and not 
according to the international price. 
For the second position within the global ranking alternative Mil 
selects the Ilo copper refinery whereas the Alternative SMPIII selects 
the Chira-Piura irrigation project. Both projects have a similar 
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proportionality between the initial investment and annual benefits 
generated, nevertheless with alternative Mil the Ilo project is favored 
because of the premium assigned to foreign exchange which is sufficiently 
large so as to counter the effect assigned to the unskilled labor imputed 
to the Chira-Piura project. But the foreign exchange premium as calcu­
lated under Alternative SMPIII is not sufficiently large to keep the Ilo 
project in the second position of the ranking. That is to say in 
Alternative Mil the foreign exchange premium is imputed to all the annual 
production whereas in Alternative SMPIII only to 56 percent of the annual 
production is given by relationship 6.47d. On the other hand the Chira-
Piura project has a similar balance of payments effect in both alterna­
tives. 
For the fourth and fifth position within the global ranking, the 
alternative Mil selects the Olmos irrigation project and the Jequetepeque 
project respectively. This is due to the fact that under Alternative Mil 
the construction and operating foreign exchange costs are larger for the 
Jequetepeque irrigation, whereas in Alternative SMPIII this difference 
tends to disappear as can be seen in Table 6.2 and relationships 6.42 
and 6.45. We already indicated that with respect to irrigation projects 
the Chira-Piura project is the most profitable. 
For the sixth and seventh position of the global ranking both 
alternatives coincide to select the Steel Plant and the.Fertilizer project 
respectively. 
On the other hand, the eighth and ninth positions are undecided be­
tween the Michiquillay and Cajamarquilla project. According to the 
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Alternative Mil the Michiquillay project is more profitable than the 
Camarquilla refinery. This is because in Alternative Mil the construc­
tion foreign component is greater in the Cajamarquilla project, neverthe­
less in Alternative SMPIII the direct investment on the balance of payment 
is still greater for the Cajamarquilla project but the difference is less 
impressive. 
For the tenth position both alternatives coincide to select the 
Cerro Verde project. 
Finally the eleventh and twelfth positions of the global ranking is 
undecided between the Majes irrigation project and the Yura cement plant. 
The Alternative Mil selects the Majes project because in this alternative 
the Yura project obtains a negative net foreign exchange effect, whereas 
in Alternative SMPIII this project obtains a positive balance of payments 
effect. 
With respect to the values and ranking of Alternative Mill we observe 
in Table 6.4 that only the irrigation projects have decreased their bene­
fit-cost ratio with respect to the values obtained under Alternative Mil. 
This decrease is caused by a disproportionate increase in investment costs 
with respect to the benefits. That is to say while the capital expendi­
tures and the premium to be paid for foreign exchange have increased by 
90 percent, the net benefits have increased only by 17 percent due to the 
weight given to consumption by the public sector and by farmers respec­
tively. We must observe that this outcome is the result of the initial 
assumption about the marginal propensities to consume and to invest by the 
economic groups participating in the investment project. That is to say 
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we assumed that the public sector saves a greater share of its income 
relative to fanners. 
Taking these assumptions into consideration we observe that the 
mining and industrial projects have improved slightly their benefit-cost 
ratio and ranking but keeping among them the order obtained under 
Alternative Mil. On the other hand the irrigation projects have decreased 
significantly their benefit-cost ratio, but they also maintain among them 
the ranking obtained under Alternative Mil. Nevertheless they have been 
displaced to the second half of the global ranking. Under this alterna­
tive all projects except the Majes irrigation are considered socially 
profitable, 
E. Partial Evaluation Criteria and National Objectives 
The evaluation and ranking of the twelve selected projects have been 
done according to the indexes of profitability suggested by the applica­
tion of different methodologies of evaluation. Nevertheless it is common 
practice in the social benefit-cost evaluation of projects to relate the 
performance of a given investment to one or more specific objectives such 
as production, employment and the balance of payments. 
In this study we have not tried to obtain a ranking according to the 
contribution of the project to these national objectives, because the 
nature of the sectoral projects determine by their performance within the 
global ranking these comparative advantages in terms of production, 
employment and foreign exchange savings. 
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By simple inspection of Table 6.2 we can appreciate that the agricul­
tural projects which contribute to the generation of employment, whereas 
the mining projects are specifically conceived to contribute to the 
generation of foreign exchange. If we were to take a ranking which would 
take into account only one or the other partial aspect then logically we 
would arrive at a ranking quite different when we consider all of these 
aspects simultaneously. Nevertheless we must emphasize that the methods 
utilized here can be used to demonstrate the effects on partial objec­
tives. 
The objective of increasing national income can be measured by the 
net present value, the benefit-cost ratio, the social marginal produc­
tivity criterion, the semi input-output method or whatever combination of 
variables which permit us to construct the output-investment ratio. On 
the other hand the foreign exchange objective can be represented by the 
conçonent rB/K of the social marginal productivity method, the output in 
the foreign exchange-investment ratio or whatever combination of variables 
that reflect the construction of a project as related to the generation 
of foreign exchange. 
The objective of employment generation can be measured by the employ­
ment-output ratio or/and the employment-investment ratio or whatever com­
bination of variables that reflect wages and salaries associated with 
production or capital expenditures. On the other hand we must observe 
that both the statistical information as well as the computation of 
profitability indexes have been done in such form as to be able to com­
pute these partial contributions of these projects. 
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VII. SUMM^ Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective pursued throughout this thesis has been to formulate 
investment evaluation criteria which allows for the selection and prepara­
tion of a public investment program which is consistent with the national 
development plan both at the national,regional as well as sectoral level. 
Initially we analyze the theoretical basis for the traditional 
principal methods of evaluation which are still frequently used as the 
instrument of analysis in feasibility studies and financial-economic 
reports submitted to public entities. 
Given the limitations of these methods we present and analyze the 
conceptual basis of social benefit-cost analysis. As a point of departure 
we take the model of perfect competition and proved for that model that 
the benefit-cost criterion is a restatement of the first order optimality 
conditions of the perfectly competitive model. 
In the case of developed economies one generally assumes that market 
prices are an acceptable approximation to equilibrium prices as could be 
derived under a model of perfect competition. Under such conditions 
market prices reflect the social opportunity cost of the factors of 
production. Nevertheless the environment of the economies of developing 
countries are significantly different from those commonly associated with 
the model of perfect competition. In this sense there exist a series of 
market imperfections which make it impossible to satisfy the conditions 
of equilibrium required for an optimal distribution of resources. 
Commonly such disequilibria are associated with certain market dis­
tortions due to monopolistic elements, price controls, institutionally 
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determined wage rates, fixed exchange rates, rigidity in interest rates, 
capital rationing, the existing of surplus labor, etc. 
Given these conditions the prices of the system do not reflect the 
true opportunity cost of the factors of production. Consequently the 
evaluation of an economic rearrangement based on market prices would 
result in an inefficient distribution of resources. Prices then do not 
reflect the social costs and benefits of using and producing different 
commodities. 
Given this situation the problem reduces to that of adjusting market 
prices in such a form so as to obtain the relevant shadow prices which 
reflect the true social opportunity cost of the factors of production, 
particularly with respect to strategic inputs such as capital, labor and  ^
foreign exchange. 
With this in mind we proceeded to develop and analyze current 
methodologies which try to determine the correct form of estimating the 
shadow price of labor, the shadow price of foreign exchange, the shadow 
price of investment and the social rate of discount. In each case we have 
presented the theoretical basis for the estimation of these parameters, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
Subsequently we develop the methods of social evaluation which we 
then apply to twelve selected projects. First we analyze separately 
the two methodological variants of benefit-cost analysis referred to as 
the ONUDI method, whose principal author was Marglin and the other 
referred to as the OCDE method whose principal authors were Little and 
Mirrlees, When we compare these procedures we find that both methods 
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utilize the method of discounted cash flows. This leads to the expression 
of profitability indexes in terms of net present value, the benefit-cost 
ratio and in terms of the internal rate of return. The method of Marglin 
actualizes costs and benefits in terms of consumption, little and 
Mirrlees utilize investment goods as the numeraire. Another difference 
between the OCDE method and the ONUDI method is that the former utilizes 
border prices in the numeraire whereas the latter utilizes domestic prices 
in the numeraire. Both procedures adjust market prices by means of the 
estimation of shadow prices. The principal characteristic of the UNIDO 
method is the weighting of consumption generated by each group that 
participates in the project. That is to say the Marglin method weights 
the flows of costs and benefits according to the marginal propensities to 
consume and to invest of each economic group. The OCDE method only 
differentiates between the source of funds as between the private and 
public sector. 
On the other hand the social marginal productivity method as proposed 
by Chenery determines the annual increment in national income and the 
balance of payments effect per unit of project investment. Basically this 
method jointly values the capital turnover rate and the balance of pay­
ments effect of an investment project. 
The semi input-output method incorporates in the evaluation of 
projects the intersectoral effects. This method divides the input-output 
matrix in two rectangular sub-matrixes grouping to which correspond 
national and international sectors respectively. The national sectors 
are defined by those sectors whose products or services are restricted to 
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the internal market because of technical, economic or structural reasons. 
The contrary is the case for international sectors. 
In this form the benefits of a project are evaluated in relation to 
changes in the level of production of a group of interrelated national 
sectors. 
In order to have a global vision of the Peruvian econony we have 
included a small descriptive section which highlights the behavior of the 
principal global and sectoral indicators of the Peruvian econoiny for the 
period 1968-1975. We have given greater emphasis to the behavior of 
aggregate variables on the expenditure side, and especially to the program 
of public investment implemented during this period. Within this we have 
highlighted the contribution of the principal projects, their objectives 
and their source of financing. 
With respect to the twelve projects selected for economic evaluation 
we must indicate that these projects have been selected under the con­
viction that they are the most representative within their respective 
sectors and that they reflect the strategy pursued by the government in 
the investment field. In absolute amounts these twelve projects consti­
tute approximately seventy percent of investment under actual implementa­
tion. 
For the agricultural sector we have chosen the irrigation projects 
Chira-Piura, Olmos, Jequetepeque and Majes. For the industrial sector we 
chose the la Pampilla oil refinery, the Fertilizer Plant, the Steel Plant 
and the Yura cement project. For the mining sector we chose the Ilo 
copper refinery, the Michiquillay copper production project, the 
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Cajamarquilla zinc refinery and the Cerro Verde copper production 
project. We give a summary description of each project, their principal 
characteristics, their costs, and their expected benefits. 
The basic information for these projects is provided by the respec­
tive feasibility studies, which was complemented by information from 
other sources so as to check the consistency of these studies as well as 
to obtain the necessary division in of labor machinery, materials both 
in terms of national and foreign exchange conçonents. 
On the other hand given the tendency to underestimate the costs and 
overestimate the benefits it has been necessary to adjust the estimates 
according to opinion sampling realized both in the office and at the field 
level and in other cases according to the statistics for prices and pro­
duction. 
Once we verified and adjusted the components of investment and 
production we then actualized the studies on the basis of 1976 prices. 
This adjustment was necessary in order to express costs and benefits of 
the selected projects with respect to the same base year, which allows us 
to compare one project with another. For the purpose of the conversion 
to the same base year we utilized the deflators listed in Table 6.1. 
Subsequently we proceeded to realize the social evaluation of these 
projects so as to obtain a ranking of these according to the different 
indexes of profitability obtained. The lœthod proposed by Marglin is 
applied in three successive stages which allow us to appreciate the 
influence on the indexes of profitability the incorporation of the 
separate assumptions and adjustments which convert a stricted financial 
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analysis into a social benefit-cost analysis. The results of Alternative 
I of Marglin based on market prices, show that with the exception of the 
Cerro Verde and Majes project, the remainder of the projects are finan­
cially profitable. 
For the irrigation projects we observe that the net present value 
ranking and the benefit-cost ratio are stable. They place the Chira-
Piura and Olmos project in the first two places. The internal rate of 
return ranking considers the Olmos project as the most profitable because 
of its larger period of construction. For the industrial projects we 
observe that the benefit-cost ratio and the internal rate of return 
yield identical rankings, placing the La Pampilla oil refinery and the 
Steel Plant in the first two positions. The net present value ranking 
give first position to the Steel plant because of its large annual value 
of production relative to the La Pampilla refinery project. For the 
mining projects we observe that the three indexes of commercial profita­
bility such as net present value, benefit-cost ratio and the internal 
rate of return yield the same ranking, placing the Ilo refinery and 
Cajamarquilla project in the first two positions. 
If we take the twelve projects together we observe that there does 
not exist a sectoral predominance in the global ranking. Nevertheless, 
the Steel Plant, the La Pampilla oil refinery, the Ilo project and the 
Chira-Piura and Olmos irrigation projects occupy the first five posi­
tions of the global ranking with respect to all indexes of profitability 
considered in this alternative. 
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The inclusion of shadow prices for labor and foreign exchange as 
under Alternative II increases the indexes of profitability for all 
projects with the result that all are considered to be socially profit­
able. 
The ranking of the agricultural projects is stable for the three 
indexes of profitability, placing the Chira-Piura and Olmos projects 
in the first two positions. The Majes project always obtains the last 
position in the sectoral ranking. On the other hand the ranking of the 
industrial projects is unstable with respect to the three indexes of 
profitability, although the Yura cement project always comes in last 
position. For the ranking of the benefit-cost ratio and the internal 
rate of return criterion the La Pampilla oil refinery occupies first 
place, but in the net present value calculations the Steel plant dis­
places it because of its larger annual production. 
With respect to the mining projects we also observe that the results 
given the utilization of the three indexes of profitability are unstable. 
In the net present value ranking the Cerro Verde and Michiquillay proj­
ects occupy the first two positions because of their foreign exchange 
earnings and because of the value of annual production which are signifi­
cantly larger than those for the Ilo and Cajamarquilla projects. On the 
other hand when we utilize the benefit-cost ratio and internal rate of 
return ranking the Ilo project becomes the most profitable displacing 
the Cerro Verde project now to last position. If we take all twelve 
projects together one observes that the net present value ranking favors 
projects with the larger annual production of export oriented projects 
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such as mining projects. On the other hand the benefit-cost ratio and 
the internal rate of return ranking favor agricultural projects and to a ' 
lesser extent the industrial projects. 
The inclusion of weighting factors for consumption, as under 
Alternative III, increases the social profitability of industrial and 
mining projects. The irrigation projects are severely affected decreas­
ing their indexes of social profitability. The Majes project is the only 
project, however, which obtains a negative social profitability. This 
deterioration in the profitability of irrigation projects is due to the 
fact that their investment costs increase according to the weight assigned 
to government consumption, whereas benefits increase in a smaller propor­
tion according to the weighting given to the consumption by farmers. 
We must indicate that the ranking of the mining and industrial 
projects maintain as between themselves the ranking as obtained by the 
second alternative of Marglin, because the weighting factors affects both 
costs and benefits almost proportionally. 
On the other hand the method proposed by Little and Mirrlees, as 
under Alternative IV are quite stable and comparable to those obtained 
under Alternative II by Marglin, because the assumptions and parameters 
utilized in both methods are quite the same, with exception that in 
Alternative IV salaries and wages during the construction and operation 
phase are expressed in terms of consumption generated. 
We applied a sensitivity analysis only for Alternative III of the 
Marglin method. For this purpose we assumed a social rate of discount 
respectively equal to 8 percent, 10 percent and 12 percent. Similarly we 
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assign a foreign exchange premium of 50 percent and 70 percent over the 
current market price. For the shadow price of labor we also considered 
this wage rate with and without indirect effects which are associated 
with the shadow price of investment. According to the results obtained, 
we observe that to the extent that the social rate of discount decreases 
from 12 percent to 8 percent, the shadow price of investment will in­
crease, lAich in turn increases to a larger extent the weighting factor 
of consumption of those economic groups which have a larger propensity 
to save. 
The projects mostly affected by the consideration of a smaller rate 
of discount are the irrigation projects, because as we indicated the 
investment costs to be assumed by the government increase to a larger 
extent, than the benefits generated by the farmers. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of indirect effects in the estimation of the shadow price 
of labor determines that the shadow wage rate be larger than the market 
wage rate, which affects paradoxically those projects most intensive in 
labor such as the irrigation projects. 
In the application of Chenery's social marginal productivity method 
we have considered also three analytical alternatives. In Alternative I 
we proceeded to calculate the indexes of social marginal productivity 
taken the total investment as an absolute figure. Costs and benefits 
are represented by the values sustained by the project once it reaches 
full production, without taking into account any possible discounting 
process. In Alternative II we proceed to express the total cost of the 
project and the annual production and cost flows and the corresponding 
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balance of payments effect in terms of annual equivalents. Alternative 
III is similar to Alternative II, except that we also allow for a shadow 
price for labor. 
The sectoral ranking of mining and industrial projects are quite 
stable for the three alternatives of the social marginal productivity 
criterion, when the shadow price is 1,5 times the market price for foreign 
exchange. In the industrial sector the La Fampilla and the Steel plant 
occupy the first two positions. In the mining sector the Ilo and 
Cajamarquilla project are considered as the most profitable. On the 
other hand the ranking of the irrigation projects is stable only for 
Alternatives II and III. Both place the Chira-Piura and Jequetepeque 
project in the first two positions. The indexes of social marginal 
productivity obtained in the three alternatives classify all twelve proj­
ects as socially profitable. We must mention thatthe hypothesis of 
Chenery is confirmed for all three of these alternatives, that is to say 
that the sectoral ranking given by the capital turnover ratio is the same 
as that provided by the social marginal productivity criterion. 
On the other hand the results generated by the utilization of the 
semi input-output method is quite similar to that obtained by the benefit-
cost ratio and the social marginal productivity method. The ranking of 
the industrial and mining projects is quite similar to that obtained 
under the above mentioned methods. With respect to the irrigation 
projects, the semi input-output method selects the Jequetepeque project 
as the most profitable. The Majes project as with the previous methods 
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occupies last place. According to the indexes of profitability obtained 
all projects prove to be profitable. 
Subsequently we make a comparison of the results taking as a base 
the ranking obtained by the utilization of the benefit-cost ratio for 
Alternatives II and III for Marglin and Alternative III for Chenery's 
social marginal productivity criterion. In this comparative analysis we 
observe that the performance of the irrigation projects with the excep­
tion of the Majes project is outstanding given that they occupy the third, 
fourth and fifth place in the global ranking under Alternative II as 
proposed by Marglin. In the global ranking on the basis of the social 
marginal productivity criterion, the irrigation projects even improve 
their ranking, now occupying the second, third and fifth place within 
the global ranking. This improvement in their position is due to the fact 
that in the social marginal productivity criterion the foreign exchange 
effect is less intensive which reduces the relative profitability of 
mining projects. In general the Chira-Piura and the Majes project always 
occupy the first and fourth place in sectoral ranking, whereas the 
Jequetepeque and Olmos project interchange positions according to the 
method of analysis utilized. 
The performance of industrial projects is stable for the three 
alternatives considered and compared both at the sectoral and global 
ranking. In the global ranking the La Pampilla refinery, the Steel plant 
and the Fertilizer project occupy the first, sixth and seventh position 
respectively. The Yura cement project is the least profitable. It shares 
with the Majes project last place. 
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For the mining projects we observe that the Ilo refinery occupies 
the second place in the global ranking of Alternative III as proposed by 
Marglin, but is displaced to a fourth position when we utilize the social 
marginal productivity ranking. The remaining mining sectoral projects are 
located in the eighth, ninth and tenth position. In the sectoral ranking 
the Ilo refinery and the Cerro Verde project always occupy the first and 
fourth place respectively. On the other hand the Michiquillay and 
Cajamarquilla projects interchange a third and fourth position. 
The adoption of Alternative III as proposed by Marglin affects the 
ranking of the irrigation projects considerably because of the high 
weight given to consumption by the government. The mining and industrial 
projects inçrove their positions relative to the irrigation projects but 
maintain internally their relative ranking as obtained under Alternative 
II. 
Finally we summarize in the following lines the most important 
findings of this study. 
One observes that the formulation and preparation of the feasibility 
studies are somewhat limited in the sense that such studies do not con­
sider technological alternatives, particularly as to the comparative 
advantages of more or lesser capital intensity projects, and their 
differential reliance on foreign exchange. Similarly there do not exist 
as of now specific instructions as to the preparation and evaluation of 
such studies from the social-economic point of view. In the review of 
these feasibility studies we found a marked heterogeneity as to concepts, 
definitions, evaluation methods, conventions and methods of presentation 
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utilized. These differences make it difficult to identify the principal 
variables and indicators which must serve in the selection and comparison 
as between these projects. When we take together the different methods 
and indexes of profitability used in this study we would like to indicate 
that each one of them has been designed to quantify one specific objec­
tive. All of them, however, do coincide in the selection of projects 
that happen to be profitable or nonprofitable. But within this, the 
rankings obtained are unstable. Hence the importance of relating the 
evaluation criteria to the purpose and necessity of analysis. According 
to the results of comparative analysis we observe that the sectoral rank­
ings are quite stable, but that the global rankings varies very substan­
tially from one method to the other. This indicates that the ranking 
generated by different methods of evaluation is the same for projects 
within a sector but quite different when one compares projects between one 
sector and the other. With respect to the consistency between the 
projects evaluated in this study and national objectives such as growth, 
employment and foreign exchange generation, we must indicate that each 
group of projects contributes to a lesser or greater extent to each of 
these objectives. Each sector, however, tends to have a predominance in 
one or another partial objective. If one does not clearly specify the ob­
jectives which one hopes to reach with a program of investment which bal­
ances partial objectives one can not necessarily reject a project which 
will achieve one or another of these objectives in isolation. Finally 
we may observe that all of the projects evaluated here are considered to 
be socially profitable with the exception of the Majes irrigation project 
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under certain assumptions. This in general would indicate that the 
government's public investment project as currently constituted is in 
general terms well conceived. 
According to the results obtained one does not observe the pre­
dominance in the global ranking of one sector relative to another. 
Nevertheless it may be somewhat surprising to many knowledgeable persons 
that the ranking of the irrigation projects is superior to that of mining 
and industrial projects. 
For its part the methods of social benefit-cost analysis give us an 
efficient instrument for the evaluation, selection and ranking of proj­
ects. Nevertheless the final composition of an investment program may 
have to include certain very specific targets closely related to one or 
several national objectives. 
Finally the social benefit-cost evaluation of a project should be 
realized both in the pre-investment stage, during the investment stage 
and during the production stage, coinciding respectively with the study, 
construction and operation phases of the project. 
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X. APPENDIX A 
Table A.l. Gross domestic product by expenditure category at constant 
1970 market prices, 1968-74 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
(billion soles) 
Gross domestic product 215.3 224.3 240.7 253.2 268.2 282.6 301.3 
Consumption 175.9 184.7 199.8 208.2 219.3 243.0 261.1 
Public 27.4 27.7 29.0 30.8 33.1 37.7 40.7 
Private 148.5 157.0 170.8 177.4 186.2 205.3 220.4 
Gross investment 27.8 28.7 31.1 38.7 38.8 41.8 52.1 
Fixed investment 25.9 26.7 29.9 33.0 35.1 39.5 51.1 
Public (7.6) (9.1) (10.9) (12.7) (13.6) (16.1) (26.8) 
Private (18.3)(17.6) (19.0) (20.3) (21.5) (23.4) (24.3) 
Stock changes 1.9 2.0 1.2 5.7 3.7 2.3 1.0 
Exports 47.6 46.5 47.5 45.5 49.3 39.6 42.7 
Imports 35.8 35.6 37.7 39.2 39.2 41.8 54.6 
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Table A.2. Gross domestic product by expenditure category, real growth 
rates, 1969-74 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Average 
1968-74 
(annual rates, percent) 
Gross domestic product 4.1 7.3 5.2 5.9 5.4 6.6 5^  
Consumption 5.1 8.1 4.2 5.4 12.4 7.9 6.8 
Public 1.0 4.9 6.6 8.5 12.6 8.7 6.8 
Private 5.9 8.7 3.8 4.8 12.4 7.8 6.8 
Gross investment 3.1 8.3 25.0 - 7.6 21.5 11.0 
Fixed investment 3.0 12.2 10.0 6.9 17.4 20.6 12.0 
Public (19.0) (20.1) (15.5) (8.7) (23.8) (42.1) (23.4) 
Private (-3.7) (8.1) (6.8) (5.8) (13.4) (5.7) (4.8) 
Stock changes -------
Exports -2.4 2.2 -4.1 8.1 -19.7 8.1 -1.7 
Inmorts -0.6 5.6 4.2 -0.3 6.6 30.6 7.3 
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Table A.3. Gross domestic product by expenditure category, 1968-74 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
(structure, percentages of total) 
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Consunction 84.5 83.8 83.0 84.1 85.2 85.7 88.0 
Public 13.0 12.2 12.0 12.5 13.0 12.7 12.3 
Private 71.5 71.6 71.0 71.6 72.2 73.0 75.7 
Gross investment 13.9 13.3 12.9 15.0 14.1 14.3 16.4 
Fixed investment 13.0 12.4 12.4 12.6 12.8 13.3 16.1 
Public (3.8) (4.2) (4.5) (4.8) (5.0) (5.5) (8.5) 
Private (9.2) (8.2) (7.9) (7.8) (7.8) (7.8) (7.6) 
Stock changes 0.9 0.9 0.5 2.4 1.3 1.0 0.3 
Exports 20.6 19.7 19.7 16.0 15.4 15.0 16.1 
Imports 19.0 16.8 15.6 15.1 14.7 15.0 20.5 
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Table A.4. Gross domestic product by sectoral origin, real growth 
rates, 1969-74 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
(annual rates, percent) 
Gross domestic product 4.1 7.3 5.2 5.9 5.4 6.6 
Agriculture 6.6 7.8 3.0 - 2.4 2.3 
Fishing -10.0 34.0 -13.4 —48.4 -23.6 40.9 
Mining 9.9 5.1 -2.8 6.4 0.7 2.5 
Manufacturing 2.1 10.2 12.1 12.7 7.5 8.0 
Construction 6.7 13.6 10.5 12.4 8.2 17.0 
Electricity, gas and water 5.0 4.6 7.6 5.7 6.0 9.0 
Ownership of dwellings 3.1 -0.2 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.7 
Administration and defense 2.0 4.3 6.5 7.0 7.0 5.5 
Commerce 9.9 4.7 8.3 5.4 6.0 6.0 
Other 6.0 5.2 1,9 6.2 6.3 7.8 
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Table A.5. Gross domestic product by sectoral origin, 1968-74 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
(structure, percentages of total) 
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture 14.7 15.0 15.1 14.8 14.0 13.6 13.0 
Fishing 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.3 1.1 0.8 1.1 
Mining 8.7 8.3 8.2 7.5 7.6 7.3 7.0 
Manufacturing 23.0 22.6 23.2 24.7 26.2 26.8 27.0 
Construction 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.2 
Electricity, gas and water 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Ownership of dwellings 4.5 4.5 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 
Administration and defense 8.7 8.5 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.5 
Commerce 13.4 14.1 13.8 14.2 14.2 14.3 14.1 
Other 19.2 19.7 19.1 IS.4 18.5 18.5 18.8 
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Table A.6. Gross capital formation of the public sector, by institutional 
origin, 1968-75 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
(million soles) 
Central government 2,603 2,912 5,765 7,115 8,503 7,593 14,937 15,564 
Public enterprises 2,557 4,307 3,852 4,042 5,117 10,648 19,935 32,198 
Public institutions 
and social security 1,519 1,140 571 580 362 377 897 920 
Local governments 423 473 709 1,051 850 1,243 1,400 1,438 
Total 7,102 8,832 10,897 12,788 14,832 19,861 37,169 50,120 
Table A.7. Public investment: Major projects 
Agriculture 
Chira-Piura 
Majes 
Olmos 
Jequetepeque 
Tinajones I 
Power and mining 
Cerro Verde I 
Cerro Verde II 
Ilo I 
Ilo II 
Cajamarquilla 
Michiquillay 
La Pampilla 
Pipeline 
Mantaro I and II 
Fisheries 
Paita con^ lex 
La Puntilla complex 
Samanco complex 
Total cost Beginning of operations 
(million soles) (year) 
11,780 1978 
14,757 1981 
11,396 progressive 
5,922 1980 
10,000 1981 
7,276 1977 
90,436 1982 
2,196 1976 
5,892 1980 
11,505 1980 
35,752 1981 
5,634 1976 
27,000 1978 
22,525 1978 
1,600 1977 
1,350 1976 
962 1978 
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Total cost Beginning of operations 
(million soles) (year) 
Transport and communications 
Oroya-Aguaytia 
Tarapoto-Serrayanacu 
Callejon de Huaylas 
Railroad rehabilitation 
Telecommunications network 
National telex network 
Industry 
Steel plant expansion 
Metal work complex 
Newsprint plant 
Urea plant 
Health and Sanitation 
National rural water supply 
and sewerage 
Hospitals network 
4,013 
1,382 
1,622 
2,679 
1,007 
671 
65,907 
732 
2,786 
3,635 
1978 
progressive 
1977 
1978 
1976 
1976 
1980 
1977 
1977 
1979 
1,437 
1,556 
1976 
1979 
Table A.8. Public investment program by sectoral origin, 1968-75 
1968 1969 1970 1971 
(million soles) 
Productive sectors 1,854 4,128 2,008 2,982 
Agriculture 537 387 676 811 
Industry and tourism 271 2,041 480 462 
Mining and hidrocarbons 1,034 1,700 780 1,646 
Fisheries 12 - 72 63 
Physical infrastructure 2,666 2,212 5,358 4,994 
Transport and communications 2,666 2,212 3,770 3,602 
Power - - 1,588 1,392 
Social sectors 915 686 1,104 1,125 
Education 176 149 333 356 
Health 204 214 168 103 
Housing 535 323 603 666 
Other 1,667 1,806 2,427 3,687 
Total 7,102 8.832 10,897 12,788 
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1972 1973 1974 1975 1968 1975 
(million soles) (percentage) 
4,689 8,806 16,553 33,974 26 68 
2,083 2,702 4,707 6,021 8 12 
214 235 887 3,495 4 7 
2,046 5,447 9,776 22,207 14 44 
346 422 1,183 2,071 - 5 
4,479 5,210 7,171 8,880 M 1J_ 
2,587 3,010 4,286 4,480 38 9 
1,892 2,200 2,885 4,400 - 8 
2,013 1,911 2,853 3,617 U 1 
702 844 1,468 1,300 2 3 
273 213 294 1,149 3 2 
1,038 854 1,091 1,168 8 2 
3.651 3,754 10,592 3,649 23 8 
14,832 19,681 37,169 50,120 100 100 
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Total A.9. Public investment program by regional origin, 1968-75 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
(structure, percentage of total) 
North 17 33 17 23 21 26 22 23 
Central 21 18 12 20 21 19 11 7 
Lima 
metropolitan 14 11 12 10 12 8 8 9 
South 14 10 18 13 15 14 18 21 
East 5 8 9 11 14 13 25 25 
Multiregional 29 20 32 23 17 20 16 15 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table A.10. Public investment program and its financing, 1968-75 
Source 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
(million soles) 
Public treasury 3,230 3,689 6,779 6,505 6,087 8,724 14,194 15,248 
Capital revenue 179 265 565 3,193 4,157 2,917 3,569 3,989 
Internal debt 105 53 8 412 957 341 864 3,712 
External debt 3,588 4,825 3,520 2,583 3,508 7,795 18,463 27,171 
External transfers - - 25 95 123 84 79 -
Total 7,102 8,832 10,897 12,788 14,832 19.861 37,169 50,120 
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Table A. 11. Saving-investment gap 
Year National savings Gross domestic Gap Ratio 
investment 
(1) (2) (1-2) (l)/(2) 
(million soles) (percentage) 
1968 20,232 25,783 -5,551 78 
1969 24,128 27,863 -3,735 87 
1970 35,967 31,049 4,918 116 
1971 37,614 39,536 -1,922 95 
1972 38,992 41,834 -2,842 93 
1973 41,986 50,682 -8,696 83 
1974 47,637 72,416 -24,779 66 
1975 41,136 105,985 -64,845 39 
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Table A.12. Central Government cash operations, 1969-76 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975-76 
(billion soles) 
Current revenues 32.3 38.9 41.7 45.6 53.4 69.3 188.6 
Current expenditures 28.2 32.1 36.9 42.0 52.5 62.3 191.0 
Current account 
surplus or deficit 4.1 6.8 4.8 3.6 0.9 7.0 -2.4 
Capital expenditures 6.0 9.5 12.5 14.1 15.4 21.4 64.9 
(Gross fixed investment) (2.9) (5.8) (7.1) (8.5) (7.6) (14.9) n.a. 
Overall surplus or 
deficit 
-2.0 -3.2 —8.1 -10.8 -14.6 -14.4 -67.3 
Financing 
External, net 1.3 1.6 -0.4 2.2 7.0 11.2 23.2 
Domestic, net 0.7 1.6 8.5 8.6 7.6 3.2 44.1 
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Table A.13. Public enterprises cash operations, 1969-74 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
(billion soles) 
Current revenues 7.8 10.2 11.5 15.1 21.3 29.0 
Current expenditures 6.2 7.5 9.9 12.7 21.9 31.6 
Current account surplus 
or deficit 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.4 -0.6 —2 • 6 
Capital revenue^  1.0 0.8 2.9 3.0 3.9 4.3 
Capital expenditures 4.8 4.9 4.2 5.4 11.2 21.4 
(Gross fixed investment) (4.3) (3.8) (4.0) (5.1) (10.6) (19.9) 
Overall surplus or deficit -2.2 -1.4 0.3 - -7.8 -19.8 
XI. APPENDIX B 
Table B.l. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, 
Chira-Piura project 
Feasibility studies 
Item base year = 1967 
(million soles) 
Total output 1632.8 
Domestic currency 1274.8 
Foreign currency 520.7 
Agricultural income foregone 162.7 
Total investment 5718.5 
Domestic currency 3838.6 
Construction and equipment 428.6 
Labor 480.5 
Assistance and supervision 613.1 
Administrative costs 223.6 
Farm development 2092.8 
Foreign currency 1879.9 
Operating costs 1324.6 
Production costs 761.1 
Labor 545.5 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 13.5 
Foreign currency 4.6 
®The output and production costs adjustments have been made 
according to tables B.2. and B.3. 
R^ate of exchange US $1.00 = s/.70.0. 
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 ^ Adjusted 
Deflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars) 
4778.1 68.3 
3624.8 51.8 
1480.6 21.2 
327.3 4.7 
11780.6 168.3 
8114.8 115.9 
1.94 831.5 . 11.9 
3.33 1600.0 22.9 
1.94 1189.5 17.0 
1.94 433.8 6.2 
1.94 4060.0 58.0 
1.95 3665.8 52.4 
29563.4 42.3 
1705.8 24.3 
1222.6 17.5 
1.94 26.0 0.4 
1.95 9.0 0.1 
Table B.2. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production and costs, Piura 
valley at full output 
Cultivated Gross Production 
hectares per hectare 
Product 
No. % Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
Cotton 31326 46.7 18994 40270 
Rice 9762 14.6 13936 51367 
Com 6506 9.7 10864 25960 
Grains 8057 12.0 8363 21112 
Potato 6705 10.0 11508 87380 
Citrics 670 1.0 21964 42067 
Bananas 670 1.0 19320 65764 
0. Fruits 670 1.0 18553 50200 
Orchards 2689 4.0 14312 51860 
Total 67055 100.0 15283 43743 
Lower Piura 54135 80.7 15347 43040 
Middle Piura 12920 19.3 15015 46687 
Without project 44615 - 13925 31576 
feasibility study projections (base year = 1969). 
1^976 prices. 
T^he agricultural income foregone is given by the difference between 
1408.8 and 1199.0. 
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Production costs Gross production Production costs 
per hectare 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted^  Adjusted** 
(soles) (million soles) (million soles) 
13450 27071 595.0 1261.5 421.3 848.0 
10750 23950 136.0 501.4 104.9 233.8 
7780 15759 70.7 168.9 50.6 102.5 
10411 14620 67.4 170.1 83.9 117.8 
9720 49636 77.2 585.9 65.2 332.8 
15900 23620 14.7 28.2 10.0 15.8 
8962 27000 12.9 44.1 6.0 18.0 
11760 23510 12.4 33.6 7.9 15.7 
11370 20150 38.5 139.5 30.6 54.2 
11647 25928 1024.8 2933.2 781.0 1738.6 
11974 26655 830.8 2330.0 648.2 1443.0 
10278 22879 194.0 603.2 132.8 295.6 
12078 26880 621.3 1408.8^  538.8 1199.0^  
Table B.3. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production and costs, Chira 
valley at full output 
Cultivated Gross production 
Product P" 
No. % Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
Cotton 14810 
Rice 3346 
Com 3133 
Forage 13314 
Beans 4806 
Alfalfa 4877 
Bananas 1673 
Dates 1*73 
Citrics 3774 
0. Fruits 3062 
Orchards 5874 
Total 60316 
Without project 47653 
24.6 15200 42351 
5.5 9600 51658 
5.2 13354 25667 
22.1 2020 8886 
8.0 5040 23128 
8.1 14600 44770 
2.8 28000 66328 
2.8 33000 64344 
6.3 27200 42150 
5.1 17612 52320 
9.7 15470 52125 
100.0 12778 36014 
7737 16248 
feasibility study projection (base year = 1967). 
1^976 prices. 
T^he agricultural income foregone is given by the difference between 
774.3 and 656.8. 
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Production costs 
per hectare 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
12250 26580 
8000 23740 
7650 15350 
1220 4624 
4000 13964 
11600 18236 
17000 26973 
18100 29865 
15000 22315 
10850 23968 
8500 20745 
8664 19726 
6055 13783 
Gross production 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(million soles) 
225.1 627.2 
32.1 172.8 
41.8 80.4 
26.9 118.3 
24.2 111.1 
71.2 218.3 
46.8 111.0 
55.2 107.6 
102.6 159.1 
53.9 160.2 
90.9 306.2 
770.7 2172.2 
368.7 774.3' 
Production costs 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted 
(million soles) 
181.4 393.6 
26.8 79.4 
24.0 48.1 
16.2 61.6 
19.2 43.7 
56.6 88.9 
28.4 45.1 
30.3 50.0 
56.6 84.2 
33.2 73.4 
49.9 121.8 
522.6 1189.8 
288.5 656.8^  
Table B.4. Chira-Piuxa project: Benefits, costs by year 
(at market prices) 
Item Year: 1 2 3 
Agricultural output - - -
Domestic currency - - -
Foreign currency - - -
Agricultural income foregone (Ot) - - -
Total investment (K^ ) 321.8 691.7 714.1 
Domestic currency (K°) 213.4 352.6 356.7 
Construction and equipment 24.6 76.9 81.0 
Labor 60.0 140.0 140.0 
Assistance and supervision 92.8 99.7 99.7 
Administratives costs 36.0 36.0 36.0 
Farm development - - -
Foreign currency (<) 108.4 339.1 357.4 
Ooeratine costs (cp - - -
Domestic currency <C°) - - -
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency (C^ ) 
Salvage value (V^ ) 
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(million soles) 
- 2257.7 2473.2 2688.6 2796.3 2904.0 3011.7 
- 1835.4 1988.4 2141.3 2217.8 2294.2 2370.7 
- 749.6 812.1 874.6 905.8 937.1 968.3 
- 327.3 327.3 327.3 327.3 327.3 327.3 
683.7 735.7 655.7 711.9 705.7 767.7 716.8 
408.2 417.8 403.0 413.4 412.2 423.7 415.0 
62.5 72.1 57.3 67.7 66.5 78.0 70.3 
140.0 140.0 140.0 140.0 140.0 140.0 140.0 
99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 
36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 
70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 
275.5 317.9 252.7 298.5 293.5 344.0 300.8 
-
1818.6 1967.0 2116.0 2190.3 2264.9 2338.9 
-
1809.6 1958.0 2107.0 2181.3 2255.6 2329.9 
-
1034.5 1120.6 1207.0 1250.1 1293.2 1336.3 
-
749.1 811.4 874.0 905.2 936.4 967.6 
- 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 
— 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Table B.4. (continued) 
Item 11 12 13 14 
Agricultural output 3119.4 3205.6 3334.8 3377.9 
Domestic currency 2447.2 2508.4 2600.1 2630.7 
Foregn currency 999.5 1024.5 1062.0 1074.5 
Agricultural income foregone 327.3 327.3 327.3 327.3 
Total.investment 791.7 854.1 70.0 70.0 
Domestic currency 428.1 439.7 70.0 70.0 
Construction and equipment 82.4 94.0 - -
Labor 140.0 140.0 - -
Assistance and supervision 99.7 99.7 - -
Administratives costs 36.0 37.8 - -
Farm development 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 
Foreign currency 363.6 414.4 - -
Operating costs 2413.2 2472.7 2561.8 2591.6 
Domestic currency 2404.2 2463.7 2552.8 2582.6 
Proudction costs 1379.4 1413.9 1465.4 1482.9 
Labor 988.8 1023.8 1061.3 1073.7 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 
Foreign currency 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Salvage value — - — -
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15 16 17-60 61 
3550.3 
2753.1 
1124.5 
327.3 
70.0 
70.0 
4365.7 
3332.0 
1361.0 
327.3 
70.0 
70.0 
4778.1 
3624.8 
1480.6 
327.3 
70.0 
70.0 
5395.7 
3624.8 
1480.6 
327.3 
70.0 
70.0 
70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 
2710.5 
2701.5 
1551.8 
1123.7 
26.0 
9.0 
2859.2 
2850.2 
1638.0 
1186.2 
26.0 
9.0 
2963.4 
2954.4 
1705.8 
1222.6 
26.0 
9.0 
2963.4 
2954.4 
1705.8 
1222.6 
26.0 
9.0 
617.6 
Table B.5. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, Jequetepeque 
project 
Feasibility studies 
Item base year = 1972 
(million soles) 
Total output 2626,3 
Domestic currency 2154.3 
Foreign currency 756.7 
Agricultural Income foregone 284.7 
Total Investment 3306.2 
Domestic currency 1816.8 
Construction and equipment 834.5 
Labor 534.6 
Assistance and supervision 145.6 
Administrative costs 64.5 
Farm development 237.6 
Foreign currency 1489.4 
Operating costs 1836.2 
Production costs 1124.6 
Labor 660.5 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 43.5 
Foreign currency 7.6 
T^he output and production costs adjustments have been made according to 
table B.6. 
R^ate of exchange US $1.00 » s/.70.0. 
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Adjusted 
Deflator^  1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
3829.7 54.7 
3062.5 43.7 
1075.8 15.4 
308.6 4.4 
5922.0 84.6 
3360.2 48.0 
1.72 1435.4 20.5 
2.16 1154.8 16.5 
1.72 250.4 3.6 
1.72 110.9 1.6 
1.72 408.7 5.8 
1.72 2561.8 36.6 
2181.1 31.2 
1318.6 18.8 
774.5 11.1 
1.72 74.9 1.1 
1.72 13.1 0.2 
Table B.6. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production and costs, 
Jequetepeque project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production 
hectares per hectare 
Product 
No. % Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
Rice 26102 24.7 35484 49845 
Com (feed) 22981 21.7 15755 28424 
Sorgum 17822 16.8 14993 15563 
Soybeans 6625 6.3 10460 13131 
Beans 3726 3.5 11943 22676 
Swt. Potato 65 0.1 7692 14880 
Yucca 560 0.5 9464 19842 
Vegetables 8045 7.5 28000 49068 
Alfalfa 1900 1.8 31421 44139 
Fruits 8000 7.6 36000 49637 
Sugar cane 8518 8.1 75710 93578 
Wheat 1438 1.4 12517 34916 
Total project 105782 100.0 27519 39121 
Without project 45134 — 24802 28522 
feasibility study projection (base year = 1972). 
1^976 prices. 
T^he agricultural income foregone is given by the difference between 
1287.3 and 978.7. 
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Production costs Gross Production Production costs 
per hectare 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) (million soles) (million soles) 
18820 22791 926.2 1301.1 491.2 594.9 
9890 12224 362.1 653.2 227.5 280.9 
7660 8122 267.2 277.4 136.5 144.8 
7360 7971 69.3 87.0 48.5 52.8 
7480 12309 44.5 84.5 27.7 45.9 
4290 8017 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.5 
5740 11760 5.3 11.1 3.2 6.6 
14120 21331 225.3 394.7 113.6 171.6 
15220 18431 59.7 83.9 28.8 35.0 
19410 22302 288.0 397.1 155.3 178.4 
63440 65384 644.9 797.1 540.6 556.9 
8230 17256 18.0 50.2 11.9 24.8 
16875 19787 2911.0 4138.3 1785.1 2093.1 
18495 21685 1119.0 1287.3^  834.7 978.7^  
Table B.7. Jequetepeque project: Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item 
Year: 1 2 3 
Agricultural output - - -
Domestic currency (B*) - - - ^ 
Foreign currency (<) - - -
Agricultural income foregone (Ot) - - -
Total investment (Kt) 714. 7 1360.2 1023.0 
Domestic currency (K^ ) 475. 5 753.1 608.1 
Construction and equipment 330. 4 558.0 413.0 
Labor 100. 0 150.0 150.0 
Assistance and supervision 31. 3 31.3 31.3 
Administratives costs 13. 8 13.8 13.8 
Farm development - - • -
Foreign currency (K5 239. 2 607.1 414.9 
Operating costs 
Domestic currency 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency 
Salvage value 
<c^ ) 
(C°) 
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10-12 
(million soles) 
- 772.4 1190.9 1435.0 1574.5 2620.6 2829.0 
- 800.0 1109.6 1290.3 1393.5 2169.4 2322.5 
- 281.0 389.9 453.3 489.6 759.8 816.0 
- 308.6 308.6 308.6 308.6 308.6 308.6 
500.0 408.4 548.9 621.9 646.1 97.9 -
431.5 371.1 444.3 493.2 566.9 97.9 -
151.7 139.9 242.4 291.3 190.8 - -
150.0 134.2 156.8 156.8 156.8 
-
-
31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3 - -
13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 - -
84.7 51.9 - - 174.2 97.9 -
68.5 37.3 104.6 128.7 79.2 - -
- 678.4 929.6 1076.1 1159.9 1846.2 1971.8 
- 672.4 923.6 1070.1 1153.9 1833.1 1958.7 
- 408.7 567.0 659.3 712.1 1107.7 1186.8 
- 240.1 333.0 387.2 418.2 650.5 697.0 
- 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 74.9 74.9 
_ 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 13.1 13.1 
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Table B.7. (continued) 
13-23 24-27 28-53 54 
Agricultural output 3074.0 3308.9 3829.7 4102.7 
Domestic currency 2503.2 2677.0 3062.5 3062.5 
Foreign currency 879.4 940.5 1075.8 1075.8 
Agricultural income foregone 308.6 308.6 308.6 308.6 
Total investment - - - -
Domestic currency - - - -
Construciton and equipment - - - -
Labor - - - -
Assistance and supervision - - - -
Administratives costs - - - -
Farm development - - - -
Foreign currency - - - -
Operating costs 2118.3 2139.3 2181.1 2181.1 
Domestic currency 2105.2 2126.2 2168.0 2168.0 
Production costs 1279.1 1292.3 1318.6 1318.6 
Labor 751.2 759.0 774.5 774.5 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 74.9 74.9 74.9 74.9 
Foreign currency 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 
Salvage value — - - 273.0 
Table B.8. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, Olmos project 
Item 
Feasibility studies 
base year = 1974 
(million soles) 
Total output 2243.3 
Domestic currency 1642.1 
Foreign currency 601.2 
Total investment 5337.6 
Domestic currency 3022.0 
Materials and equipment 107.8 
Labor 478.2 
Assistance and supervision 343.3 
Agricultural development cost 2092.7 
Foreign currency 2315.6 
Operating cost 1547.5 
Production costs 839.7 
Labor 687.1 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 15.9 
Foreign currency 4.8 
T^he output and production costs adjustments have been made according to 
table B.9. 
R^ate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
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Adjusted 
Deflator^  1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
5444.3 77.8 
3985.2 56.9 
1459.1 20.9 
11396.4 162.8 
6834.7 97.6 
1.98 213.4 3.1 
3.76 1797.9 25.7 
1.98 679.7 9.7 
1.98 4143.5 59.2 
1.97 4561.7 65.2 
3157.9 45.1 
1714.3 24.5 
1402.6 20.0 
1.98 31.5 0.5 
1.97 9.5 0.1 
Table B.9. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production and costs, Olmos 
project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production 
Product hectares per hectare 
No. % Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
Cotton 22737 24.0 13089 41824 
Oil seeds 20144 21.2 10798 36469 
Rice 6825 7.2 14300 50985 
Maize 4331 4.6 18702 24991 
Oranges 2600 2.7 33731 42240 
Lemons 1000 1.1 28600 41880 
Bananas 2800 2.9 31607 66264 
Avocado 1387 1.5 35977 126628 
Mango 700 0.7 19000 39967 
Pineapple 300 0.3 24333 82160 
Vegetables 4097 4.3 38028 51350 
Repeat 8200 8.6 8488 20723 
Livestock 19830 20.9 44170 99196 
Total 94951 100.0 21804 53231 
Poultry 
Total project 
F^easibility study projection (base year = 1966). 
b 
1976 prices. 
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Production costs 
per hectare 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
Gross production Production costs 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted* Adjusted^  
(million soles) 
11025 
9096 
7525 
10713 
16000 
15320 
16960 
28360 
6150 
9936 
17950 
3475 
30919 
14721 
26470 
23823 
23970 
15620 
22425 
22145 
27193 
75620 
9877 
33140 
21044 
7315 
58479 
30509 
297.6 
217.5 
97.6 
81.0 
87.7 
28.6 
88.5 
49.9 
13.3 
7.3 
155.8 
69.6 
875.9 
2070.3 
173.0 
2243.3 
950.9 
734.6 
348.0 
108.2 
109.8 
• 41.9 
185.3 
175.6 
28.0 
24.6 
210.4 
169.9 
1967.1 
5054.3 
390.0 
5444.3 
250.7 
183.2 
51.4 
46.4 
41.6 
15.3 
47.5 
39.3 
4.3 
3.0 
73.5 
28.5 
613.1 
1397.8 
129.0 
1526.8 
601.8 
479.9 
163.6 
67.6 
58.3 
22.1 
76.1 
104.9 
6.9 
9.9 
86.2 
60.0 
1159.6 
2896.6 
220.0 
3116.9 
Tablé B.IO. Olmos project: Benefits, costs by year (at market prices) 
Item 
Year: 1 2 3 
Agricultural output (B^ ) - - -
Domestic currency (B*) - - -
Foreign currency (<) - - -
Total investment (K^ ) 50.4 213.2 233. 9 
Domestic currency (Kf) 45.8 99.2 106. 3 
Materials and equipment 13.4 11.0 11. 0 
Labor 17.7 53.2 60. 3 
Assistance and supervision 14.7 35.0 35. 0 
Agricultural development test - - -
Foreign currency (K^ ) 4.6 114.0 127. 6 
Operating costs (C^ ) - - -
Domestic currency (C*) - - -
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative ocsts 
Foreign currency (C^ ) 
244b 
6 7 8 9 10 11 
(million soles) 
- - - 217.8 408.3 653.3 909.9 1301.2 
- - - 159.4 298.9 478.2 666.1 952.5 
- - - 58.4 109.4 175.1 243.8 348.7 
427.9 650.3 746.1 561.3 665.5 411.3 436.7 470.2 
154.3 221.7 262.5 219.4 246.0 201.6 208.7 219.4 
11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
108.3 175.7 216.5 99.4 126.0 81.6 88.7 99.4 
35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 
- - - 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 
273.6 428.6 483.6 341.9 419.5 209.7 228.0 250.8 
- - - 159.4 274.8 415.0 561.5 785.9 
- - - 149.9 265.3 405.9 552.0 776.4 
- - - 65.1 128.6 205.7 286.3 409.7 
- - - 53.3 105.2 168.3 234.2 335.2 
- - - 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 
9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Table B.IO. (continued) 
Item 12 13 14 15 
Agricultural output 1709.5 2155.9 2645.9 3190.4 
Domestic currency 1251.4 1578.1 1936.8 2335.4 
Foreign currency 458.1 577.8 709.1 855.0 
Total investment 439.9 676.7 502.9 420.0 
Domestic currency 198.3 248.1 233.9 196.6 
Materials and equipment 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Labor 83.3 133.1 118.9 81.6 
Assistance and supervision 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Agricultural development cost 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 
Foreign currency 241.6 428.6 269.0 223.4 
Operating costs 1019.7 1275.3 1555.7 1867.5 
Domestic currency 1010.2 1265.8 1546.2 1858.0 
Production costs 538.3 678.9 833.1 1004.6 
Labor 440.4 555.4 681.6 821.9 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 
Foreign currency 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 
245b 
16 17 18 19 20 
(million soles) 
21 22 23 
3605.9 4066.8 4431.7 4845.4 5014.1 5112.1 5166.6 5242.9 
2639.5 2976.8 3244.0 3546.8 3670.3 3742.1 3782.0 3837.8 
966.4 1090.0 1187.7 1298.6 1343.8 1370.0 1384.6 1405.1 
388.1 356.0 222.6 200.1 94.4 94.4 94.4 94.4 
196.6 196.6 145.1 145.1 89.4 89.4 89.4 89.4 
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
81.6 81.6 30.1 30.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 
191.5 159.4 77.5 55.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
2132.4 2369.3 2578.1 2815.0 2911.6 2967.7 2998,9 , 3042.6 
2122.9 2359.8 2568.6 2805.5 2902.1 2958.2 2989.4 3033.1 
1150.3 1280.6 1395.4 1525.7 1578.8 1609.7 1626.9 1650.9 
941.1 1047.7 1141.7 1248.3 1291.8 1317.0 1331.0 1350.7 
31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 
9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 
245c 
Table B.IO. (continued) 
Item 24 25 26 27-62 
Agricultural output 5302.7 5335.4 5389.9 5444.3 
Domestic currency 3881.6 3905.4 3945.4 3985.2 
Foreign currency 1421.1 1430.0 1444.5 1459.1 
Total investment 94.4 94.4 94.4 74.0 
Domestic currency 89.4 89.4 89.4 74.0 
Materials and equipment 6.0 6.0 6.0 -
Labor 4.4 4.4 4.4 -
Assistance and supervision 5.0 5.0 5.0 -
Agricultural development cost 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 
Foreign currency 4.5 4.5 4.5 -
Operating costs 3076.8 3095.5 3126.7 3157.9 
Domestic currency 3067.3 3086.0 3117.2 3148.4 
Production costs 1669.7 1680.0 1697.1 1714.3 
Labor 1366.1 1374.5 1388.6 1402.6 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 
Foreign currency 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Table B.ll. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, 
Majes project 
Item 
Feasibility studies 
base year = 1974 
(million soles) 
Total output 
Domestic currency 
Foreign currency 
Total investment 
Domestic currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Labor 
Assistance and supervision 
Administrative costs 
Farm development 
Foreign currency 
Operating costs 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency 
3622.9 
2174.0 
448.9 
10906.3 
9292.6 
1419.0 
243.0 
1040.6 
1580.0 
310.0 
4700.0 
1613.7 
1746.6 
968.5 
712.1 
59.3 
6.7 
The output and production costs adjustments have been made 
according to table B.12. 
Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
246b 
Adjusted 
Deflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars) 
4874.8 69.6 
4270.0 61.0 
604.0 8.6 
14757.6 210.8 
12740.5 182.0 
1.22 1730.6 24.7 
1.46 354.8 5.1 
1.69 1758.6 25.1 
1.35 2133.0 30.5 
1.35 418.5 6.0 
1.35 6345.0 90.6 
1.25 2017.1 28.8 
2495.4 35.6 
1386.3 19.8 
1019.1 14.6 
1.35 80.0 1.1 
1.50 10.0 0.1 
Table B.12. Unadjusted and adjsuted gross production and costs, Majes 
project at full output 
Gross production 
per hectare 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) 
Alfalfa 19630.1 26.2 25370 43998 
Com (forage) 13889.0 18.5 11485 19733 
Com (feed) 6665.0 8.9 20179 27974 
Wheat 9863.6 13.2 16034 35683 
Potato 2750.8 3.7 60999 84235 
Beans 4008.4 5.3 17717 23032 
Cotton 2850.7 3.8 19200 40344 
Vegetables 5279.1 7.0 41385 49268 
Barley 3155.1 4.2 11327 16792 
Fruits 6094.8 8.2 73647 69326 
Onion 410.7 0.5 64800 73563 
Garlic 410.7 0.5 64800 74965 
Total 75008.0 100.0 26888 38819 
Livestock 
Total project 
F^easibility study projection (base year = 1974). 
1^976 prices. 
Cultivated 
Product hectares 
No. % 
247b 
Production costs Gross production Production costs 
per hectare 
Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  Unadjusted^  Adjusted^  
(soles) (million soles) (million soles) 
12258 20350 498.0 863.7 240.6 399.5 
11409 21040 159.5 ' 274.1 158.5 292.1 
12207 19778 134.5 186.4 81.4 131.8 
7510 17350 158.1 352.0 74.1 171.1 
37840 50408 167.8 231.7 104.1 138.7 
8793 11430 71.0 92.3 35.2 45.8 
12996 25194 54.7 115.0 37.0 71.8 
19907 26180 218.5 260.1 105.1 138.2 
6613 12705 35.7 53.0 20.9 40.1 
20101 21306 448.9 422.5 122.5 129.8 
31616 39689 26.6 30.2 13.0 16.3 
34046 67700 26.6 30.8 14.0 27.8 
13417 21372 2016.7 2911.8 1006.4 1603.1 
- - 1606.2 1963.0 674.2 802.3 
_ 3622.9 4874.8 1680.6 2405.4 
Table B.13. Majes project: Benefits, costs by year (at market prices) 
Item 
Year 1 2 3 
Agricultural output CB^ ) - - -
Domestic currency - - -
Foreign currency - - -
Total investment (Kt) 119.4 358.2 1191.7 
Domestic currency (K°) 94.2 284.5 919.6 
Materials 19.1 77.3 258.6 
Equipment 3.5 12.0 49.1 
Labor 54.3 98.9 254.8 
Assistance and supervision 13.4 79.8 298.5 
Administrative costs 3.9 16.5 58.6 
Farm development - - -
Foreign currency (Kj) 25.2 73.7 272.1 
Operating costs (C^ ) - - -
Domestic currency (<) - - -
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency (C^ ) 
Salvage value (V^ ) 
248b 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(million soles) 
-
- -
- 158.0 298.0 417.6 742.4 
-
-
-
- 138.4 262.2 365.8 650.3 
-
- -
- 19.6 35.8 51.8 92.1 
1900.6 2153.7 1986.5 1400.1 634.0 634.0 698.0 825.0 
1447.7 1639.1 1466.2 1242.2 634.0 634.0 698.0 825.0 
393.0 451.0 377.2 154.4 - - - -
85.6 97.4 79.5 27.7 - - - -
377.3 420.7 391.7 160.9 - - - -
495.4 561.1 517.2 167,6 - - - -
96.4 108.9 100.6 33.6 - - - -
-
-
- 698.0 634.0 634.0 698.0 825.0 
452.9 514.6 520.3 157.9 - - - -
-
-
- - 125.3 162.4 307.2 476.1 
-
-
-
- 115.3 152.4 297.2 466.1 
-
-
-
- 20.2 41.7 125.1 222.4 
-
- -
- 15.1 30.7 92.1 163.7 
-
-
— 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 
— 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Table B.13. (continued) 
Item 
12 13 14 15 
Agricultural output 1206.3 1966.5 2732.2 3550.7 
Domestic currency 1056.6 1722.5 2393.2 2935.0 
Foreign currency 149.7 244.0 339.0 415.7 
Total investment 888.0 968.0 1000.0 -
Domestic currency 888.0 968.0 1000.0 -
Materials - - - -
Equipment - - - -
Labor - - - -
Assistance and supervision - - - -
Administrative costs - - - -
Farm development 888.0 968.0 1000.0 -
Foreign currency - - - -
Operating costs 717.3 1031.0 1320.4 1561.7 
Domestic currency 707.3 1021.0 1310.4 1551.7 
Production costs 361.3 542.0 708.7 847.7 
Labor 266.0 399.0 521.7 624.0 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 
Foreign currency 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Salvage value — - - -
248d 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22-56 57 
3862.0 4143.0 4329.3 4561.3 4654.1 4874.8 4874.8 7145.8 
3629.0 3629.0 3792.0 3995.4 4076.7 4270.0 4270.0 4270.0 
479.1 514.0 537.1 565.9 577.4 604.8 604.8 604.8 
1923.7 2140.7 2237.2 2357.9 2406.1 2495.4 2495.4 2495.4 
1913.7 2130.7 2227.2 2347.9 2396.1 2485.4 2485.4 2485.4 
1056.2 1181.2 1236.8 1306.3 1334.1 1386.3 1386.3 1386.3 
777.5 869.5 910.4 961.6 982.0 1019.1 1019.1 1019.1 
80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
80.0 
10.0 
2271.0 
Table B.14. Unadjsuted and adjusted output and cost data, 
Ilo II project 
Feasibility studies 
base year = 1975 
(million soles) 
Total output^ 1193.2 
Total investment 5114.0 
Domestic currency 2047.9 
Materials 541.1 
Equipment 790.2 
Labor 507.6 
Working capital 209.0 
Foreign currency 3066.1 
Materials 53.9 
Equipment 2672.0 
Know How 340.2 
Operating costs^ 538.4 
Domestic currency 316.5 
Production costs 157.5 
Labor 119.0 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 40.0 
Foreign currency 221.9 
R^ate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
A^nnual gross production at full capacity, 
c 
Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
249b 
Adjusted 
Deflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
1.98 2362.5 33.7 
5891.9 84.1 
2662.3 38.0 
1.31 708.8 10.1 
1.25 987.7 14.1 
1.41 "715 .-8 10.2 
1.20 250.0 3.6 
3229.6 46.1 
1.06 57.1 0.8 
1.06 2832.3 40.4 
340.2 4.9 
719.9 10.3 
404.8 5.8 
1.20 189.0 2.7 
1.41 167.8 2.4 
1.20 48.0 0.7 
1.42 315.1 4.5 
Table B.15. Ilo II project: Benefits, costs by year (at market prices) 
Item Year : 1 2 3 
Total output 
(foreign currency) 
(Bt) - - -
Total investment (K^) 1462.8 2694.0 1735.1 
Domestic currency (K°) 534.6 1146.1 981.6 
Materials 80.3 390.5 238.0 
Equipment 226.7 507.4 253.6 
Labor 227.6 248.2 240.0 
Working capital 
-
- 250.0 
Foreign currency (%[) 928.2 1574.9 753.5 
Operating costs (C^) - - -
Domestic currency (C°) - - -
Production costs - - -
Labor - - -
Maintenance and 
administrative costs - . - -
Foreign currency (<) - - -
Working capital and 
salvage value (V,) - - -
250b 
7-22 23 
2000.3 2157.7 2268.0 2362.5 2841.5 
719.9 719.9 719.9 719.9 719.9 
404.8 404.8 404.8 404.8 404.8 
189.0 189.0 189.0 189.0 189.0 
167.8 167.8 167.8 167.8 167.8 
48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 
315.1 315.1 315,1 315.1 315.1 
479.0 
251 
Table B.16. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, Cajamar 
quilla project 
Feasibility studies, base year = 1976 
Item 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
Total output 3002.8 42.9 
Total investment 11504.9 164.4 
Domestic currency 4593.8 65.6 
Materials 932.8 13.3 
Equipment 2637.2 37.7 
Labor 621.9 8.9 
Administrative costs 58.6 0.8 
Working capital 343.3 4.9 
Foreign currency 6911.1 98.8 
Materials 751.2 10.7 
Equipment 5064.3 72.4 
Assistance and supervision 1095.6 15.7 
Operating costs 1045.3 14.9 
Domestic currency 728.4 10.4 
Inputs and materials 437.3 6.3 
Labor 266.8 3.8 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 24.3 0.3 
Foreign currency 316.9 4.5 
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
^Annual gross production at full capacity. 
^Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
Table B.17. Cajamarquilla project: Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item Year 1 2 3 
Total output 
(foreign currency) 
-
-
-
Total investment <V 539.2 3865.3 4463.6 
Domestic currency (<) 222.3 1128.7 1783.9 
Materials 102.6 727.6 46.6 
Equipment 1.9 274.6 1363.9 
Labor 111.9 111.9 298.5 
Administrative costs 5.9 14.6 23.4 
Working capital - - 51.5 
Foreign currency (<) 316.9 2736.6 2679.7 
Operating costs (C^ ) - - -
Domestic currency (Cj) - - -
Production costs - - -
Labor - - -
Maintenance and 
administrative costs - - -
Foreign currency (<) - - -
Working capital and 
salvage value — — -
252b 
6 7 8-18 19 
(million soles) 
2492.3 3002.8 3002.8 3002.8 4499.9 
2456.5 180.3 - - -
1424.1 34.8 - - -
56.0 — — — — — 
962.0 34.8 — — — — 
99.6 _ _ — — — 
14.7 — — — — — 
291.8 — — — — — 
1032.4 145.5 — - — — 
867.7 1045.3 1045.3 1045.3 1045.3 
604.6 728.4 728.4 728.4 728.4 
363.0 437.3 437.3 437.3 437.3 
221.4 266.8 266.8 266.8 266.8 
20.2 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 
263.1 316.9 316.9 316.9 316.9 
1497.1 
Table B.18. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, Michiquillay 
project 
Item 
Feasibility studies 
base year = 1975 
(million soles) 
Total output 
Total investment 
Domestic currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Labor 
Assistance and supervision 
Administrative costs 
Working capital 
Foreign currency 
Operating costs^  
Domestic currency 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency 
5628.3 
29910.4 
21495.6 
2583.6 
12971.8 
499.8 
1454.5 
2170.9 
1815.0 
8414.8 
3971.7 
2732.6 
1401.4 
642.6 
688.6 
1239.1 
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
^Annual gross production at full capacity. 
^Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
253b 
Adjusted 
Deflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
1.98 11144.0 159.2 
35752.5 510.7 
26832.8 383.3 
1.31 3384.5 48.3 
1.25 16214.8 231.6 
1.41 705.0 10.1 
1.20 1745.4 24.9 
1.20 2605.1 37.2 
1.20 2178.0 31.1 
1.06 8919.7 127.4 
4727.6 67.5 
3414.1 48.8 
1.20 1681.7 24.0 
1.41 906.1 12.9 
1.20 826.3 11.8 
1.06 1313.5 18.7 
Table B.19. Mchiquillay project: Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item Year: 1 2 3 
Total output 
(foreign currency) 
-
-
-
Total investment (Kt) 4824.8 5045.9 6238.1 
Domestic currency 3130.1 3440.4 4543.4 
Materials 637.8 517.9 562.3 
Equipment 1852.2 2161.0 2932.7 
Assistance and supervision 296.7 261.8 314.2 
Labor 135.0 135.0 135.0 
Administrative costs 208.4 364.7 599.2 
Working capital - - -
Foreign currency 
r
t 1694.7 1605.5 1694.7 
Operating costs (C^) - - -
Domestic currency (c") - - -
Production costs - - -
Labor - - -
Maintenance and 
administrative costs - - -
Foreign currency (<) - - -
Working capital and 
salvage value (VJ — 
254b 
6 7 8 9 10 
(million soles) 
7847.0 8890.0 9240.0 10353.0 
8431.2 6767.1 3508.9 932.9 
6022.9 5607.5 3152.0 932.9 
752.1 1139.3 554.5 
4013.2 3550.1 926.2 
471.3 314.2 87.2 
135.0 135.0 30.0 
651.3 468.9 312.6 
1241.5 932.9 
2408.3 1159.6 356.9 
3660.5 4309.3 4315.1 4425.6 
2429.6 2964.7 2998.0 3150.2 
697.2 1232.3 1265.6 1417.8 
906.1 906.1 906.1 906.1 
826.3 826.3 826.3 826.3 
1230.9 1344.6 1317.1 1275.4 
254c 
Table B.19. (continued) 
Item 11 12-21 22-25 26 
Total output 
(foreign currency) 
10950.0 11144. ,0 8436. ,0 11427.4 
Total investment - - - -
Domestic currency - - - -
Materials - - - -
Equipment -
Assistance and supervision - - - -
Labor 
- -
- -
Administrative costs - - - -
Working capital - - • — -
Foreign currency - - - -
Operating costs 4741.4 4727. 6 4384. 2 3876.2 
Domestic currency 3414.5 3414. 1 3106. 0 2598.0 
Production costs 1682.1 1681. 7 1373. 6 865.6 
Labor 906.1 906. 1 906. 1 906.1 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 826.3 826. 3 826. 3 826.3 
Foreign currency 1326.9 1313. 5 1278. 2 1278.2 
Working capital and 
salvage value . 2991.4 
Table B.20. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data Cerro Verde 
II, project 
Item 
Feasibility studies 
base year = 1975 
(million soles) 
Total output 
Total Investment 
Domestic currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Labor 
Administrative costs 
Working capital 
Foreign currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Assistance and supervision 
c 
operating costs 
Domestic currency 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency 
10970.2 
77681.9 
35264.6 
21125.6 
3672.9 
3746.8 
3569.3 
3150.0 
42417.3 
19290.0 
20838.3 
2289.0 
7151.8 
6450.2 
5540.2 
490.0 
420.0 
701.6 
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
^Annual gross production at full capacity. 
^Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
255b 
Adjusted 
Deflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
1.98 21721.0 310.3 
- 90435.7 1291.9 
- 45610.7 651.6 
1.31 27674.5 395.4 
1.25 4591.1 65.5 
1.41 5281.9 75.5 
1.20 4283.2 61.2 
1.20 3780.0 54.0 
- 44825.0 640.3 
1.06 20447.4 292.1 
1.06 22088.6 315.5 
- 2289.0 32.7 
- 8685.3 124.1 
- 7843.4 112.1 
1.20 6648.5 95.0 
1.41 690.9 9.9 
1.20 504.0 7.2 
1.20 841.9 12.0 
Table B.21. Cerro Verde II project; Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item 
Year 1 2 3 
Total output • — - -
Domestic currency (B°) - - -
Foreign currency <®t> - - -
Total investment (Kj) 18197.7 24263.5 26863.3 
Domestic currency 8768.0 11690.6 12943.4 
Materials 5811.6 7748.8 8579.2 
Equipment 947.7 1263.6 1399.0 
Labor 1109.2 1478.9 1637.8 
Administrative costs 899.5 1199.3 1327.8 
Working capital - - -
Foreign currency (<) 9429.7 12572.9 13919.9 
Operating costs (C,) - - -
Domestic currency (C*) - - -
Production costs - - -
Labor - - -
Maintenance and 
administrative costs - - -
Foreign currency (Ct) - - -
Working capital and 
salvage value (VJ 
256b 
4 5-9 10-18 19 
(million soles) 
19594.0 21721.0 31485.7 
879.7 1086.0 1086.0 
18714.3 20635.0 20635.0 
21111.2 - - -
12208.7 -
5534.9 — — — 
980.8 - - -
1056.4 - - -
856.6 — — — 
3780.0 — — — 
8902.5 - - -
8061. 2 8685. 3 8685.3 
7219. 3 7843. 4 7843.4 
5965. 2 6648. 5 6648.5 
690. 9 690. 9 690.9 
563. 2 504. 0 504.0 
841. 9 841. 9 841.9 
9764.1 
Table B.22. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data. 
La Paapilla project 
Item Feasibility studies 
base year =1974 
(million soles) 
Total output 
Total investment 
Domestic currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Labor 
Assistance and supervision 
General expenses 
Working capital 
Foreign currency 
Material 
Equipment 
Assistance and supervision 
Operating costs 
Domestic currency 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency 
4247.7 
4149.6 
1487.0 
566.9 
167.8 
246.1 
11.3 
178.4 
316.5 
2662.6 
3.3 
1554.0 
1105.3 
2918.7 
2848.1 
2582.0 
38.5 
227.6 
70.6 
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70. 
^Annual gross production at full capacity. 
Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
257b 
Adjusted 
Deflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)* 
4.00 16990.6 242.7 
5633.3 80.5 
2194.7 31.3 
1.50 850.4 12.1 
1.46 245.0 3.6 
1.69 416.0 5.9 
1.35 15.2 0.2 
1.35 240.8 3.4 
1.35 427.3 6.1 
3438.6 49.1 
1.20 4.0 0.1 
1.25 1942.5 27.7 
1.35 1492.1 21.3 
10842.9 154.9 
10700.3 152.9 
4.00 10327.9 147.6 
1.69 65.1 0.9 
1.35 307.3 4.4 
2.02 142.6 2.0 
Table B.23. La Pampilla project: Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item Year: 1 2 3 
Total output - - -
Domestic currency 
-
- -
Foreign currency 
- - -
Total investment 543.4 1280.2 2316.6 
Domestic currency (KJ) 209.8 543.6 776.7 
Materials • 39.1 345.0 342.3 
Equipment 2.7 30.6 146.8 
Labor 104.0 104.0 104.0 
Assistance and supervision 3.8 3.8 3.8 
General expenses 60.2 60.2 60.2 
Working capital 
-
- 119.6 
Foreign currency (Kf) 333.6 736.6 1539.9 
Operating costs (C^ ) 
Domestic currency (c") 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency (C^ ) 
Working capital and 
salvage value (V^) 
258b 
7 8 
(million soles) 
10-22 23 
5097.0 
3134.7 
1962.3 
1493.1 
664.6 
124.0 
64.9 
104.0 
3.8 
60.2 
307.7 
828.5 
3252.9 
3210.1 
3098.4 
19.5 
16990.8 16990.8 16990.8 12049.3 12606.4 
10449.3 10449.3 10449.3 12049.3 12049.3 
2943.7 4906.7 6541.5 6541.5 6541.5 
7645.9 12743.1 
4702.2 7837.0 
4879.2 8132.0 10842.9 10842.9 10842.9 10842.9 10842.9 
4815.0 8025.0 10700.3 10700.3 10700.3 10700.3 10700.3 
4647.4 7745.8 10327.9 10327.9 10327.9 10327.9 10327.9 
29.3 48.8 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 
92.2 138.3 
42.8 
230.4 
64.2 107.0 
307.3 307.3 307.3 307.3 307.3 
142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 
557.1 
Table B.24. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data. Steel Plant, 
project 
Item Feasibility studies base year = 1974 
(million soles) 
Total output 
Total investment 
Domestic currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Labor 
Assistance and supervision 
Working capital 
Foreign currency 
Operating costs^  
Domestic currency 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administration costs 
Foreign currency 
22189.1 
47801.2 
28997.5 
7736.9 
3292.5 
5036.1 
5232.0 
7700.0 
18803.7 
11430.2 
11198.1 
9332.5 
1144.6 
721.0 
232.1 
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.?0.0. 
^Annual gross production at full capacity. 
"^Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
259b 
Adjusted 
ïflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)* 
1.61 35791.1 511.3 
65907.2 941.5 
42402.6 605.7 
1.50 11606.3 165.8 
1.46 4807.1 68.7 
1.69 8511.0 121.6 
1.35 7083.2 101.2 
1.35 10395.0 148.5 
1.25 23504.6 335.8 
18969.8 270.9 
18679.7 266.8 
1.69 15772.0 225.3 
1.69 1934.4 27.6 
1.35 973.3 13.9 
1.25 290.1 4.1 
Table B.25. Steel Plant project: Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item Year : 1 2 3 
Total output (Bt) - - -
Domestic currency (B^ ) - - -
Foreign currency c:) - - -
Total investment (Kt) 75.1 4565.8 16524.0 
Domestic currency (K*) 45.2 2682.1 9253.6 
Materials 16.7 1050.3 4451.1 
Equipment 6.4 398.9 1585.3 
Labor 12.3 620.0 620.0 
Assistance and supervision 9.8 612.9 2597.2 
Working capital - -
Foreign currency (K^ ) 29.9 1883.7 7270.4 
Operating costs (Ct) - - -
Domestic currency (<) - - -
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency (C^ ) 
Working capital and 
salvage value (V^) 
260b 
4 5 6 7 8 
(million soles) 
- 5368.7 13242.7 16106.0 17537.6 
- 5088.7 11142.7 13026.0 13407.6 
- 280.0 2100.0 3080.0 4130.0 
11509. 7 6040.7 3407.0 4382.2 3754.3 
6456. 6 3281.8 1876.9 3080.0 2063.5 
2825. 5 568.1 368.2 484.4 703.3 
1070. 9 472.2 267.9 247.9 330.4 
620. 0 620.0 620.0 620.0 620.0 
1940. 2 331.5 214.8 282.7 409.8 
- 1290.0 406.0 1445.0 -
5053. 1 2758.9 1530.1 1302.2 1690.8 
- 3546.3 7439.3 8854.9 9562.8 
- 3502.8 7331.9 8724.4 9420.6 
- 2555.1 5949.2 7183.4 7800.5 
- 290.2 715.7 870.5 947.9 
- 657.5 667.0 670.5 672.2 
— 43.5 107.4 130.5 142.2 
Table B.25. (continued) 
Item ' 1° 11 
Total output 
Domestic currency 
Foreign currency 
Total investment 
Domestic currency 
Materials 
Equipment 
Labor 
Assistance and supervision 
Working capital 
Foreign currency 
Operating costs 
Domestic currency 
Production costs 
Labor 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency 
Working capital and 
salvage value 
19327.2 21116.7 24337.9 
13797.2 13696.7 15937.9 
5530.0 7420.0 8400.0 
2228.9 1517.7 1509.7 
1760.1 3181.4 1235.1 
262.2 116.0 116.0 
99.4 33.5 53.9 
620.0 620.0 620.0 
153.0 67.7 67.7 
625.5 544.2 377.5 
468.8 136.3 274.6 
10829.8 11714.5 13307.2 
10673.2 11543.4 13110.0 
8675.2 9446.5 10835.1 
1044.6 1141.3 1315.4 
953.4 955.3 959.5 
156.6 171.1 197.1 
260d 
12 13 14 15 16-24 
(million soles) 
25 
35791.1 45568.6 
18991.1 18991.1 
16800.0 16800.0 
25411.7 
14981.7 
10430.0 
2478.2 
2199.7 
346.6 
81.0 
620.0 
202.3 
949.8 
278.5 
13838.0 
13632.1 
11297.9 
1373.4 
960.8 
205.9 
27917.1 
15667.1 
12250.0 
2978.8 
2410.1 
150.9 
101.2 
620.0 
88.0 
1450.0 
568.7 
15076.6 
14850.4 
11277.8 
1508.8 
963.8 
226.2 
30422.4 
16632.4 
13790.0 
3732.4 
3540.8 
90.0 
45.2 
620.0 
85.6 
2700.0 
191.6 
16315.4 
16068.8 
13457.8 
1644.2 
966.8 
246.6 
32927.8 
16127.8 
16900.0 
1202.7 
1135.7 
57.0 
13.0 
458.7 
607.0 
67.0 
17553.2 
17286.4 
14536.9 
1779.6 
969.9 
266.8 
18969.8 
18979.7 
15772.0 
1934.4 
973.3 
290.1 
18969.8 
18679.7 
15772.0 
1934.4 
973.3 
290.1 
9777.5 
Table B.26. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data. Fertilizer, 
proj ect 
Feasibility studies 
Item base year = 1971 
(million soles) 
Total output^  588.0 
Total investment 1870.2 
Domestic currency 780.6 
Materials 50.1 
Equipment 365.9 
Labor 109.6 
General expenses 44.6 
Working capital 210.4 
Foreign currency 1089.6 
Materials 31.2 
Equipment 1058.4 
Operating costs^  353.5 
Inputs and materials 275.1 
Labor 13.8 
Spare parts 22.4 
Maintenance and 
administration costs 42.2 
(Foreign currency) -
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
^Annual gross production at 71 percent of full capacity. 
^Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
261b 
Adjusted 
iflator 1976 prices 
(million soles) (million dollars)^  
2.42 1423.0 20.3 
3634.8 52.0 
1661.1 23.8 
1.78 89.2 1.3 
2.02 739.1 10.6 
2.41 264.1 3.8 
2.23 99.5 1.4 
2.23 469.2 6.7 
1973.7 28.2 
1.86 58.0 0.8 
1.81 1915.7 27.4 
709.0 10.1 
1.95 536.4 7.7 
2.41 33.2 0.5 
2.02 45.3 0.6 
2.23 94.1 1.3 
(3.0) 
Table B.27. Fertilizer project: Benefits, costs by year (at market 
prices) 
Item Year; 
Total output (B^ ) - - 925.0 
(foreign currency) t' 
Total investment (K^ ) 930.8 2704.0 
Domestic currency (^ ) 358.5 1202.6 
Materials 26.0 63.2 
Equipment 227.0 412.1 
Labor 76.6 187.5 
General expenses 28.9 70.6 
Working capital - 469.2 
Foreign currency (K^ ) 572.3 1501.4 
Operating costs (C^ ) - - 521.3 
Domestic currency (C^ ) - - 518.3 
Production costs - - 348.7 
Labor - - 33.2 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs - - 136.4 
Foreign currency (cf) - - 3.0 
Working capital and 
salvage value (V^ ) -
262b 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(million soles) 
996.1 1067.2 1138.4 1209.5 1280.7 1351.8 1366.1 
- - -
-
-
-
-
568.3 600.6 629.1 651.6 670.9 680.0 686.5 
565.3 597.6 626.1 648.6 667.9 677.0 683.5 
395.9 428.0 456.5 479.0 498.3 507.4 513.9 
33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 
136.4 136.4 136.4 136.4 136.4 136.4 136.4 
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
-
-
-
-
- -
262c 
Table B.27. (continued) 
Item ' 11 12 .13-16 17 
Total output 
(foreign currency) 
1380.3 1394.5 1423.0 2176.2 
Total investment - - - -
Domestic currency - - - -
Materials - - - -
Equipment - - - -
Labor - - - -
General expenses - - - -
Working capital - - - -
Foreign currency - - - -
Operating costs 692.9 699.3 709.0 709.0 
Domestic currency 689.9 696.3 706.0 706.0 
Production costs 520.3 526.7 536.4 536.4 
Labor 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 136.4 136.4 136.4 136.4 
Foreign currency 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Working capital and 
salvage value 753.2 
Table B.28. Unadjusted and adjusted output and cost data, 
Yura project 
Feasibility studies 
base year = 1974 
(million solez) 
Total output^  259.4 
Total investment 1075.1 
Domestic currency 557.3 
Materials 136.9 
Equipment 198.0 
Labor 75.7 
Assistance and supervision 41.3 
General expenses 105.4 
Foreign currency 517.8 
Operating costs^  154.4 
Production costs 108.9 
Labor 16.3 
Maintenance and 
administration costs 29c2 
(Foreign currency) 
^Rate of exchange US $1.0 = s/.70.0. 
^Annual gross production at full capacity. 
^Annual operating costs at full capacity. 
263b 
Adjusted 
Deflator  ^
(million soles) (million dollars) 
1.91 495.4 7.1 
1467.7 21.0 
820.4 11.6 
1.50 205.4 2.9 
1.46 289.0 4.1 
1.69 127.9 1.8 
1.35 55.8 0.8 
1.35 142.3 2.0 
1.25 647.3 9.4 
252.4 3.6 
1.69 184.0 2.6 
1.69 27.5 0.4 
1.35 39.4 0.6 
(1.5) 
Table B.29. Yura project: Benefits, costs by year (at market prices) 
Item 
Year: 
Total output (B^ ) 
Domestic currency (B°) -
Foreign currency (B^ ) 
Total investment (K^ ) 312.8 
Domestic currency (K^ ) 135.4 
Materials 
Equipment 45.4 
Labor 25.9 
Assistance and supervision 16.7 
General expenses 47.4 
Foreign currency (K^ ) 177.4 
Operating costs (C^ ) 
Domestic currency (C^ ) 
Production costs 
Labor -
Maintenance and 
administrative costs 
Foreign currency (C^ ) 
Salvage value (V^ ) 
264b 
2 3 4 5-17 18 
731.1 
341.6 
92.4 
134.1 
51.0 
16.7 
47.4 
389.5 
423.8 
343.4 
113.0 
109.5 
51.0 
22.4 
47.5 
80.4 
495.4 495.4 
446.0 446.0 
49.4 49.4 
252.4 
250.9 
184.0 
27.5 
39.4 
1.5 
252.4 
250.9 
184.0 
27.5 
39.4 
1.5 
576.4 
446.0 
49.4 
252.4 
250.9 
184.0 
27.5 
39.4 
1.5 
81.0 
